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As my writing has unfolded over the years it was not until recently that I was able 
to see the connections between my seemingly varied interests. In retrospect I have 
always been writing about religion and science, or at least religion and knowledge, 
but in recent years I became involved with the “religion and science debate.” This 
is an interdisciplinary group of scholars who examine the relationship between 
these institutions from normative and empirical perspectives. This involvement 
was largely at the hand of Ron Numbers, who I think I first met at a conference 
on secularism at Chapel Hill in 2001, and since then he has slowly worked toward 
bringing me into this academic world, and particularly toward bringing me into 
conversation with historians. I have greatly enjoyed being a sociologist among the 
historians, and thank Ron for his sponsorship and friendship.
Over the years, as I have tried to understand this phenomenon sociologically, I 
have written a number of articles and chapters for books that address various fac-
ets of the broader issues examined in this book. Now that I have tried to synthesize 
all of the earlier partial attempts into one book, my perspective has changed a bit. 
Themes from these earlier articles survive in this book. While it is primarily only 
the embryonic ideas from these earlier papers that survive, I have left unchanged 
some paragraphs from two of the original texts, so as to not reinvent the wheel.1 
I need to acknowledge the intellectual work of Michael Evans (no relation), who 
 co-authored a few of these articles, including one from which a few pages are 
reproduced in Chapter 4.
The ideas now summarized in this book benefitted greatly from presenta-
tions to audiences. Thanks to the audience at the “Beyond the Creation-Evolution 
Controversy: Science and Religion in Public Life Conference” of the Program on 
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If you are going to disagree with your adversary in a debate in the public sphere, I 
want you to disagree with them for the right reason. A democracy ideally requires 
knowing the views of those you disagree with, so that your true differences can be 
negotiated. As a sociologist of religion, I often am bothered by seeing debates in the 
public sphere when people who are misinformed about American  religion— typically 
nowadays these are social and political liberals—make empirical assumptions about 
their supposed adversaries that are most certainly false. These false assumptions 
distort the debate about the motives and predicted actions of adversaries in the pub-
lic sphere, and often mislead these liberals into wasting their precious resources 
chasing dragons that do not exist, when they could be focused on effectively achiev-
ing their goals, like combatting global warming. Perhaps nowhere are these false 
assumptions more extreme than in discussions of religion and science.
This book is dedicated to trying to dislodge the myth that there is, in the pub-
lic, a foundational conflict between religion and science, specifically that there is 
conflict over “ways of knowing” about the natural world. I know that discredit-
ing this myth will not be easy. In popular accounts, “religion” and “science” have 
always been at war over knowledge, with the first battle being between Galileo 
and the 17th century Catholic Church. For example, a textbook on the relation-
ship between science and religion identifies historical landmarks in the “debate” 
at least four centuries old: the “medieval synthesis,” the Copernican and Galilean 
controversies, debates over Newton’s ideas, and Darwinism.1 This narrative of con-
flict is classically indicated in the title of an 1896 book by the former president of 
Cornell University Andrew Dickson White: A History of the Warfare of Science 
with Theology in Christendom.2
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My argument is that, with a few limited exceptions, even the most conservative 
religious people in the U.S. accept science’s ability to make factual claims about 
the world. By the end of this book I hope to disabuse the reader of the idea of 
fundamental conflict over knowledge about nature, while giving the non-religious 
a more accurate reason to (potentially) disagree with (some) religious people—
namely, that religious people’s moral values are different from those promulgated 
by science. There is a moral conflict among the public between religion and science.
This is not the perspective you will get from the theologians, scientists, and his-
torians who currently dominate the discussion of religion and science, as they see 
the relationship—and thus any potential conflict—as primarily about knowledge. 
Up until very recently social scientists have also shared the knowledge conflict 
perspective. There are many reasons why these academics see this debate through 
this lens, which I will discuss in subsequent chapters. But, if we want to understand 
the relationship between contemporary religious people and science, we need to 
change our lens, or we will seriously misunderstand the situation, and seriously 
undermine our ability to have reasonable debates in the public sphere about how 
to move forward with our most pressing social problems.
To see how assumptions of a knowledge conflict are pervasive in the public 
sphere, consider global warming, one of the great moral challenges to the world. 
In global warming debates some liberals have created a dragon of religion to chase, 
wasting time, instead of focusing on what is really wrong about the public debate 
about climate change. To see the problem, let’s look at some of the discourse in the 
Huffington Post, which is a major source of information for liberals. I looked at all 
of the Huffington Post articles categorized under “climate denial” that appeared to 
discuss religion.3
To anticipate what I will discuss in much more detail below, what has struck me 
as totally wrong in liberals’ conception of religion and science is the presumption 
that religious people have a different way of knowing facts about the world than 
scientists, and that therefore if a religious person does not accept one scientific 
claim, this indicates that they will not accept any scientific claim. Therefore, the 
assumption continues, people who do not accept scientists’ claims about human 
evolution will not accept scientists’ claims about global warming.
In looking at these articles, a few have little analysis and yet leave the impres-
sion that conservative Protestants, if not all religious people, disagree with scien-
tific claims about global warming because they also believe in religious claims. For 
example, an article titled “Rush Limbaugh: ‘If You Believe In God . . . You Cannot 
Believe In Man-Made Global Warming,’” reports the comments of the prominent 
right-wing radio personality who said that “if you believe in God then intellectu-
ally you cannot believe in man-made global warming.” The reason is that “you 
must be either agnostic or atheistic to believe that man controls something he 
can’t create.”4 That is, scientific fact claims that climate is a naturalistic process are 
Introduction    3
wrong because climate is actually controlled by God. This implies there are two 
opposing versions of how nature works and, consequently, two opposing ways of 
knowing about nature. The article does not explicitly say that ordinary religious 
people would agree with Limbaugh, but implies it, giving the impression that reli-
gious people would have a nonscientific way of knowing if and why the climate is 
changing.
More analytic posts by academics similarly reinforce these false assumptions. 
Philosopher and historian Keith Parsons writes about American reverence for 
science in the 1950s, stating that “something has been lost. Fifty years ago sci-
ence was king. Science had respect; it was bigger than ideology. No longer.” He 
criticizes postmodern skepticism about truth from the left, and concludes that 
the biggest enemy of science is “big money.”5 But in his depiction of the right’s 
suspicion of science, he focuses on a religiously inspired conflict over knowledge 
claims. He writes that “the Texas State Board of Education, which is dominated by 
religious fundamentalists, prefers the propaganda of ax-grinding cranks over the 
recommendations of hundreds of qualified scientists and scholars.” His example 
of conflict is evolution: “How, indeed, has it ever come to be thought that there is 
still a scientific debate over evolution, or that pluperfect nonsense like creation-
ism is worthy of a hearing? How did there come to be a multi- million dollar ‘cre-
ation museum’ in Kentucky, with full-scale models of dinosaurs fitted out with 
saddles? (Why saddles? So Adam and Eve could ride them around Eden. Duh.)” 
Everything he writes about Texas fundamentalist Protestant beliefs and creation-
ism is probably true, but the implicit conclusion here is that the industry-funded 
skepticism of global warming science is abetted by the same fact-conflict for 
evangelicals that leads them to believe that dinosaurs needed saddles. This could 
only be the case if he presumes that conservative Protestants unwillingness to 
accept scientific claims about evolution means they will not accept any fact claim 
from science.
It should be no surprise that the most un-nuanced version of these assumptions 
comes from a prominent atheist scientist who clearly wants to portray religion in 
a negative way. In a Huffington Post article titled “The Folly of Faith,” the recently 
deceased physicist and atheist author Victor Stenger starts by writing “religion and 
science have long been at war with one another.”6 He sees a war of facts: “Religion 
is based on faith. By contrast, science is not based on faith but on objective obser-
vations of the world. This makes religion and science fundamentally incompat-
ible.” This is the pure form of the myth: there is a religious way of knowing and a 
scientific one—and they are mutually exclusive. Moreover, he writes, “nowadays, 
religious leaders and their political supporters are increasingly, and more stri-
dently, trying to define the real world on their own terms. In the process, they 
are undermining scientific consensus on issues of great consequence to humans 
everywhere, such as overpopulation and planetary climate change.”
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He then provides two pieces of evidence. One is that the Cornwall Alliance, 
which appears to be an energy-industry funded group of religious right figures, 
claims that God created a resilient planet that can withstand changes. Second, that 
there are conservative Protestant climate change deniers who feel that “it is hubris 
to think that human beings could disrupt something that God created.” Stenger 
implies that these religious-right activists represent “religion.”
In a subsequent post titled “Global Warming and Religion,” Stenger provides 
more justification for his claim of a connection between religion and global warm-
ing denial.7 He starts with poll results that showed that, while 58 percent of the 
religiously unaffiliated believed in global warming, only 50 percent of religious 
believers do, which is “evidence for a correlation between religion and global 
warming denialism.” Those trained in social statistics will recognize that this is 
at best a very weak correlation. However, he continues by noting 34 percent of 
white evangelical Protestants polled believed in global warming. One reason for 
conservative Protestants not believing in global warming is belief in Armageddon, 
he says, and then quotes as evidence the view of a Republican house member that 
climate change is a myth because God told Noah he would never destroy the Earth 
by flood again. Of course, we have no evidence that typical members of evangelical 
groups believe in this link between climate change and Armageddon, but again it 
is implied.
This type of survey data has been more closely analyzed by sociologists. The 
question is: is it the religion of evangelicals that leads them to be more skeptical 
of scientific claims about global warming, or some other characteristic that evan-
gelicals tend to have? Evangelicals are anti-elite, and conservative in the traditional 
sense of the term—suspicious of government. When you take the basic opinion 
statistics of the type Stenger uses but control for Republican party identification 
and political ideology, the religion effects disappear and conservative Protestants 
are just as much believers in global warming as are the non-religious.8 What does 
this mean? It means that there is not a religious basis for global warming denial, 
but rather the basis is other characteristics of evangelicals—probably that they 
watch too much Fox News. Stenger’s assumption about fundamentally different 
ways of knowing fact claims about the world are distracting his readers from the 
true culprits that he does identify and that they should be organizing against—the 
energy industry that funds skepticism of climate change.
In a breath of fresh air, one of the articles I reviewed on Huffington Post does 
not make the assumption of a knowledge conflict between religion and science, I 
would guess because the author is familiar with ordinary religious people. In an 
analysis of why some conservative Protestants reject the claims of scientists, the 
Reverend Jim Ball, who works for the Evangelical Environmental Network, identi-
fies a number of barriers to action for conservative Protestants.9 The first is igno-
rance, with some not knowing “what a serious threat global warming is, especially 
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to the poor and vulnerable.” The second barrier he hears about from evangelicals 
is related to knowledge and is that “the science is not settled.” He says that “this 
dodge is simply unacceptable today,” and such a person should “ask God to help 
you see the truth, to have ‘eyes to see.’” The third is “mistrust of the messengers,” 
and here he references moral conflict in the public sphere between groups: “Maybe 
you feel that scientists have disrespected your faith, or even tried to take your 
faith away from you, that environmentalists and democratic politicians don’t share 
many of your values or beliefs.” The fourth is “fear of lifestyle impacts.” The fifth is 
that people are “immobilized by inaction.” The sixth is that it is so big a challenge, 
“how can you carry another burden like global warming, especially when no one 
person can solve this problem?”
This list was written by someone who is involved with the on-the-ground evan-
gelical world, and undoubtedly encounters evangelical denialists repeatedly. Yet 
only one knowledge claim seems prominent enough in that world to make his 
list, and it is not presented as a knowledge conflict because no alternative religious 
way of knowing is presented. Indeed, that we should wait for science to settle sug-
gests belief in scientific ways of knowing. He is reporting on a close to the ground 
conflict that is not about how facts about nature are generated. To anticipate later 
chapters, Ball’s third reason for evangelical lack of action on climate change— 
mistrust of scientists’ values—is the most accurate.
WHAT IS  C ONFLICT,  AND BET WEEN WHOM?
It is amazing that in all of the few centuries of discussion of a “conflict” between 
religion and science, we have never explicitly been told what the conflict is about. 
Yes, we know the conflict is about certain scientific claims, like the age of the Earth 
or whether people can be healed via supernatural force. But, how would you rec-
ognize this conflict when you see it?
For the vast majority of scholars in the “religion vs. science” debate, the conflict 
is about incompatible ideas. For a very large portion of scholars who debate reli-
gion and science, the conflict exists only as ideas on a page—and whether these 
ideas can be logically related. For example, can we assert that Darwinian evolution 
is true while retaining the belief that God inspired those who wrote the Bible? 
If these debates simply remained intellectual puzzles at an Oxbridge High Table, 
nobody would care. But, these academic debates eventually trickle down to the 
public.
So, what is conflict? At minimum it must be said, and not surprisingly from a 
sociologist, that I am not focused upon conflict between ideas on a page but rather 
on social conflict between people over action in the world. I am not opposed to 
intellectual debate in the realm of pure ideas, but I should note that the reason so 
much energy is spent on debates about conflicting ideas is the presumption that 
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these ideas influence ordinary people’s actions. For example, many scholars have 
dedicated a lot of time to showing that Darwinism is compatible with evangelical 
Protestantism, and the at least implicit hope is that their proposed solution will 
help ordinary evangelicals operate in the world.
The most consequential conflict is therefore between people. Imagine a fun-
damentalist Protestant sitting in a pew in East Texas thinking that the Earth is six 
thousand years old. Since this view is at odds with the scientific consensus, he has 
the intellectual prerequisite for conflict with science, but is not yet in conflict. He 
is in conflict with science when he goes to the local school board and says out loud 
that the schools should not teach modern geology, a position that would presum-
ably be opposed by others. Similarly, someone is engaged in religious conflict with 
science if they cancel their appointment with their oncologist and instead go to a 
Pentecostal preacher to be healed. And, to turn to moral conflict, a religious per-
son is in conflict with science if they call their congressperson and ask that embry-
onic stem cell research be banned because their religion teaches that embryos have 
the same status as born persons. That all said, it is often difficult for social science 
to observe actual conflict between religion and science, and often all we can mea-
sure is the cognitive prerequisites to conflict, such as attitudes. However, what I 
will choose to empirically examine, and how I interpret what I examine, will be 
based on my premise that what ultimately matters is human action.
The Importance of the Public Instead of Elites
My concern with debates in the public sphere, and my definition of conflict which 
requires human interaction, makes the views of the citizens much more important 
than those of the elites. For my purposes, an elite is anyone who has a social role 
that allows them to influence the views of other people beyond their immediate 
acquaintances and family members on the issue under debate. So, obviously all 
academics are potentially elites, as are scientists, politicians, clergy, theologians, 
church officials, journalists, pundits, TV and movie producers, and leaders of 
social movements. The public, or citizens as I will often call them, are all of the 
other members of the public who lack this power. Someone could be elite in one 
context but not in another. For example, corporate executives are likely elites on 
the issue of worker pay, but are unlikely to be so for a debate about religion and sci-
ence. The elites in the religion and science debate are largely academics, scientists, 
and religious leaders, with a smattering of others we could call public intellectuals.
The reason that the public is more important for debates in the public sphere is 
that elites cannot, at least in the present day, do too much on their own. The president 
of the Southern Baptist Convention, an elite, cannot engage in religion and science 
conflict by banning the teaching of evolution in public schools in Texas. But, he can 
eventually do so if he gets the public to start a social movement, and this public 
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pressures elected officials. Rush Limbaugh is an elite, and has power because of his 
role, but his ability to stay on the air, and to influence policy, is dependent on the pub-
lic. If we are interested in conflict over religion and science as I have defined it—for 
example, whether children will learn evolution—we need to understand the public.
We know a lot about how the elites in the religion and science debate think, and 
very little about how the public views religion and science. To anticipate my argu-
ment, the elites see the relationship—and thus any conflict—between religion and 
science as concerning knowledge. Critically, much of what is seemingly known 
about the public has actually been distorted by extrapolating the views of the elites 
to the public. But, in the past ten years a new group of scattered sociological stud-
ies have been undertaken that do not begin by presuming that the relationship 
concerns knowledge. We can now see how the entire “religion and science debate” 
needs to be reconfigured if we are going to talk about the public.
ELITE AND PUBLIC BELIEF SYSTEMS
Before continuing, I must clarify some terminology. A “belief ” is a feeling of being 
sure that something is true, whether or not there is evidence or justification for 
it.10 An example would be believing the Earth is four and a half billion years old. 
“Knowledge” means justified belief. My belief about the age of the Earth becomes 
knowledge if I also believe that radiometric dating accurately describes the age of 
rocks, as the radiometric dating is the justification for my belief. It is telling about 
the status of religion and science in the contemporary age that we do not say “reli-
gious knowledge” but “religious belief,” because religion is considered to be unjusti-
fied by evidence. We do not say “scientific beliefs” but rather “scientific knowledge,” 
which indicates that if a claim is scientific, it is considered to be justified belief.
A belief system is simply the relationship between beliefs. A particular type of 
belief system relevant to the religion and science debate is what I will call a knowl-
edge system, where beliefs are structured in a hierarchical fashion, with higher-
level and more abstract beliefs justifying lower-level and less abstract beliefs. The 
lower beliefs, since they are now justified, become knowledge.
Scholars see religion and science as knowledge systems, in which people engage 
in deductive reason from the most abstract justificatory principles down to the most 
concrete claims.11 In this elite account, beliefs are like the pyramids in Figure 1. On 
the ground of the hypothetical pyramid on the right is a belief such as “the Earth is 
6,000 years old.” To justify this belief, somewhere higher in the pyramid there needs 
to be a belief such as “what the Bible says is literally true,” and above that, perhaps at 
the top, something like “God can control nature.” In the pyramid on the left, a differ-
ent on-the-ground belief is that the Earth is 4.5 billion years old, which is considered 
true because the radiometric dating of rocks is true. We know the radiometric dat-
ing is true because that which is observed through human senses is true.
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All of the lower parts of the pyramid not only have to be logically consistent 
with each other, but have to be logically consistent with what is above them. In 
this view of structure of beliefs, beliefs from the bottom of opposing pyramids 
such as “Moses parted the Red Sea” and “grass produces oxygen” cannot be held 
by the same person, because if you follow each claim up through the levels of 
deductive justification, they end up in logically incompatible places near or at the 
top of each pyramid. Put simply, in this view, if you believe in the method that 
produced the statement about grass you cannot believe that the sea parted due to 
divine intervention. Or, to turn to my introductory example, if you believe God 
created humans, not evolutionary forces, you cannot also believe scientific claims 
about global warming. Figure 1 is a depiction of the religion and science conflict as 
portrayed in the Huffington Post.12
Critically, academics and other elites generally hold to these knowledge sys-
tems of deductive belief for the issues that they focus upon. Moreover, I would 
describe the tasks of philosophy, theology, and science as making the vertical and 
horizontal links in pyramids as logically coherent as possible. In fact, you could 
argue that this is what academic training is, where expertise on a topic is learning 
to justify your lower-level beliefs with higher-level ones.
Any set of beliefs could be organized in this way. We can imagine that knowl-
edge about baseball could be so organized, and if one listens to sports radio, there 
are a lot of middle-aged men in America who have intricately organized, logically 
coherent justificatory belief systems about that sport. That is not how most people 
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view baseball. But, religion and science have historically been defined as these 
pyramids. Peter Harrison persuasively argues that the interaction between science 
and religion around the time of the 16th Century Reformation led to both religion 
and science being defined by elites as hierarchical belief structures.13
Academics and other elites reason in this way because they exist in institutions 
that reward them for it. The philosophy professor who does not reason in this way 
will be denied tenure. If this very book has inconsistent fact claims at the bottom, 
or does not describe its higher-level principles accurately enough, it would not be 
published. However, and again critically, members of the public are generally not 
rewarded for formulating logical structures like this about religion or science, or at 
least do not have logical structures that reach quite as high or have the same degree 
of coherence. They may have spent the effort to develop such structures in other 
areas, like sports or politics. I will examine social science research on the coher-
ence of the public’s belief systems much more closely in Chapter 5. But, once we 
no longer assume that the public has a hierarchical justified system of belief back 
to first principles concerning religion and science—as is assumed in the scholarly 
literature—we will have to rethink the entire “religion and science debate.”
C ONFLICT OVER WHAT? THREE T YPES OF 
REL ATIONSHIPS BET WEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE
We have discussed what conflict is, and between whom it occurs (public or elites). 
The final distinction is conflict over what? The response from scientists would 
be—knowledge, of course, because we scientists are only discovering knowledge. 
However, that turns out to be a very distorted view of the situation. There are three 
possible relationships, and thus possible conflicts, between religion and science. 
These are the relationships of systemic knowledge, propositional belief and morality.
The Systemic Knowledge Relationship and Possible Conflict
I use the term systemic knowledge to indicate depictions of relationship and pos-
sible conflict that assume people are using hierarchical systems of justified belief 
like those represented in the pyramids in Figure 1. The vast majority of the claims 
about conflict are that science justifies concrete beliefs about nature through rea-
son and observation, while religion justifies belief through faith and authority. 
Systemic knowledge conflict will be most recognizable to readers—in fact, I sus-
pect most would wonder what else the religion and science debate could possibly 
be about. The common image is of a debate between justifying claims about the 
age of the Earth by consulting the Bible vs. justifying its age by radiometric dating.
There is a strong and a weak version of the systemic knowledge relationship 
that depends on what science “is” or requires, which parallels the distinction made 
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by philosophers and historians between the use of methodological and metaphysi-
cal naturalism in science.14 The weak version assumes that the apex of the scien-
tific knowledge pyramid is methodological naturalism, which is “a disciplinary 
method that says nothing about God’s existence,” where fact claims are justified 
through observation and reason.15 With methodological naturalism, only natural 
processes can be invoked as explanation, and science cannot use the supernatu-
ral in its explanations or methods. But, science would make no claims about that 
which cannot be empirically investigated, like the existence of God.
In this weak version of the systemic knowledge relationship, people could not 
believe in a demonstrable scientific claim about nature (e.g., how plants work) and 
a religious claim about nature that is testable (e.g., the Earth is six thousand years 
old). That is, believing in a young Earth would mean you could not believe in sci-
entists’ facts about other topics—and hence there would be conflict. But, this weak 
version would allow for people who believe in scientific facts about plants to also 
believe in nonempirical claims like the existence of God, Heaven, the Virgin Birth 
and so on. This weak version of the systemic knowledge relationship is most com-
monly portrayed by the elites in the academic religion and science debate, with the 
assumption that any conflict comes from violating its precepts.
The strong version of the systemic knowledge relationship assumes not only 
methodological naturalism, but also that science requires metaphysical natural-
ism, where science actively “denies the existence of a transcendent God.”16 This is 
most recognizable as the position of the scientific atheists. Metaphorically, the apex 
of the scientific pyramid in this strong version is metaphysical naturalism, which 
requires that a person could not believe scientific claims based on scientific meth-
odology about why plants move and also believe in a nontestable claim like the 
existence of God. You could also not believe two on-the-ground fact claims—one 
religious and one scientific—even if the religious one is never examined by science. 
For example, a Catholic could not believe in scientific claims about global warming 
and in the Resurrection, even if there is no scientist who ever makes a claim about 
the resurrection (e.g. there is no scientific discipline of anti- Resurrection studies).
I will show in subsequent chapters that the elites in the debate assume either 
the strong or weak version of the systemic knowledge relationship. This is typi-
cally indicated by claiming that someone’s belief in one fact claim implies belief 
in another (implicitly, because they are connected by the same justificatory belief 
above), or by reference to the justificatory beliefs themselves (typically called 
“method”). The elites’ extrapolation of this relationship to the public has ham-
pered our understanding of religion and science. I will show that it is implausible 
for the public to have such a conflict between religion and science because, as I 
will discuss below, people do not have the time, motivation, or desire to make their 
beliefs logically coherent in the way this model demands.
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Of course, elites have had the time and have been rewarded. For example, in the 
infamous 1860 Oxford debate between Bishop Wilberforce and T. H. Huxley over 
Darwin’s claims about evolution, both were elites focused on this issue. Wilberforce 
knew he would have to respond to Huxley, and logical coherence would have been 
the standard of who won the debate.17 Similarly, in the 1925 Scopes trial, William 
Jennings Bryan knew he would be forced to respond to Clarence Darrow. But, 
members of the general public are not going to face a Darrow—or a university ten-
ure committee, to mention another social institution that rewards logical coher-
ence. It is important to point out that I am not opposed to systemic knowledge, 
nor to the academics and organizations that try to create it. I had better not be, 
as I work in a university that requires it. Rather, I am opposed to assuming that 
systemic knowledge is used by everyone for all issues, and that the public views 
institutions only through the lens of knowledge.
Propositional Belief Relationship and Possible Conflict
The relationship concerning propositional beliefs does not presume logical jus-
tification or deduction from more general beliefs. A proposition is an assertion 
without a justification—it is at the bottom of the pyramid in Figure 1 with no logi-
cal connections higher in the pyramid.18 Any agreement or conflict remains at the 
propositional belief level—such as “science claims the Earth is billions of years old, 
but my religion tells me the Earth is 6,000 years old.” No one who is rewarded to 
argue in terms of logical systems of ideas—such as a university  professor—would 
reason in this way. But, it is quite plausible for the general public, who are not 
rewarded for using tightly connected logically coherent structures of justified 
belief, to do so. This relationship is not described in the current religion and sci-
ence literature, which assumes a systemic knowledge relationship, but it is the best 
description of the public’s orientation to religion and science derived from the 
sociological studies that I will report below.
In this model, since people do not reason up to higher-level justificatory beliefs, 
there is no reason why people in a tradition that has conflicting propositional belief 
claims with science would be in conflict over all scientific knowledge. For example, 
a believer in a six thousand-year old Earth could accept most of the claims in the 
field of chemistry, because chemistry contains few or no propositional statements 
that conflict with any religious claims. They would presumably, however, avoid the 
parts of science that make many conflicting statements, like geology. I will show 
in later chapters that there is evidence for this type of conflict with some religious 
groups. The question is how pervasive this more limited conflict really is, and I 
will suggest that it is probably limited to a very small group of religious people in 
the U.S. Later, I will describe the social effect of such a conflict, which is much less 
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dramatic than would be the case if the religious public were engaged in systemic 
knowledge conflict with science.
Moral Relationship and Possible Conflict
I think that the moral relationship between religion and science, which often 
results in conflict, is dominant in at least the contemporary U.S. While academics 
use the term “morality” in many ways, I will follow cultural and historical sociolo-
gists who use it to mean “relating to human character or behavior considered as 
good or bad . . . [or] the distinction between right and wrong, or good and evil, in 
relation to the actions, desires, or character of responsible human beings.”19
This relationship between religion and science is rarely if ever talked about 
directly, and is obscured by our focus on knowledge conflict. The relationship in 
many cases is one of agreement—both religion and science believe in the moral 
value of the relief of human suffering and that it is good to acquire knowledge 
about the world. This relationship is also obscured because scientists typically 
claim that they do not advocate for a morality. Instead, they are engaged in the 
morally neutral analysis of nature. However, a better way to describe the work of 
a chemist who is trying to understand how electrons move is that this work does 
promote a moral perspective that “inquiry into the functioning of nature is of 
value.” Similarly, cancer research presumes the moral value that suffering is bad. It 
is just that there is moral consensus about these scientific activities, so they are not 
even considered to concern morality.
But, there are also many instances of contemporary moral conflict. For exam-
ple, is it morally acceptable to take the mitochondrial DNA out of one human egg 
and put it in another? Is it acceptable to engage in embryonic stem cell research? 
More abstractly, does Darwinian theory implicitly teach a moral lesson to chil-
dren? Critically, these debates are independent of any conflict over knowledge, 
and many religious people have been opposed to scientists on each of them.
Even if scientists do not take a public moral stance such as “destroying embryos 
is acceptable,” scientific research and technology itself is often morally expres-
sive. As bioethicist Erik Parens points out, technology is not morally neutral, but 
pushes people in particular moral directions.20 For example, inventing a test to 
see whether a fetus or embryo has Down syndrome presumes that people should 
avoid having children with Down syndrome. Of course, people can refuse the test, 
but the existence of this test, and the fact that doctors are supposed to discuss it 
with pregnant woman, expresses the moral message.
I am not the first to see the importance of moral conflict between science 
and religion. Some of the historians who have been able to get a bit closer to the 
views of the religious public have shown how the public often has both knowl-
edge and moral conflict with science. For example, Ronald Numbers’ canonical 
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book about creationism shows that creationist activists were often not so con-
cerned about the fact claims of Darwinism, but rather that Darwinism was 
teaching youth a particular moral lesson.21 For example, the defender of the cre-
ationist view in the Scopes trial, William Jennings Bryan, was concerned about 
“the paralyzing influence of Darwinism on the conscience. By substituting the 
law of the jungle for the teachings of Christ, it threatened the principles he val-
ued most: democracy and Christianity.” He thought that this teaching had led 
to both German militarism and the German decision to declare war in World 
War I.22 However, historians have generally not theorized this moral conflict. 
I will argue that this moral conflict is more relevant to today’s public than is 
knowledge conflict.
SUMMARY OF SUBSEQUENT CHAPTERS
This book should definitely not be considered the last word on this subject, but 
more like a provocation. I am pulling together information from diverse fields to 
lay the groundwork for my claims, and in the data analytic chapters I rely upon a 
myriad of data that was not originally designed to test my thesis. I want to con-
vince others that this thesis demands further investigation.
I should be clear at the outset that I am focusing on the U.S. in order to keep a 
sprawling topic under control, as well as due to a lack of data from other countries 
and, frankly, my own limited knowledge of non-Anglophone cultures. Some of 
the academic debate I will be summarizing includes Britain, which has had an 
influence on American debates and has a strong history of an elite debate between 
religion and science. Moreover, besides a few brief discussions of Judaism, I am 
not focusing on religious minorities in the U.S. because, again, there are almost no 
contemporary data, primarily because each minority group represents two percent 
of the population or less. Therefore, my analysis is primarily about different types 
of Christians and the nonreligious.23
In Chapter 2, I start to outline the assumptions in the academic religion and sci-
ence debate. I examine the academic advocates in the debate, the scientists and the 
theologians, as well as dialogue associations that share the views of the theologians, 
and show that they assume that the relationship between religion and science con-
cerns systemic knowledge. The most extreme are the scientific atheists who assume 
the strongest version of the systemic knowledge conflict thesis—that a person who 
believes in any scientific facts cannot believe in any religion. I review the liberal 
Christian theological synthesizers, who also assume that both religious and scien-
tific knowledge are systems, but who also think they can be synthesized into one 
knowledge structure. I also explain why these groups hold the positions they do.
In Chapter 3, I continue to describe the academic debate by turning to the 
observers or analysts of the debate of the scientists and theologians, who are 
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primarily historians and sociologists. They too share the view that any relationship 
is based on systemic knowledge. If my entire thesis is correct, we would expect 
that the sociologists who study the contemporary public to see moral conflict, so I 
focus on the source of the sociologists’ blinders.
In Chapter 4, I start to develop my overall explanation for why the participants 
in the academic debate assume the public is also in systemic knowledge conflict. 
Put simply, radical changes to the religion of the American public over the past 
fifty years have not been accounted for. For example, it turns out the sociology 
debates examined in Chapter 3 that assume systemic knowledge conflict are based 
on much older theories. In this chapter I examine more contemporary definitions 
of religion, debates about secularization, and the sociology of science and show 
that these all portray religion and science as not in knowledge conflict. Moreover, 
the history literature examined in the previous chapter, produced by professional 
historians, was largely of elite debates from fifty or more years ago. Looking at the 
recent history of public debates between religion and science, largely not written 
by historians, we see debates that are fixed resolutely on morality, not knowledge. I 
conclude this chapter by showing how the exemplar case of contemporary religion 
and science debate—Darwin and evolution—is primarily about morality.
In Chapter 5, I turn to existing research on the public to show that it is extremely 
unlikely that the contemporary religious public thinks their religion is about knowl-
edge claims about nature, or that science is exclusively about nature. This makes 
systemic knowledge conflict unlikely. I begin with a history of American religion 
and science and conclude that it is really only in the conservative Protestant tradi-
tion that the religious public could be taught a knowledge conflict with science. 
I continue by examining contemporary social science research that suggests, to 
somewhat overstate the case, that members of the general public do not have 
knowledge systems—which would make systemic knowledge conflict impossible.
I continue by discussing research on the contemporary American religious 
public showing that conservative Protestantism is decreasingly concerned with 
truth and doctrine. The tradition is also becoming increasingly therapeutic— 
concerned with the happiness and well-being of the individual. Moreover, reli-
gious Americans in general are increasingly assembling their religious beliefs from 
different religious systems with less concern for what the elites would consider 
incompatibilities. All of this suggests that conservative Protestantism is not con-
cerned with systemic knowledge about nature. Finally, I turn to what we know 
about the public’s view of science and scientists, and show that it is unlikely that 
the public views scientists as morally neutral observers of nature, but are rather 
more likely to see them as morally questionable outsiders who potentially need to 
be controlled. This disparate research on the public provides the grounds for being 
skeptical that we will find systemic knowledge conflict between religious citizens 
and science.
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In Chapter 6, I put the conflict narrative to an empirical test and do not find 
any religious groups where the members are in systemic knowledge conflict 
with science. I do find that most Christian traditions are, to varying degrees, 
in  propositional belief conflict with science over a few fact-claims about the 
world— fact-claims that do not matter to the everyday lives of the vast majority of 
Americans. Finally, I engage in some speculation as to why—given that I did not 
find systemic knowledge conflict—religious people would be disproportionately 
engaged in propositional belief conflict. Of all the possibilities, I focus for the rest 
of the analyses in this book on the idea that this more limited belief conflict is 
actually driven by moral conflict with science.
Chapter 7 puts the moral conflict theory to an empirical test. Data that can be 
used to examine moral conflict between religion and science are limited because 
the scholars who develop data sources have presumed that science is about knowl-
edge. However, I outline three types of moral conflict which I can indirectly 
examine. The first is conflict over which institution will set the meaning and pur-
pose of society. Will we have faith in science or religion? I show that religious 
Americans, and conservative Protestants in particular, are in conflict with science 
over which institution our society should have faith in. The second is conflict over 
the implicit morality embedded in some scientific claims, such as Darwinism. I 
find that conservative Protestants are in moral conflict with science over scientific 
claims in the public sphere. The third conflict is over technology, such as medical 
technology having to do with embryonic stem cells or the genetic modification of 
humans. I find that conservative Protestants are in moral conflict with scientists 
over technology to modify the human body. I finish the chapter with a close look 
at interviews with religious people about reproductive genetic technology. This 
analysis suggests a subtle moral conflict exists over the use of this particular set of 
technologies.
Chapter 8 is the conclusion, and I finish by discussing the contribution of soci-
ological analysis of the contemporary public relationship between religion and sci-
ence to other disciplines in the religion and science debate. If we are to have an 
improved debate, we need a social location, and I ponder the possibilities. I finish 
by describing the research agenda necessary for this new direction in the field.
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The Religion and Science Advocates in 
the Academic Debate
Unsurprisingly, the academic religion and science debate involves advocates 
of religion and science—theologians and scientists. In this chapter, I show that 
almost the entire debate involving scientists and theologians assumes that what 
is under debate is systemic knowledge. That is, to examine one strand, the debate 
is whether religion and science have always been locked in “warfare” over how to 
make claims about the natural world. Scientists point to Galileo’s persecution by 
the Catholic Church for arguing that the Earth is not the center of the universe. 
On the other side, theologians work to resolve any conflict by making sure that 
there is no disagreement between the fact claims of science and that of religion. I 
will also explain why science and technology focus on a systemic knowledge rela-
tionship, and not on a moral relationship. Finally, I will, when possible, show that 
these elites assume that the public has the same relationship between religion and 
science as they do. They are never explicit about this. When it is not possible to 
determine if they are extrapolating their views to the public, the elite views remain 
important for us to consider because they are trying to teach the public a particu-
lar relationship between religion and science.
The scientists and the theologians create two problems for a healthy debate 
about religion and science in the public sphere. First, by writing as if all conflict 
is about knowledge, the public who consumes this material is taught that reli-
gion and science are in knowledge conflict and not moral conflict. Second, by not 
acknowledging that the concern with coherent knowledge is an elite activity, these 
writers imply that the public has systemic knowledge concerns, when in actuality 
the religious public may only be in propositional belief conflict with science.
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Before I get to the specific reasons that members of these two groups would 
view themselves as engaged in a systemic knowledge relationship, let me address 
two general explanations. First, to reiterate what I wrote in the Introduction, these 
two groups comprise academics and/or have a large amount of academic training, 
and are rewarded for thinking extensively on this exact topic. Therefore, all else 
being equal, they will have worked out systemic knowledge because, to oversim-
plify, that is what academia trains people to do.
Second, that academics would see the specific institutions of religion and sci-
ence as both systemic knowledge systems is over-determined, and indeed has its 
origins before the sixteenth century Reformation. From the Greeks forward, reli-
gion, and science for that matter, were virtues of the individual. Historian Peter 
Harrison describes an early Christian author as seeing religion as “not a system of 
beliefs and practices but of godliness, modes of worship, a new kind of race, and 
a way of life.” By the time of the Reformation, the meaning of “religion” begins to 
shift. The “interior virtues of scientia and religio” change. While catechisms had 
once been understood as techniques for developing an interior piety, they now 
came to be the essence of some objective thing—religion. In Harrison’s words, 
“religion was vested in creeds rather than in the hearts of the faithful.” That is, 
“religion” shifts from an “interior disposition” to “beliefs themselves.” Protestant 
reformers further contributed to this idea by insisting that Christians be able 
to articulate the doctrines, and do so in propositional terms. The printing press 
also contributed to this process, as Protestant clergy stressed the importance of 
the inculcation of religious doctrines—now available more broadly. Indeed, cat-
echisms came to embody the content of the Christian religion.1
Now conceptualized as a system of beliefs, religion could be “true” or “false.” 
With this new idea of religion as a system of belief comes the idea that religion 
can be rationally justified. Harrison almost perfectly depicts my pyramid meta-
phor when he writes that for idealists, “the perfect religion would be a body of 
propositions, firmly established by ironclad logical demonstrations.” At this point, 
he continues, “belief could be described as the act of giving intellectual assent to 
propositions.”2
Ironically from the contemporary perspective, the “sciences” of the seven-
teenth century—called natural history and natural philosophy—were given the 
task of providing some of the general warrants to justify the new propositional 
religion, which reinforces the idea that religion should be understood as “a system 
of beliefs” that requires rational support. With this definition, religion was now 
capable of conflict with science because, in Harrison’s words, “religion consists of 
factual claims that should be subject to scientific confirmation.” The end result is 
that religion is “characterized by propositional beliefs, which, on par with beliefs 
in other spheres, require rational justification.”3
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There is general truth in the common wisdom that Protestantism is concerned 
with proper belief and Catholicism is concerned with proper practice, so this is a 
particularly Protestant way of looking at religion. But, it was Protestants who were 
at the center of these changes, and it was Protestantism that dominated the public 
square, academia, and public life in the U.S. until the mid-twentieth century. This 
idea of religion as a hierarchically justified system of belief and facts became the 
elite conception of what “religion” was, and thus influenced debate from that point 
forward.
So, any academic should be prone to seeing both religion and science as sys-
temic knowledge. I will argue in later chapters that the “religion” described by 
Harrison as emerging before the Reformation and continuing to today either was 
never held by the ordinary members of these religions, or has run its course and 
is being changed into something else, at least in the U.S. For the remainder of the 
chapter I will examine how academic scientists and theologians view their own 
beliefs and the relationship to the beliefs of the other institution. Besides their 
own self-image of producing systemic knowledge, I will also explain why they see 
themselves in systemic knowledge conflict with the other, and why the possibility 
of moral conflict never seems to be discussed.
C ONTEMPOR ARY SCIENTIST S IN THE DEBATE: 
WE ONLY PRODUCE KNOWLED GE
Obviously one important set of elites in any debate between religion and science are 
contemporary scientists. They generally believe that any conflict with science by the 
public, religious or otherwise, is about a lack of knowledge by the public. For there to 
be a “religion and science” debate there must be scientists, but having them in a debate 
means accepting their premise that any conflict with them is only about knowledge.
The field of science communication offers us some studies of academic scientists 
in general, which offer background for my later examples of scientists in the reli-
gion and science debate itself. These studies do evaluate what these scientists think 
the public’s views are, and reveal that scientists think that any conflict between 
them and the public—religious or otherwise—is about knowledge of the natural 
world. One study concludes that “almost universally” scientists “believe the public 
is inadequately informed about science topics.” Further, scientists believe that, “the 
public is uninterested in becoming more knowledgeable,” and that scientific illit-
eracy is at the root of opposition to new technologies and adequate science fund-
ing. The authors also summarize several studies that find that “scientists view the 
public as non-rational and unsystematic in their thinking such that they rely on 
anecdotes.” That is, the public is accused of not using a system of knowledge. Other 
studies have found that scientists see the public as emotional, fear prone, focused 
on the sensational, self-interested, and “stubborn in the face of new evidence.”4
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Similarly, a survey of members of the American Academy for the Advancement 
of Science found that 85 percent thought that “the public does not know very much 
about science” and this was a “major” problem “for science in general.” When sci-
entists were asked about public engagement, studies suggest that scientists view 
engagement as chiefly about information dissemination rather than dialogue. 
Moreover, “the primary argument that scientists give for public engagement is the 
need to increase citizen knowledge . . . or allay unfounded fears,” with engagement 
usually “framed in terms of providing information.” That is, communication with 
the public, religious or otherwise, is about knowledge. Anticipating my later point 
that conflict may actually be about morality, these studies show that the key diffi-
culty for scientists in public engagement “may be that scientists often believe pub-
lic debates should turn on logic and cost-benefit-analysis accounting whereas the 
public wants consideration of factors such as fairness, ethics, and accountability.” 
The study authors’ overall conclusion is that “scientists believe the public knows 
little about a range of scientific issues and that they see this knowledge deficit as 
shaping risk perceptions, policy preferences, and decisions.” Scientists “emphasize 
a need to educate the public so that non-experts will make policy choices in line 
with the preferences of scientists.”5
In other words, scientists are in the thrall of what communications scholars 
consider to be one of the great myths about public communication—the knowl-
edge deficit model.6 This is the belief, largely held by scientists, that “ignorance is 
at the root of social conflict over science. . . . Once citizens are brought up to speed 
on the science, they will be more likely to judge scientific issues as scientists do and 
controversy will go away.”7
The knowledge deficit model held by scientists dismisses any possibility that 
the relationship between religion and science, and any possible conflict, is moral. 
Indeed, it can lead scientists to redefine obvious cases of moral conflict as being 
about knowledge. For example, Sir Peter Medawar commented on public fears of 
genetic manipulation in the 1970s by ignoring the obvious moral conflict between 
scientists and the public and attributing conflict to a lack of knowledge. He wrote 
that “I find it difficult to excuse the lack of confidence which otherwise quite sen-
sible people have in the scientific profession . . . for their fearfulness, laymen have 
only themselves to blame and their nightmares are a judgement on them for their 
deep-seated scientific illiteracy.”8
Scientists Who Reflect on the Public’s Views of Religion and Science
I lack a survey of the scientists who are engaged in the religion and science debate, 
so I will instead conduct a small case study of a group of elite scientists engaged 
in a religion and science event. The assumption by scientific elites that systemic 
knowledge conflict also organizes the thought of the religious public is quite 
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evident in the 2005 Terry Lectures at Yale. That year was the 100th anniversary of 
the prestigious lectureship devoted to “religion and its application to human wel-
fare in the light of scientific knowledge and philosophical insights.”9
This makes a good case study because the prominence of the event meant that 
some of the more influential scientists who had focused on the religion and sci-
ence debate were invited to speak, and because they were asked their views of the 
religious public. The fact that it was held under the auspices of the Yale Divinity 
School suggests that if anything the scientists would be more restrained in what 
they would otherwise say about religion.
The Yale selection committee decided to ask the question why the contro-
versy between science and religion in the public “continues with such force.”10 The 
organizers asked a philosopher of religion, a historian of religion and science, a 
sociologist of religion and three scientists to each provide an explanation for the 
continued conflict in the public. What resulted is that all of the lecturers assumed 
that “controversy” was about knowledge claims, except, as we might expect, the 
sociologist, who had more knowledge of the contemporary religious public’s 
views.11 The scientists in particular reinforced the idea that the public’s conflict was 
about knowledge claims.
Paleontologist Keith Thomson introduced the series of lectures by repeating 
the systemic knowledge conflict narrative, saying “there is bound to be a debate 
because science and religion are two very different entities with different ways of 
arriving at ‘truth.’ Both have claims on both our reason and our intuition.” One dis-
advantage for religion in this debate is that it is seen as “imposing a body of truths 
that must be accepted on faith and revelation rather than discovery and analysis.” 
In case this was not clear enough, he then wonders what science’s greatest liability 
is “when it comes to public understanding and acceptance.” He concludes that the 
limit on public acceptance is that science “proceeds by making a changing and 
progressively more uncommon sense out of common sense  .  .  . People distrust 
a science that gives changing, more refined, answers.”12 Conflict for Thomson is 
driven by the powerful knowledge-making apparatus of science.
Another scientist on the panel, Lawrence Krauss, at first sounds like he sees 
moral conflict as the cause of the “continued debate,” when he says that conflict is 
the result of “fear of the moral implications of science and its perceived challenge 
to religion.” However, he also says that debates about evolution are a “straw man,” 
and “what people are challenging is science itself and the methods by which it 
investigates the universe.” So, he sees the religious public as in systemic knowledge 
conflict with science. It turns out the link to morality for Krauss is that the loss 
of epistemic standing of the “God caused nature” perspective leads to thinking 
that science “is inherently atheistic, and thus immoral.”13 So, any moral conflict is 
simply the result of the fact that the supernatural is not allowed as a justification 
for fact claims. In fairness to Krauss, he was focusing on the intelligent design 
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movement, and this is one place where both sides are talking about knowledge, 
with intelligent design advocates trying to overthrow the scientific pyramid that 
has methodological naturalism at the top.
The first two scientists appear to see a strong version of the systemic knowledge 
conflict between the religious public and scientists. The final scientist, Kenneth 
R. Miller, assumed the weak version of systemic knowledge relationship, prob-
ably because he is a Catholic who uses Catholic theology to talk about religion 
and science. Early in his talk he acknowledged that opponents of Darwin often 
give moral reasons for their opposition, that “Darwin’s great idea is indeed seen 
as the foundation of everything wrong in society, including lawlessness, abortion, 
pornography,, and the dissolution of marriage.”14 However, his chapter is not about 
moral conflict but rather primarily shows that Intelligent Design claims are scien-
tifically false.
He finishes with a section that argues for the standard Catholic account of 
systemic knowledge compatibility based on a science that assumes methodologi-
cal naturalism. “Nothing could be worse for people of faith than to defer to the 
Bible to [sic] as a source of scientific knowledge that contradicted direct, empirical 
studies of nature” he begins. Saint Augustine “warned of the danger inherent in 
using the Bible as a book of geology, astronomy, or biology . . . to Augustine, the 
eternal spiritual truth of the Bible would only be weakened by pretending that it 
was also a book of science.” Opposing atheist advocates of the strong version of 
systemic knowledge conflict, where science requires metaphysical naturalism, he 
rejects their attempts to claim that “science alone can lead us to truth regarding the 
purpose of existence.”15 In sum, Miller does not see conflict between his version of 
science and his religion, but the relationship he depicts is nonetheless the relation-
ship between two forms of systemic knowledge. As we will see in a few pages, he 
would fit in well with the theologians in this debate.
Scientific Atheists and Their Allies
By far the group of scientists engaged in the religion and science debate with the 
biggest soap box are the scientific atheists. For example, an incredible 21.4 per-
cent of a random sample of Americans claim to have heard of Richard Dawkins, 
undoubtedly the most influential scientific atheist, whereas only 4.3 percent claim 
to have heard of evangelical scientist Francis Collins, who we will meet later in this 
chapter.16 In general, the scientific atheists have a greater influence on the public’s 
views of religion and science than any other type of academic.
The systemic knowledge conflict view is evident in their writings. They portray 
both religion and science—among elites and the public—as iron-clad hierarchi-
cally structured systems of belief. On the science side, science requires meta-
physical naturalism, and therefore any conflict between religion and science is the 
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strong systemic form. That is, if you believe in one scientific knowledge claim that 
has been institutionalized by the scientific community you must believe in them 
all, and you certainly cannot believe any knowledge claim that is “non-scientific” 
such as the existence of God. For the scientific atheists, religion must fit into the 
scientific pyramid or be declared false, starting with what they take to be a fact 
claim about the world demonstrable through scientific observation—whether 
God exists.
Regarding values, scientists are not promoting any, but are simply investigating 
nature. Religiously derived values appear, but they are driven by what the scien-
tific atheists consider the central knowledge claim—the existence of God. Were 
this false knowledge claim to be eliminated, then the faulty values of the religious 
public would also be repaired.
This belief in pure logical coherence and hierarchical justification up to first 
principles is exemplified by Dawkins’ admitted theological ignorance. From the 
view of religious critics of Dawkins, he needs to know something about what he is 
criticizing. In my terms, religious people complain that Dawkins does not know 
anything about the middle of the religious pyramid—what Christians really think 
about creation, miracles, the human and so on. This critique was most evocatively 
stated by Terry Eagleton in his review of Dawkins’ book The God Delusion:
Imagine someone holding forth on biology whose only knowledge of the subject is 
the Book of British Birds, and you have a rough idea of what it feels like to read Rich-
ard Dawkins on theology. Card-carrying rationalists like Dawkins, who is the nearest 
thing to a professional atheist we have had since Bertrand Russell, are in one sense 
the least well-equipped to understand what they castigate, since they don’t believe 
there is anything there to be understood, or at least anything worth understanding. 
This is why they invariably come up with vulgar caricatures of religious faith that 
would make a first-year theology student wince. The more they detest religion, the 
more ill-informed their criticisms of it tend to be.17
But, this ignorance is not a problem if religion and science are assumed to be per-
fectly coherent hierarchical structures of knowledge or belief, where all lower-level 
beliefs are dependent on the top belief. Indeed, Dawkins has admitted that he has 
not bothered to learn much theology because it is all irrelevant. In reaction to the 
critique that he does not know very much theology, Dawkins wrote “Yes, I have, 
of course, met this point before. It sounds superficially fair. But it presupposes that 
there is something in Christian theology to be ignorant about. The entire thrust 
of my position is that Christian theology is a non-subject. It is empty. Vacuous. 
Devoid of coherence or content. .  .  . The only part of theology that could possi-
bly demand my attention is the part that purports to demonstrate that God does 
exist. This part of theology I have, indeed, studied with considerable attention. 
And found it utterly wanting.”18
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He has effectively defined religion as a hierarchical logical structure of knowl-
edge with “God exists” at the apex. Knocking out this apex leaves us with the only 
logical conclusion, that all claims below it on the pyramid are false. Moreover, 
science and religion are coherent knowledge structures that you have to believe 
all of, because you agree with the first principles, and since these first principles 
are incompatible, you cannot believe any components of the opposing structure.
Dawkins and other scientific atheists have often been accused of being funda-
mentalists, but the reasons offered for the similarity with Protestant fundamen-
talism are varied. If we focus on what the scientific atheists think structures of 
knowledge are, Dawkins is like a Protestant fundamentalist pastor. Both believe 
in iron-clad hierarchical knowledge in science and religion. Fundamentalist elites 
simply insert a different belief at the top and utterly reject any scientific claim 
that does not fit with that top belief, such as the age of the Earth. Critically, both 
Dawkins and his fundamentalist adversaries are teaching the public the idea that 
any conflict between religion and science concerns the strong version of systemic 
knowledge.
We can also consider the views of Jerry A. Coyne, who is probably the most 
influential American scientific atheist. The first page of his book Faith versus Fact 
reveals the base assumption of what the debate is about when he writes that the 
book “is about the different ways that science and religion regard faith, ways that 
make them incompatible for discovering what’s true about our universe. My thesis 
is that religion and science compete in many ways to describe reality—they both 
make ‘existence claims’ about what is real—but use different tools to meet this 
goal.” In my terms, he thinks both religion and science are primarily methods 
for making claims about the natural world. Indeed, he sees that “the truth claims 
religion makes about the universe turns it into a kind of science, but a science 
using weak evidence to make strong statements about what is true.” “Science and 
religion, then, are competitors in the business of finding out what is true about our 
universe.”19 A lot of his book consists of arguments that religion is about knowl-
edge generation and not about something like moral values. This seems critical 
to his argument, because if religion is not about knowledge production, then as a 
scientist he has no argument against it.
Like Dawkins he spends a lot of time on the fact claim that God does not exist 
because, without an empirically verifiable deity, the entire logically deductive 
pyramid of religious belief below it collapses. His assumption is that these beliefs 
are logically coherent. For example, he says the reason that elite scientists are less 
likely to be religious is that “science’s habit of requiring evidence for belief, com-
bined with its culture of pervasive doubt and questioning, must often carry over 
to other aspects of one’s life—including the possibility of religious faith.” I empha-
size the word “must” in the quote to focus on the assumption he is making about 
logical consistency. He further demonstrates his assumption by saying that some 
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people can wall off this logic: it is the religious scientists who “happen to be the 
ones who can compartmentalize two incompatible worldviews in their heads.”20
What is most striking about Coyne’s book is not the fairly standard scientific 
atheist assumptions about what religion is. Rather, it is that he so deeply assumes 
systemic knowledge conflict that he apparently does not realize that his book 
makes the case that the actual conflict between science and religion is over moral-
ity. In his final chapter titled “Why Does It Matter,” he talks about the harms that 
come from the public using religion to make claims about the natural world. He 
starts with an extreme and rare case to stand in for all religion, which is “those 
sects that reject medical care in favor of prayer and faith healing, and enforce this 
belief on their children,” by which he is primarily referring to Christian Science 
and Jehovah’s Witnesses.21 Like the Huffington Post bloggers we met in the first few 
pages of this book, he also claims that religion leads to denial of climate change 
by citing the religious claims of conservative politicians and an energy industry-
funded evangelical think tank. As we will see in Chapter 6, this claim is just based 
on the assumption that people who do not believe science in one instance cannot 
believe it in another. This one extremely rare claim and one empirically false claim 
are about knowledge conflict.
But, the main reasons he thinks that religion should be gotten rid of is that he 
does not like its moral agenda. In addition to faith healing and climate science, 
there are “several other areas where science clashes with faith in the public arena.” 
The first is embryonic stem cell research, which has been limited because of reli-
gious beliefs that embryos are equivalent to persons. The second is vaccination 
against the virus that causes cervical cancer, which is spread by sexual contact. 
Because “many Christians oppose any sex outside of marriage” they oppose the 
mandatory vaccinations because they think it will encourage sex outside of mar-
riage. Another harm that springs “from the morality claims of faith, claims that 
flout both science and reason” is “opposition to assisted dying.” Most people think 
it is “merciful to euthanize our dog or cat if it’s suffering terribly” but followers of 
many religions reject this because humans are “the special creation of God, and 
uniquely endowed with souls.”22
While these religious moral claims are all dependent on facts to the extent that 
religious morality is dependent on a belief in God, these facts are very far up the 
pyramid. That Coyne’s primary opposition to religion appears to be moral can be 
seen in the fact that the religious opponents of embryonic stem cell research, sex 
outside of marriage, and opposition to assisted dying would agree with all of the 
scientific claims about these phenomena. They would agree with embryologists’ 
claims of how many cells an embryo has and what would happen if you were to 
let it continue dividing. They would agree with how viruses cause cervical cancer. 
They would agree with descriptions of how people die and how their dying could 
be assisted. They would just disagree over what we should do about these things. 
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These moral debates in the public sphere would be much more efficient if Coyne 
would just define the morality of science and directly argue about morality.
There are too many scientific atheists to conduct an analysis of each one. I will 
conclude this section by examining the historian Ronald Numbers’ contribution 
to the Yale conference described above, in which he compiled the views of religion 
of famous scientific atheists. Numbers is making a point about intelligent design 
theory, but I repurpose his compilation to show that the scientific atheists not 
only assume that religion only concerns knowledge claims, but that disproving 
one knowledge claim by religion through science invalidates the entire knowledge 
structure—including belief in God—because each piece of knowledge is logically 
dependent on each other.
Numbers writes that atheist Daniel Dennett has “portrayed Darwinism as ‘a 
universal solvent, capable of cutting right to the heart of everything in sight’—and 
particularly effective in dissolving religious beliefs.”23 This is only possible if all 
religious beliefs are so utterly dependent upon the fact claim that humans did not 
evolve from lower life forms, or more generally that events do not happen in the 
world for random reasons, that removing this one piece of the knowledge pyramid 
causes its collapse.
Scientific atheists also make it clear that science and religion are only about 
knowledge by comparing knowledge claims from the two. Co-discoverer of the 
structure of DNA and Nobel prize winner Francis Crick wrote that “the view of 
ourselves as ‘persons’ is just as erroneous as the view that the Sun goes around the 
Earth. . . . In the fullness of time, educated people will believe there is no soul inde-
pendent of the body, and hence no life after death.” Oxford chemist Peter Atkins 
notes appreciatively that science abrogates to itself “the claim to be the sole route 
to true, complete, and perfect knowledge.” Harvard biologist E. O. Wilson writes 
that “the final decisive edge enjoyed by scientific naturalism will come from its 
capacity to explain traditional religion, its chief competition, as a wholly mate-
rial phenomenon. Theology is not likely to survive as an independent intellectual 
discipline.” The late William Provine, who was a biologist and historian at Cornell, 
wrote that “modern evolutionary biology tells us loud and clear [that] there are 
no gods, no purposes, no goal-directed forces of any kind. There is no life after 
death . . . There is no ultimate foundation for ethics, no ultimate meaning to life, 
and no free will for humans either.”24
In all of these claims against religion by famous scientists, religion only con-
cerns knowledge about the natural world, and therefore is not only in conflict 
with scientific knowledge, but is doomed to extinction once it is shown that sci-
entific knowledge is superior. Most critically, religion and science are each logi-
cally coherent systems of fact claims reaching up to first principles (reason and 
observation vs. faith), so you cannot believe in one component of a system without 
believing in them all.
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Why Scientists Assume Any Relationship Concerns  
Systemic  Knowledge
To explain why the scientists see religion and science as both systemic knowledge 
structures, and that these are then in conflict, we must start by reiterating what I 
wrote at the beginning of this chapter. That is, post-Reformation definitions do 
portray religion as a set of hierarchically oriented beliefs, so we can see why scien-
tists who are not familiar with the religious public would assume that for ordinary 
religious people “religion” means hierarchically structured beliefs about knowl-
edge. I think science is a systemic knowledge system, although I will argue that it 
is also a moral system.
In addition to this general explanation, over the years scholars have pointed out 
that promoting the idea that they are in knowledge conflict with religion is critical 
to scientists’ self-identity and is a way to gather resources. In a seminal series of 
articles during the emergence of the field of the sociology of scientific knowledge 
in the early 1980s, Thomas Gieryn and colleagues examined the boundary drawing 
that scientists have historically engaged in against pseudoscience, mechanics and 
religion. Drawing such boundaries was useful for scientists’ professional goals, 
such as “acquisition of intellectual authority and career opportunities.”25
For example, referring to the efforts of John Tyndall in Victorian England, 
Gieryn writes that “because religion and mechanics thwarted (in different ways) 
Tyndall’s effort to expand the authority and resources of scientists, he often chose 
them as ‘contrast cases’ when constructing ideologies of science for the public.”26 In 
a later application of these ideas to American court trials over teaching creation-
ism in the classroom, Gieryn and his colleagues conclude that the relationship 
between religion and science was used to advance the goals of justifying invest-
ments in scientific research and education, and the monopolization of “profes-
sional authority over a sphere of knowledge in order to protect collective resources 
for scientists.”27
Historian Peter Harrison also sees that the emergence of what we would now 
recognize as science in the nineteenth century was partially accomplished by 
“drawing sharp boundaries and positing the existence of contrast cases” including 
“science and religion.” “Religion is what science is not: a kind of negative image 
of science” writes Harrison, and “the conflict myth continues to serve the role for 
which it was originally fashioned in the late nineteenth century, of establishing 
and maintaining boundaries of the modern conception ‘science.’”28
Scientists then promote the myth of an enduring and timeless knowledge con-
flict between religion and science, with scientists promoting the idea of Galileo 
being an early martyr for science at the hands of religion. Galileo never went to 
jail—to paraphrase the title of a book meant to disabuse scientists and others of the 
conflict myth—but it is in the interests of scientists to continue to say that he did.29
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In a fascinating analysis of how scientists describe the Galileo affair in text-
books and other texts, communications scholar Thomas Lessl finds that the stories 
about Galileo “reflect the master narrative of ‘warfare between science and reli-
gion’ that has been such a prominent feature of scientific rhetoric during the past 
century.” In the common scientific narrative, Galileo was not only the first person 
to use empiricism to make discoveries about nature, but this was at the core of his 
conflict with the Catholic Church. Lessl cites Stephen Hawking’s A Brief History 
of Time, which states that “Galileo, perhaps more than any other single person, 
was responsible for the birth of modern science. His renowned conflict with the 
Catholic Church was central to his philosophy, for Galileo was one of the first to 
argue that man could hope to understand how the world works, and, moreover, 
that we could do this by observing the real world.” Such statements frustrate histo-
rians to no end, because they are not fully true. Galileo was not persecuted for his 
methods or his rationalistic assumptions, and defended his views as descriptions 
of the world created by God.30
We could go on and on with this, as historians show that the myths of the 
conflict between religion and science of Galileo, Darwin and many others, often 
promulgated by scientists, are incredibly persistent. The frustration of historians 
has reached the point where Jon Roberts calls the idea of a universal knowledge 
conflict between science and Christianity the “idea that wouldn’t die.”31 The ques-
tion is why scientists keep repeating these false statements. One reason is that con-
temporary science finds it useful as a way of saying what makes science distinctive 
and thus worthy of public investment and trust. Another plausible answer is that 
the myth is a type of identity-work, a set of myths that define the community of 
scientists in ways that are useful. For example, if older scientists want to teach 
new scientists that science is rational and disinterested, then it is useful to have an 
“other” with which to contrast yourself. In Lessl’s words, “the presumed irrational-
ity, credulity, and intellectual self-interest attributed to Galileo’s opponents in the 
Church appear in these folk narratives as inversions of the rationalism, skepticism, 
and disinterestedness of science. Such dramatic demarcations attach distinctive 
virtues to the scientific culture and at the same time ratify its claims to institu-
tional autonomy”. Moreover, with the Galileo legend “the features of the scientific 
ethos that set it apart from religion are lionized, grounds for the scientific cul-
ture’s professional autonomy are given an historical rationalization, and a social-
evolutionary vision of science as the triumphant road to the future is dramatically 
visualized.”32
THEOLO GICAL SCIENCE-RELIGION SYNTHESIZERS
The second group in the academic religion and science debate to examine are the 
theologian synthesizers, who, after the scientific atheists, are the most prominent. 
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As we would expect, most of these theologians are liberal Protestants and Catholics, 
and many also have a PhD in a science field and/or are practicing scientists.
They assume that the relationship between religion and science concerns sys-
temic knowledge, and therefore any conflict is due to the failure to synthesize 
the fact claims of religion and science into one hierarchically structured logically 
coherent pyramid. They reject the view that science requires metaphysical natu-
ralism, and take the more mainstream view that science only requires method-
ological naturalism. That is, science cannot address non-demonstrable claims like 
the existence of God, but science should address demonstrable claims about the 
natural world like the age of the Earth. The goal of the synthesizers is then to avoid 
the weak version of systemic knowledge conflict by making religious knowledge 
claims consistent with scientific knowledge claims generated through method-
ological naturalism. For example, they want to interpret their religious tradition 
to make the Genesis narrative consistent with scientific discoveries about the Big 
Bang. I will examine the writings of a few of the more influential theological syn-
thesizers to show that in their striving to avoid conflict they deeply presume that 
the relationship between religion and science concerns systemic knowledge.33
Again, I do not want to give the impression that these efforts are wrong. Indeed, 
you could argue that this task of synthesis is what theology is. Rather, my goal is to 
point out that this perspective cannot be extrapolated to the public.
Ian Barbour’s Four Relationships Between Religion and Science
To see the most common academic depiction of the relationship between religion 
and science, we should start with the late Ian Barbour, who was one of the mod-
ern progenitors of discussions of the relationship between religion and science. 
Wikipedia, which is undoubtedly a primary information source for the public, 
claims that Barbour was “credited with literally creating the contemporary field 
of science and religion.” In the citation nominating him for the Templeton Prize, 
which he won in 1999, John B. Cobb wrote that “no contemporary has made a 
more original, deep, and lasting contribution toward the needed integration of sci-
entific and religious knowledge and values than Ian Barbour. With respect to the 
breadth of topics and fields brought into this integration, Barbour has no equal.”34
Note that, like many of the other academics discussed in this chapter, he does 
not explicitly make a distinction between elite arguments and what the public 
would think. While he and others in this group would probably acknowledge a 
difference, by not being explicit the reader is left to assume that his claims are true 
for all religious people.
For Barbour, the relationship between religion and science is resolutely about 
knowledge. Actually, science is only about knowledge, and religion sometimes has 
to change its theology due to new knowledge, or scientific knowledge raises ethical 
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debates that religion can contribute to. But the reaction by religion is always to the 
knowledge produced by science, not to any of the social or moral aspects of sci-
ence. Finally, knowledge is or should be coherent within each of the two systems, 
which reinforces the systemic knowledge conflict perspective.
The capstone book of Barbour’s career is When Science Meets Religion: Enemies, 
Strangers or Partners, published in 2000, in which he reiterates his typology of 
possible relationships between religion and science. He says early on that this 
“typology was developed for fundamental science as a form of knowledge, not 
for applied science in its impact on society and nature.” There are four possible 
relationships between religion and science: “conflict,” “independence,” “dialogue,” 
and “integration.” That all of these relationships are about knowledge is clear from 
the second sentence of the book: “Most of the founders of the scientific revolution 
were devout Christians who held that in their scientific work they were study-
ing the handiwork of the Creator.” That is, these early scientists were making fact 
claims about nature, and they saw these fact claims as logically consistent with 
their theological belief. The second paragraph emphasizes that what is important 
is that science is a knowledge producer, and that knowledge challenges religion: 
“New discoveries in science have challenged many classical religious ideas. In 
response, some people have defended traditional doctrines, others have aban-
doned the tradition, and still others have reformulated long-held concepts in the 
light of science.”35 Again, this is important activity for the elites, but Barbour does 
not mention that the public might have a different set of priorities, or that religion 
may be about more than facts about the natural world.
The book is structured around five of “the most widely debated questions,” 
over which science and religion could have a relationship. These are all about 
 knowledge—and all are knowledge claims by scientists that religion has to react 
to. First, science has shown that the Big Bang occurred, and religion should dis-
cuss what this means. Second, quantum physics has shown inherent uncertainty 
in the universe, and theology can think about what this means for theological 
thought—in my terms, what quantum physics means for the entire pyramid of 
theological belief. Third, Darwinism has shown a number of facts about where 
humans came from, and theology has developed to consider a more immanent 
God who creates over a long period of time through evolution. Fourth, scientists 
have suggested that due to genetics and body chemistry, freedom is an illusion. 
This calls into question the soul and the mind vs. matter distinction, but some 
theologians have begun to re-think those ideas in light of the science. Fifth, scien-
tists have shown that nature works through rules, but some theologians have taken 
to showing that this can be made compatible with God acting in the world in a way 
that does not violate scientific views. Every one of these questions portrays a sci-
ence that is producing knowledge, and thus religion must react to that knowledge 
either by changing the system of religious belief or interpreting the meaning of 
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that knowledge for the scientists. The debate is most certainly not about the morals 
promulgated by scientists.
This framing of the relationship as only concerning knowledge is even more 
clear when we turn to his four possible relationships, which assume that both 
science and religion are separate, logically coherent belief structures. The first 
relationship, “conflict,” is narrated through debates between Christian Biblical lit-
eralists on the one side and materialist Darwinists on the other, where the debate 
is about “scientific evidence” for evolution.36 So, for Barbour, explicit “conflict” is 
clearly about knowledge claims about nature.
“Independence” holds that science and religion “refer to differing domains of 
life or aspects of reality,” answering “contrasting questions,” that science asks “how 
things work and deals with objective facts;” while “religion deals with values and 
ultimate meaning.”37 This is akin to what was perhaps even more famously depicted 
as “non-overlapping magisteria” by Steven J. Gould.38 This describes two pyramids 
that reach to the apex of their respective core beliefs. Independence is violated 
when religion makes scientific claims, such as when fundamentalists make claims 
about the age of the Earth, or science makes religious claims, such as when scien-
tists promote naturalistic philosophies.
The “independence” relationship is technically advocating no relationship 
between religion and science, but conflict could be about systemic knowledge 
(if religion unjustifiably makes knowledge claims) or about morality (if science 
unjustifiably makes moral claims). However, when he describes the relationship in 
more detail and applies it to various scientific debates, the primary concern is reli-
gion trespassing into knowledge generation, not science trying to develop a moral 
program. Moreover, his description of the task of religion is not about morality, 
but usually about a different way of perceiving reality.39
The “dialogue” relationship is not only about knowledge, but really emphasizes 
that science and religion are separate logically coherent knowledge systems. One 
component of dialogue is talking about knowledge beyond the limits of the abili-
ties of the conversation partner—the “limit questions” which are “raised by sci-
ence but not answered within science itself.” An example would be “why is there 
a universe at all?”; answering such a question with religion does not impact the 
nature of scientific knowledge itself. Another component of dialogue is “a com-
parison of the methods of the two fields.” For example, religious ideas of what can-
not be observed, like God, may help scientists develop methods for unobservable 
subatomic particles. Science can take from religion whatever metaphors and mod-
els may be useful for integration into its system of knowledge. Science properly 
remains a logical unity only beholden to its own epistemology, as in this relation-
ship the two sides are “respecting the integrity of each other’s fields.”40
Finally, “integration” is a partnership of religion and science, and this partner-
ship is about knowledge claims, referencing the natural theology tradition that 
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sought proof of God in the facts of nature. For example, Stephen Hawking has 
claimed that “if the rate of expansion one second after the Big Bang had been 
smaller by even one part in a hundred thousand million million, the universe 
would have recollapsed before life could have formed.” To Barbour, this suggests a 
force controlling the universe, and God “caused” scientific facts, so the system of 
scientific beliefs should be modified to accept this religious belief. He also refer-
ences the “theology of nature” tradition, wherein theological ideas are reformu-
lated to fit with scientific facts, such as the idea of original sin, which needs to be 
“reformulated in the light of science.”41
While the point here is to mix knowledge claims between the two institutions, 
this integration view is even stronger in teaching people that religion and science 
must be logically unified entities. In the end they remain separate but each has 
become even more logical by not ignoring the fact claims made by each other.
Barbour actually does not advocate the “independence” relationship, which 
would block off religion from making any contribution to fact claims about 
the natural world and block off science from making religion more accurate. 
Independence “avoids conflict, but at the price of preventing any constructive 
interaction,” he writes. His “own sympathies lie with Dialogue and Integration,” 
and especially integration42. In general, Barbour’s description of the four possible 
relationships between religion and science reinforces the idea that everyone holds 
elite standards of logical coherence of belief, and that to believe in any science 
is to believe in logically coherent empirical knowledge back to the apex of the 
knowledge pyramid described in Chapter 1. The possibility of propositional belief 
conflict is also never considered as it is presumed that beliefs are nestled in hierar-
chical systems of justification (e.g. systemic knowledge).
Alister McGrath
The dominance of the portrayal of the relationship between science and religion 
as conflict between logically coherent systems of belief or knowledge can be seen 
in the work of other influential synthesizers. For example, the prolific Alister 
McGrath, who has doctoral degrees in molecular biology and theology, is cur-
rently the Andreas Idreos Professor of Science and Religion at Oxford University. 
This long-time participant in these debates titled a 1999 book simply Science and 
Religion: An Introduction. “Science and religion” is implicitly the history of elites 
trying to synthesize the knowledge systems of religion and science. The debate is 
about how one would know anything about the world—a concept high in each 
pyramid—and the book delves extensively into the philosophy of science and reli-
gion, debates over creation, natural theology as well as issues like whether God 
acts through the indeterminacies in quantum theory.43 It is not acknowledged that 
this is a history of elite debates, and it is either presumed that this is what the 
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religion and science debate “is,” or that the public views the debate the same as 
the elites.
Another book by McGrath is titled The Foundations of Dialogue in Science and 
Religion. Were this focused on the contemporary American public, the founda-
tions of dialogue might concern embryonic stem cell research and be a dialogue 
about whether scientists should consider other values besides the relief of suffer-
ing in their moral calculations. But, given that the dialogue between science and 
religion is the (unacknowledged) elite debate between theologians and scientists, 
the book is purely about systemic knowledge. For example, one chapter asks what 
the differences are between religion and science in how “information about the 
world is obtained and its reliability assessed.”44
He does write that attention has been paid to “ethical matters,” such as “whether 
recent scientific developments (such as genetic engineering) raise fundamental 
religious and moral issues.” However, systematic engagement with issues like ethics 
“rests upon a prior substantial engagement with questions of method—including 
such issues as the way in which knowledge is gained and confirmed, the manner 
in which evidence is accumulated and assimilated, and particularly the manner 
in which the world is represented.”45 That is, ethics first depends upon knowledge, 
and knowledge is therefore more important.
John Polkinghorne
Among the most famous of these theologian-scientists is John Polkinghorne, a 
theoretical physicist who later became a theologian and Anglican priest. Later 
knighted by the Queen, and a recipient of the Templeton Prize, like other theolo-
gian-scientists his goal is to make scientific and religious knowledge compatible 
and logically consistent. For example, the Bible does not say anything about quan-
tum mechanics, but quantum mechanics can be made consistent with Christian 
theology. A long quote gives a sense of his concerns:
Quantum theory was the first branch of physics to make it plain that the laws of na-
ture do not always have a tightly predictive character rather, sometimes they can take 
only probabilistic form.  .  .  . Unpredictability is an epistemological property, for it 
concerns what we can know about what is going on. How we relate what we know to 
what is actually the case is a central problem in philosophy, and perhaps the problem 
in the philosophy of science. . . . In the case of quantum theory, this realist strategy 
has been followed almost universally. . . . In the case of the intrinsic unpredictabilities 
of chaos theory, the realist option has been a far less popular move so far. Only a mi-
nority of us have made it. . . . We have done so not only because it accords with a cer-
tain scientific instinct but also because we see here the possibility of the metaphysical 
gain of describing a physical world whose process is not only subtle but also supple, 
in a way that may offer a glimmer of hope of beginning to be able to accommodate 
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our basic human experiences of intentional agency and our religious intuition of 
God’s providential interaction with creation.46
This dialogue is not about moral values. Nor is it about propositional belief claims 
where one fact-claim in the Bible contradicts a fact-claim of science. Rather, this 
dialogue is about whether entire systems of knowledge built up over the centuries 
are consistent with the scientific system of knowledge.
Why Theologians See Conflict as about Knowledge and Belief
I have three basic assertions for why these theologians see conflict as concern-
ing systemic knowledge. The first is seemingly obvious, which is that theology 
is defined as “a system of religious beliefs or ideas,”47 so obviously those who are 
experts in theology will talk of systems of related beliefs or ideas. But, that does 
not explain the focus on knowledge. Indeed, there is another type of theologian 
that is not considered to be part of a religion and science debate, who are, to use 
the Christian terms, moral theologians (Catholic) and Christian Social Ethicists 
(Protestants). The fact that the second type of theologian is not thought to be 
engaged in a “religion and science debate,” even when they debate ethics with sci-
entists, shows the utter dominance of the knowledge perspective.
A second reason why the synthesizing theologians only see knowledge con-
flict is because they are focused on dialogue with scientists—and scientists only 
think of themselves as engaged in discovering knowledge. Indeed, many of the 
most prominent of these synthesizers started their careers as academic scientists 
and only later became theologians. Science is clearly the dominant partner in this 
dialogue, as theology is reacting to scientific developments, not the inverse. Even 
if theologians were to recognize various moral conflicts between religion and sci-
ence, they would not be able to get scientists to focus on morality because this is 
not what scientists think science “does.”
The final reason is that theologians do not have any systematic way of getting 
input from the ordinary members of their religions—theology is not known for 
using the sociology of religion as a source. I will argue below that the conflict for 
the religious public is more concerned with morality. The one-way flow from theo-
logian to the pews means that the public’s view of religion and science that would 
contradict the theologians’ natural inclination cannot reach its target.
DIALO GUE ASSO CIATIONS
Associations that try to produce dialogue and understanding between scientists 
and religious people are very similar to the theological synthesizers. The organi-
zations are largely led by religious scientists. These are probably the most public 
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face of the religion and science debate because of their websites and their educa-
tional materials produced for a general audience. And, to continue the narrative of 
this chapter, they portray any relationship between religion and science as about 
knowledge, not about morals or values.
However, the fact that these associations try to interact with the public allows 
me to begin to develop my argument about the public’s views. Segueing into my 
analysis of later chapters, I will show that the closer these associations get to inter-
acting with the religious public, and not just the elites, they unreflectively start 
describing the relationship—and conflict—as moral and not about knowledge. I 
examine two associations that are arguably the most visible—one because of its 
founder and topical focus, and the other because of its association with the most 
prominent scientific organization in the world.
BioLogos
BioLogos is concerned with integrating scientific claims about biology and evolu-
tion with evangelical Protestant belief. Part of its centrality to the debate is the 
result of its focus on the most prominent disagreement between religion and sci-
ence. BioLogos began in 2006 when geneticist Francis Collins, then Director of 
the Human Genome Project, wrote a book about his own faith and the compat-
ibility of evangelical belief with science.48 The publicity around the book spurred 
him to start BioLogos in 2007, which he led until he was appointed Director of 
the National Institutes of Health in late 2009, which forced him to step down. 
BioLogos has continued with leadership from well-known evangelicals involved 
with religion/science issues.49
One can only imagine what it is like to be Francis Collins. One of the most 
influential scientists in the world, at the pinnacle of influence as Director of the 
Human Genome Project . . . and yet he claims to be a member of a religious tradi-
tion that many elite scientists think is opposed to scientific knowledge. The article 
reporting on his nomination to head the NIH in Science magazine reported that 
“some are concerned about his outspoken Christian faith,” and prominent atheists 
wrote in the New York Times suggesting that his religion disqualified him from the 
post.50 Given that Collins is a scientist, an elite, and surrounded by scientists, we 
can see why these knowledge conflict issues are central to his concerns, as they are 
in his popular book.51
This centrality is designed right into BioLogos. Its five “core commitments” 
include: “We embrace the historical Christian faith, upholding the author-
ity and inspiration of the Bible.” This indicates a standard evangelical yet non- 
fundamentalist orientation toward the Bible, and points high up the knowledge 
pyramid. The second is “We affirm evolutionary creation, recognizing God as 
Creator of all life over billions of years.” This idea, also called theistic evolution, 
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is that evolution occurred as science describes, but was caused by God, or God 
produced Creation through evolution. Again, this is a belief high in the pyramid. 
If you hold that science only requires methodological naturalism, this knowledge 
claim does not conflict with science because it is not demonstrable with science. 
BioLogos’ concern with knowledge is also made clear in the third commitment, 
which is that “We seek truth, ever learning as we study the natural world and the 
Bible.” This seems a reference to a long-standing evangelical conception of the two 
books of God: nature and the Bible, both of which are true.52
A more extensive eleven-point “What We Believe” section fleshes this out fur-
ther. The Bible is clarified as the “inspired and authoritative word of God.” The 
two books of God concept is emphasized, in that “God also reveals himself in and 
through the natural world he created  .  .  . Scripture and nature are complemen-
tary and faithful witnesses to their common Author.” Consistency of belief with 
the scientific consensus is re-emphasized in statements such as “we believe that 
God created the universe, the earth, and all life over billions of years,” and “we 
believe that the diversity and interrelation of all life on earth are best explained by 
the God-ordained process of evolution with common descent. Thus, evolution is 
not in opposition to God, but a means by which God providentially achieves his 
purposes.” Science—at least of the methodological naturalist variety—remains a 
logically coherent system where you need to accept all of the knowledge claims of 
science. It is just that the religion in which one should believe is an evangelicalism 
that does not conflict with any of these knowledge claims.
Finally, BioLogos argues that science requires methodological naturalism and 
not metaphysical naturalism—using the terms “Materialism” and “Scientism” to 
represent metaphysical naturalism. BioLogos writes “We believe that the meth-
ods of science are an important and reliable means to investigate and describe 
the world God has made. In this, we stand with a long tradition of Christians for 
whom Christian faith and science are mutually hospitable. Therefore, we reject 
ideologies such as Materialism and Scientism that claim science is the sole source 
of knowledge and truth, that science has debunked God and religion, or that the 
physical world constitutes the whole of reality.”53 In my terms, BioLogos works to 
avoid weak systemic knowledge conflict through synthesis and rejects the defini-
tion of science that could produce the strong systemic knowledge conflict.
A large portion of their website is devoted to answering questions about evolu-
tionary creationism. These questions are centrally concerned with avoiding conflict 
between the knowledge claims of scientists and conservative Protestants, or within 
conservative Protestantism, with nearly none having any referents to value conflict.54
One way to describe BioLogos is that it is part of the ongoing struggle between 
evangelicalism and fundamentalism, with BioLogos trying to teach the conser-
vative Protestant public the evangelical version of knowledge about the natural 
world. The creation of a systemic knowledge structure that accounts for theology 
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and science is part and parcel of the evangelical worldview. And, I am sure that 
people affiliated with BioLogos recognize moral conflict with science. My point 
is that by not emphasizing that the evangelical public might not have a systemic 
knowledge relationship with science—and may be focused on a moral relationship 
with science—people who encounter BioLogos might be misinformed about how 
ordinary evangelicals view science.
The American Academy for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
Another prominent dialogue association is the “Dialogue on Science, Ethics, 
and Religion” (DoSER), founded in 1995 by the American Academy for the 
Advancement of Science (AAAS).55 Its prominence stems from its sponsor. AAAS, 
founded in 1848, is the world’s largest general scientific society, including 261 affili-
ated societies and academies of science, serving 10 million individuals. It publishes 
Science magazine, which is the largest paid circulation peer reviewed general sci-
ence journal in the world, with an estimated readership of one million people. 
AAAS is the embodiment of institutional science in the U.S.56
DoSER was established to “facilitate communication between scientific and 
religious communities.” But, communication about what? The statement contin-
ues that “DoSER builds on AAAS’s long-standing commitment to relate scientific 
knowledge and technological development to the purposes and concerns of society 
at large,” which suggests this communication is about knowledge claims. However, 
their overview page describes the dialogue as not about knowledge, saying that 
“issues of value and ethics are raised by the appearance of technologies not even 
imagined by earlier generations. Questions of meaning and religion emerge from 
our deepening understanding of the natural order. Issues of value and meaning are 
grounded in the disciplines of ethics and religion.” This is then an endorsement 
of what Barbour called an “independence” relationship, and Gould called “non-
overlapping magisteria.” The religious citizens can be relieved that the AAAS is not 
putting its weight behind metaphysical naturalism in order to eliminate religion 
as the scientific atheists would want. Rather, science requires only methodologi-
cal naturalism, and religion takes up matters of value.57 At first glance, the website 
suggests that science is about knowledge, religion is about morality, so there can be 
no moral conflict as long as science does not talk about its morality.
As we dig deeper, we see DoSER describing the relationship between religion 
and science as the theological synthesizers do, making sure religion does not con-
tradict scientific knowledge claims. Of the two substantive goals of DoSER, the first 
is to “encourage an appreciation among scientists, religious leaders, and religion 
scholars of the ethical, religious, and theological implications of scientific discov-
eries and technological innovations.”58 This repeats the idea that science produces 
knowledge, and this knowledge has implications for religious and theological 
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beliefs. The second goal is to “improve the level of scientific understanding in reli-
gious communities.” Note that there is not a matching goal of “improving the level 
of theological understanding in scientific communities,” suggesting the influence 
of the knowledge deficit model. This is a one-way dialogue: scientific knowledge 
has implications for religious belief, and if religious leaders can learn the science, 
the religious system of belief can be modified.
A report of the DoSER “thematic areas” makes the emphasis on synthesiz-
ing religious and scientific knowledge more clear. One theme is “Physics & the 
Cosmos,” and the description of this theme is dominated by discussion of quarks, 
quasars and quantum mechanics and other physics facts, which “provoke intrigu-
ing physical and metaphysical questions.”59 The theme of “Neuroscience, Brain 
& Mind,” similarly starts with a compendium of fact claims in this area.60 Moral 
challenges, presumably for religion to work on, are included. For example, “many 
recent advances in neuroscience also highlight ethical questions with both societal 
and personal consequences” as science invents things to react to, such as whether 
people should be mandated to take drugs for neurological problems.
As in the other themes, these scientific facts need to be systematized with reli-
gious beliefs. DoSER talks of the spiritual ramifications of neuroscience:
such as the relationship between the human brain and mind. Interdisciplinary re-
search in neuroscience, physics, biology, philosophy and even cosmology has sparked 
interest in the conversation regarding determinism and free will. The premise is that 
if actions of minute atoms can be measured with such a high degree of certainty, then 
can larger aspects of the universe which are comprised of these atoms also be deter-
mined with a keenly devised prescription? Do these predictions extend to choices we 
make, our personalities, and our future? Can we assume biology, conditioning, and 
probabilistic calculations have declared moot our ability to choose? Theologically 
speaking, do these determined actions affect our ability to choose good from evil?61
This points fairly high up the religious belief pyramid to central concepts like free 
will. So far we see that DoSER sees a relationship of systemic knowledge between 
science and religion, where religious and scientific knowledge needs to be syn-
thesized, primarily by religion changing its claims to make them consistent with 
modern science. While mentioning that religion is concerned with morality and 
meaning, DoSER does not see a relationship between science and religion over 
morality because religion has been exclusively given that task. Thus, implicitly, 
science does not promote a particular morality.
DoSER and the Public
DoSER, unintentionally in my opinion, gets closer to accurately describing a rela-
tionship between religion and science among the public that concerns morals 
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when it moves away from elite perspectives focused on knowledge and gets input 
from regular religious citizens and non-elite scientists who have not spent much 
time pondering this issue. A recent project of DoSER was the “Perceptions” proj-
ect, intended to break down false perceptions of scientists by the religious and false 
perceptions of the religious by scientists.62 It primarily focused upon evangelicals, 
and was conducted in partnership with the National Association of Evangelicals 
and the American Scientific Affiliation. The National Association of Evangelicals 
is the largest and most influential coalition of evangelical denominations and 
organizations in the U.S., and the American Scientific Affiliation is, roughly, an 
association of evangelical scientists.
The project seems to have started with an assumption of conflict over knowledge 
or beliefs, with one document stating that “while some evangelicals may be skepti-
cal of scientific theories and worry about the impacts science may have on their 
communities, some scientists feel that evangelical Christianity hinders the growth 
of scientific literacy and argue that religion should stay out of public discourse.”63 
The project held community-based workshops that brought together local scien-
tists and local religious leaders. While not the general public, these people were a 
lot closer to being general members of the public than the elites discussed so far in 
this chapter, in that these local leaders were not experts in this debate.
Encountering a group much closer to the public seemed to necessitate talk-
ing about morality. A discussion guide for the local dialogue groups offered three 
choices for the relationship between religion and science.64 First, “Explore shared 
values and promote understanding,” which may include the values of “service, 
compassion, and perseverance.” This is the rare mention of the fact that scientists 
have values too, and while DoSER wants to highlight agreement, obviously such 
values could conflict as well. The second is to “Work together to confront common 
concerns,” such as “health, education, poverty, environmental stewardship, and 
human rights.” This too builds on a shared value—the “common concern for the 
well-being of others”—and also presumes that scientists have values they promote. 
The third possibility is to “Ensure civility and minimize confrontation” through 
separation, with the motto being “good fences make good neighbors.” It is striking 
how the premise of this project is that tensions can be lowered by by-passing elite 
concerns about fact-claims about the world, and focusing upon the shared values 
of scientists and the religious community.
Geared toward dialogue about issues other than knowledge claims about the 
natural world, it became clear at these workshops that the moral conflict between 
science and religion was two-way, wide, and deep. At a meeting between local evan-
gelicals and scientists in Denver, they talked about renewable energy—presumably 
a topic over which it would be almost impossible to find knowledge conflict, given 
that there is nothing in the evangelical tradition that would be opposed to any of 
the science required for solar panels. One pastor said “It was good to reach into the 
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world of people who are opposed (and sometimes outright hostile) to my world-
view, to understand and remember that each one is a person with very real needs.”65
At the Atlanta workshop, again focused on evangelicals and scientists, the 
report indicated that “other topics—human origins, evolution, stem cell research, 
and human sexuality—were identified as areas around which it will be more dif-
ficult to find agreement.” Two or three of these are fact-claims and one or two of 
these are moral claims—depending on what the discussion of human sexuality 
was about.
The pastor of a Baptist church near Atlanta said he was “surprised to learn that a 
lengthy ethical review process governs all publicly funded research. I had assump-
tions that were not correct. In one instance, we were talking about the sanctity of 
life. The traditional view among many evangelicals is that scientists really have very 
little to do with ‘sanctity of life’ . . . But to hear them say, ‘No, life is very important,’ 
and to understand why they’re doing what they’re doing was eye-opening.”
Clearly, this pastor thinks that scientists have a particular moral stance in public 
debates about embryonic life, and that “scientist” means “those who do not follow 
standard moral norms,” not “those who discover knowledge.” Another participant 
described another scene from the workshop where a biologist quipped, seemingly 
to break the tension, that “We have morals, too!”66 The biologist’s quip suggests a 
deep assumption on the part of the religious participants that scientists are amoral 
or immoral people. Debates about knowledge seemed to be quite secondary.
The program director reported in a newsletter of the AAAS what I will show in 
subsequent chapters: that evangelicals are not rejecting scientific facts because of 
how these facts were generated, but because they oppose the moral message that 
comes with these facts. The director wrote:
In fact, a deeper probe shows that it is actually the underlying basic philosophical 
concerns of religious citizens toward science that can lead to responses of either en-
thusiastic support for science or else rejection of scientific data in ways that can be 
sometimes baffling to scientists.
One evangelical leader who advises the project points out that people within his 
constituency are often more concerned with the “package” that they perceive may be 
coming along with science, rather than any particular result. For example, it may not 
be “the fossil record” or the age of the universe that troubles, but rather the percep-
tion that “evolutionary science implies godlessness” or the concern that “if my child 
is taught evolution in school, will it come wrapped in a package of atheism?”
In other words, Conservative Protestants are not opposed to the scientific method 
per se, but do not like the ideologies that seem to come implicitly wrapped in those 
scientific claims, such as the metaphysical naturalism of the atheist scientists. 
When the project leadership encountered the religious public, they saw that con-
flict was not primarily about knowledge claims, but was about values or morals.
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While this moral conflict was glancingly identified, it was not highlighted, 
presumably because all of the leaders of the project had knowledge conflict in 
their minds. When the perceptions project later turned back to the elites who 
ran it, predictably the conflict reverted to being about knowledge. This is exem-
plified by the fact that, after the dialogue workshops, DoSER produced a book-
let targeted to evangelical congregations called “When God and Science Meet: 
Surprising Discoveries of Agreement,” produced in conjunction with the National 
Association of Evangelicals. Critically, the majority of the leaders and writers for 
this project were either elite leaders of religious groups or academics. The advi-
sory team for this booklet included the president of the National Association of 
Evangelicals, a program officer for DoSER (who is also a scientist who works for 
NASA), the Dean of Natural and Social Science at Wheaton College (a flagship 
evangelical institution), the director of the American Scientific Affiliation, and a 
pastor in the Washington area. They asked a number of people who were both 
“committed Christians” and “credentialed scholars” to write very short essays. 
With the concerns of elites returning to the forefront, this booklet is all about 
systemic knowledge conflict.
The president of the National Association of Evangelicals sets the tone in the 
introduction by making it clear that this is all about fact claims. “We hear our 
doctor describe a life-threatening diagnosis in scientific terms and then rush to 
the hospital chapel, where we pray for divine intervention. We listen to a pastor’s 
sermon from the Bible and wonder how it fits with the latest article in Time or 
National Geographic. We are dazzled by the discoveries about tiny DNA or massive 
galaxies and are humbled by the simplicity of the Bible’s opening line that ‘God 
created the heavens and the earth (Genesis 1:1).’” He offers a solution to knowledge 
conflict by quoting Saint Augustine: “Let every good and true Christian under-
stand that wherever truth may be found, it belongs to his Master,” which is often 
paraphrased as “All truth is God’s truth.”67
In the rest of the essays there are a few passing references to scientists push-
ing metaphysics and moral values. There are warnings about “scientists who 
arrogantly puff up their knowledge of nature into materialistic metaphysics, or 
who claim that science trumps all non-scientific moral restraint,” or of science 
implicitly teaching naturalism beyond the lab. However, by and large the ten other 
short essays reiterate a version of the systemic knowledge conflict narrative. For 
example, the two books of God perspective is ubiquitous, such as where the book-
let claims that scientific skills “provide real knowledge of God’s real world, not to 
be overruled by theological or church authority.”68
In sum, when DoSER is focused on elites, it reinforces and reflects the elite view 
of a systemic knowledge conflict. However, when it encounters the public, in this 
case by facilitating conversations between local pastors and scientists, it turns out 
that moral conflict is just as important as knowledge conflict.
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THE TEMPLETON FOUNDATIONS
Readers who are familiar with these debates will note that nearly every per-
son and organization discussed in the synthesizer and dialogue sections of this 
 chapter—and numerous people who would fit in those categories but who were 
not mentioned—are involved with the Templeton foundations in some way. There 
are three foundations: The John Templeton Foundation, the Templeton World 
Charity Foundation, and the Templeton Religion Trust.
Sir John M. Templeton (1912–2008) was an early innovator in the mutual fund 
industry, making a large fortune along the way. His upbringing was in both the 
Cumberland Presbyterian Church (generally an evangelical Protestant denomi-
nation) and, seemingly paradoxically, the Unity Church.69 The Unity School of 
Christianity (Unity Church) was founded by Charles and Myrtle Fillmore in 1889, 
and is a metaphysical and mystical blend of Christianity and pantheism. This 
group emphasizes that the mind controls healing, that God is an impersonal prin-
ciple, that God is in everything, that the divine exists within everyone, there is no 
Heaven or Hell, and that Jesus was an exemplar of spiritual truth, not the Christ.70
Templeton had a very strong view of the abilities of science, seeing that it was 
primarily through scientific research that religion could make “spiritual progress.” 
It is quite clear from his voluminous writings that in his life he was primarily con-
cerned with discovering the truth of reality. While clearly science was to be used 
to discover truth about nature, Templeton was clear that there was much reality 
beyond nature. Such truth was not to be found through at least present-day sci-
ence or through religion, but through a religion that used science to discover more 
truths. Scientific research would “supplement the wonderful ancient scriptures” 
that were limited by their time.71 Thus, both science and religion are about true 
knowledge.
He was obviously not an advocate of a science that required metaphysical 
naturalism, given that he thought science could be used to show the details of 
what God truly is. He was an advocate of a science that requires methodological 
 naturalism—God is not part of a scientific explanation, but scientific findings can 
help us understand God. That is, he was the ultimate advocate of synthesis, where 
science would proceed using a secular method, and religion would learn from that 
science, adjusting its doctrines as it approached spiritual truth.
This is clear in his long-time advocacy of a “humble approach in theology and 
science.” The problem was that while scientists were humble, the theologians were 
not. He wrote that “as part of a historical legacy of the scientific method, most sci-
entists have learned to avoid the stagnation that comes from accepting a fixed per-
spective. . . . They have learned to become epistemologically open-minded, always 
seeking to discover new insights and new perspectives.” However, “often theolo-
gians, religious leaders, and lay people can be blind to obstacles they themselves 
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erect. . . . Many do not imagine that progress in religion may be possible, perhaps 
by appreciating ways that sciences have learned to flourish and by being creatively 
open to a discovery-seeking and future-oriented perspective. For so many reli-
gious people, the future of religions seems nothing much beyond the preservation 
of ancient traditions.”72
He clearly envisioned scientific research in fundamental physics, such as quan-
tum mechanics, as providing spiritual insight into the “mind of God.” Another 
approach to spiritual progress was to use science to determine whether there was 
evidence of “universal purposes in the cosmos.” Other fields like human evolution 
could tell us about the spiritual practices of Neanderthals, which could give us spir-
itual insight today. Another Templeton program examined “conceptually expansive 
ways of understanding the world,” as a way to “connect science with concepts of 
divinity,” and included research in “quantum information theory, quantum chaos, 
game theory and ethics, emergence of order, timetabling, consilience, the nature of 
mathematics, the limits of knowledge, aesthetics, the theology of artificial intelli-
gence, and the theology of extraterrestrials.”73 Templeton, and his foundations, were 
also strong advocates of the idea of dialogue between religion and science.
To return to my terminology, Templeton was, like the theological synthesizers, 
an advocate of the weak version of the systemic knowledge relationship between 
religion and science. Religion and science were in conflict over fact claims, but his 
hope was to avoid conflict by synthesizing the two pyramids into one coherent one 
that would actually be an improvement on both. Critically, science and religion are 
not centrally concerned with morality, but rather, and ideally, both are concerned 
with determining spiritual truth.
Templeton and his foundations did not create the synthesizers and the dia-
logue promoters—those were part of academia long before Templeton came on 
the scene. And, again, this sort of research is totally legitimate and is, in fact, what 
theologians are supposed to be doing. What Templeton and his foundations did 
was to amplify these ideas, involve more people than would otherwise be involved, 
and make these ideas much more publicly prominent than they otherwise would 
be. Like the other debaters in this and the following chapter, it would have been 
better for public debate about religion and science if Templeton grantees had been 
required to emphasize in all of their output that what is being discussed may not 
be how the general public views religion and science. Moreover, an implication 
of the later pages of this book is that the Templeton foundations might consider 
whether moral conflict is stopping many religious people from accepting the sci-
ence that Templeton thought was required for spiritual progress.
C ONCLUSION
The overwhelming assumption among scientists and theologians in the academic 
religion and science debate, as well as the dialogue associations, is that there is a 
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systemic knowledge relationship between religion and science. This is almost a state-
ment of faith among scientists who think that since they are only producing knowl-
edge, the only reason anyone else would be in conflict with them would, of course, be 
about knowledge. This reaches its apotheosis in the form of the scientific atheists who 
are assuming a different scientific belief system than most other  scientists—a meta-
physical naturalism instead of just a methodological  naturalism—which makes 
holding any religious idea at all incompatible with science.
Fundamentalist Protestant Biblical inerrantists ironically agree with the sci-
entific atheists about knowledge conflict, but simply reverse the conclusion: it is 
scientific knowledge that needs to be modified because it is incompatible with 
fundamentalist Biblical exegesis. The theological synthesizers also see any rela-
tionship as concerning systemic knowledge, but to avoid conflict they aim to 
change the religious knowledge system so that knowledge conflict does not exist. 
This perspective has been amplified by funding from the Templeton foundations. 
Critically, all of those discussed in this chapter are implicitly teaching systemic 
knowledge conflict to the public.
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The Academic Analysts of the 
 Relationship Between Religion 
and  Science
In addition to scientists and theologians in the academic debate, there are a number 
of other academics who are analysts or observers of the relationship between science 
and religion who, I will show, are also teaching the public the systemic knowledge 
perspective. In this chapter I will focus on the two most active groups, the historians 
and the sociologists. Historians show, for example, that Victorian era scientists often 
thought they were investigating the details of God’s creation, and thus there was 
harmony in religious and scientific knowledge. Sociologists assume that the spread 
of scientific knowledge is a cause of the loss of religious belief. As in the previous 
chapter, I will also offer an explanation of why these fields see the relationship in this 
way. I will particularly focus upon explaining this view within the field of sociology, 
given that it often focuses on the general public, and I am claiming that the public 
does not use systemic knowledge to understand science and religion.
HISTORIANS OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE
In recent decades, historians have been on a quest to debunk the claim of the inevita-
ble conflict between religion and science over knowledge about the world. They want 
to replace the universal knowledge conflict narrative with descriptions of the lim-
ited times and places such conflict has occurred, and emphasize the other times and 
places where there was no conflict over knowledge.1 While debunking the simplistic 
view of universal conflict, the historians nonetheless inadvertently reinforce the idea 
that the relationship, and any conflict, is by definition about systemic knowledge.
It is difficult to generalize about the complexity that historians see in the rela-
tionship between religion and science. Metaphorically, imagine two stages facing 
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each other. On one is a cast of one hundred characters, each representing a differ-
ent religion in a different time and place. On the other is a cast of one hundred 
characters, each representing a different conception of science in a different time 
and place. As the numerous combinations of characters stand one at a time at the 
front of each stage and face the other, historians may write about that relation-
ship. For example, the character representing mid-eighteenth-century American 
science looks little like the science character today. That character could face a 
 mid-nineteenth-century Catholic religion character, an evangelical Protestant reli-
gion character, a Jewish religion character and so on—each of which would have 
a different relationship with that particular version of science. Only some would 
be in conflict, and others would be in perfect harmony. Given these historical par-
ticularities, we can see that there was not a universal conflict in the Middle Ages, 
for example, because Isaac Newton was religious. Similarly, in the late Victorian 
era there was not universal knowledge conflict because many Anglicans agreed 
with Darwin about evolution. And, in early twentieth-century America, there was 
conflict between Darwinism and many conservative Protestants.
Again, this link across the stages is almost always about knowledge claims about 
nature, thus reinforcing the knowledge conflict narrative. There are also social, 
political, personality, disciplinary, and other conflicts described, but these are 
usually part of explaining a knowledge conflict. There are sometimes instances of 
moral conflict identified, particularly for the twentieth-century debates, but these 
are not separately theorized, and I will focus on discussing these in Chapter 4.
I start with the extremely influential late twentieth-century summary statement 
of historical work in this area, John Hedley Brooke’s encyclopedic history Science 
and Religion: Some Historical Perspectives. The book starts in the sixteenth century 
and generally proceeds chronologically. As we go through Galileo to Darwin and 
so forth, it is quite clear that the relationship between science and religion—be it 
supportive, conflictual, subsuming, or anything else—is about systemic knowl-
edge. To take but one of the innumerable possible examples, he discusses Isaac 
Newton’s “apprehension lest a fully mechanized universe might cripple divine 
activity.” We can almost see Newton trying to make consistent and systematize all 
of the knowledge in his pyramid when Brooke describes Newton’s dilemma:
His disenchantment with the cosmology of Descartes was partly due to the boldness 
with which the French philosopher had presumed to show how an organized solar 
system could develop from a disorganized distribution of matter. Newton insisted 
that organization could not result from disorganization without the mediation of 
an intelligent power. As if to defuse the deistic tendencies of Cartesian philosophy, 
Newton scrutinized the universe for evidence of divine involvement. . . . Because his 
voluntarist theology allowed events in nature to be explained both as the result of 
mechanism and of the divine will, there was a difficulty in determining what kind of 
event would most demonstrate divine involvement.2
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Anticipating my claim about late twentieth-century elite moral debates about sci-
ence, which I will examine in the next chapter, the final 10 of the 347 pages in the 
book are about “science and human values” in the twentieth century. In that sec-
tion, portrayed as a very recent development in the long history of religion and sci-
ence, but prefigured in various ways, Brooke discusses controversies surrounding 
human reproductive technologies and the moral problems supposedly caused by 
Darwinism. He is largely not discussing history, but what were at the time of his 
writing current events. Like other historians who view this development in the cur-
rent time or very recent history, it is not seen as a change in the relationship between 
religion and science, and not the imminent decline of debates about knowledge, 
but more like an additional wrinkle that has emerged in recent decades.3
We could use any other of the histories of science and religion to describe 
conflict over systemic knowledge. But one of my favorite examples comes 
from Peter Bowler, who examines debates about religion and science in early 
 twentieth-century Britain, and shows heroic attempts at iron-clad logical con-
sistency in knowledge and belief by the elites of the time. One debate was about 
whether materialism, a belief high in the scientific knowledge structure, could be 
changed to make room for religion. Some solutions included the idea that “mat-
ter itself was mysterious, and thus offered no suitable foundation for the kind of 
materialism that sought to eliminate mind and purpose from nature.” Another 
was that “ether theory” would allow for a worldview “that was still in touch with 
science, but which transcended materialism and allowed the scientist to believe 
that the universe as a whole was a divine construct.” The general idea was to take 
abstract scientific beliefs like materialism and make them compatible with reli-
gious belief and vice versa.4
Given the voluminous output of historians, it is difficult to easily demonstrate 
the utter dominance of their assumption that any relationship between science 
and religion concerns knowledge of the natural world at minimum, and a systemic 
knowledge relationship at maximum. I will make my case by summarizing the 
103-chapter encyclopedia titled the History of Science and Religion in the Western 
Tradition, published in the year two thousand, which contains chapters from most 
of the prominent historians of religion and science of the time.5 The table of con-
tents give us the general story. Part 1 is titled “The Relationship of Science and 
Religion,” and there is not an entry titled “Morality” or “Moral Debates.” However, 
there are fourteen entries that all refer to knowledge, such as “Natural Theology” 
and “Views of Nature.”6 These are followed by “Biographical Studies” of Galileo, 
Pascal, Newton, and Darwin—who we know of because of their roles in major 
transformations of our understanding of knowledge of the natural world.
The next section is titled “Intellectual Foundations and Philosophical 
Backgrounds.” These twenty-six chapters are even more clearly focused on knowl-
edge generation, with topics such as “Cartesianism,” “Baconianism,” and “German 
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Nature Philosophy.”7 Part 4 contains twelve chapters concerning “specific religious 
traditions and chronological periods.”8 The encyclopedia then turns for the final 
forty-seven entries to the history of groups of disciplines making fact-claims about 
nature. These are grouped under the headings of “Astronomy and Cosmology,” 
“The Physical Sciences,” “The Earth Sciences,” “The Biological Sciences,” “Medicine 
and Psychology,” and “The Occult Sciences.”
This is not to say that moral conflict is unmentioned in the over six hundred 
tightly packed pages of this encyclopedia. Rather, it is not central and not theo-
rized. The first two framing essays are telling. In the first, historian David Wilson 
examines the historiography of science and religion, and it is clear that the histori-
ography up to that point was about the relationship between science and religion 
over knowledge about the physical world.9 The next chapter is a summary of all 
historical studies on the conflict with science and religion, and historian Colin 
Russell outlines the “issues of contention.” The first is purely systemic knowledge, 
“in the area of epistemology: Could what we know about the world through science 
be integrated with what we learn about it from religion?” An example involves “the 
Copernican displacement of the earth from the center of the solar system.” The 
second issue is also purely systemic, and has been in the realm of methodology, 
between a “science based on ‘facts’ and a theology derived from ‘faith.’”10 So far he 
is describing conflict over ways of knowing facts—a belief far up each pyramid.
Russell identifies another conflict, which he calls “social power.” Here he points 
to historiography of religion and science that concerns knowledge conflict, but the 
explanation for the conflict is that the debate is not really about knowledge, but an 
attempt to undermine the power of institutional religion or science in society. His 
example is the efforts of the scientific naturalists associated with Thomas Henry 
Huxley and their attempt to overthrow the hegemony of the English church.11 This 
is still concerned with knowledge conflict, it is just that the motive for the conflict 
is not truth itself.
The final conflict he identifies is “in the field of ethics,” and this unintention-
ally demonstrates that historians have almost exclusively focused on knowledge 
conflict. The final conflict seems to contradict my claims in this section. However, 
unlike the other conflicts he identifies, and like Brooke, he turns from the histori-
cal literature to contemporary society, saying “most recently this has been realized 
in questions about genetic engineering, nuclear power, and proliferation of insec-
ticides.” Again, like Brooke, he gestures to the few nineteenth century cases that 
have been discussed by historians—such as debates about the morality of vac-
cination and anesthesia and moral reaction to Darwin—but then turns back to 
the present, writing that these have been replaced by “conflict over abortion and 
the value of fetal life.” He then distances historians from this version of conflict by 
writing that “in nearly all of these cases, however, it is not so much science as its 
application (often by nonscientists) that has been under judgment.”12 I take this to 
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be an oblique reference to present-day reality, but also an acknowledgment that 
historians have largely not focused on this type of conflict. Historians have seen 
the same social phenomena as I have in the contemporary world, but they have not 
worked out its implications.
Explaining Historians’ Focus On Knowledge Conflict
Historians are not wrong, but their claims need to be restricted to history and not 
the present day. The first and most important reason the historians are correct is 
that historians largely study and write about the elites who spent time thinking 
about religion and/or science, and such persons are more concerned with systemic 
knowledge. Ronald Numbers writes that historians have had little to say about 
popular views of religion and science, and even regrets that two of his own edited 
volumes have neglected the views of the public.13 There are good reasons for this 
neglect. One is, especially for historical studies before the nineteenth century, that 
what the actual “common folk” thought was irrelevant to what was going to hap-
pen in society and to the evolution of debates about religion and science. These 
societies were not democratic in the same way we think of them today, with no 
public spheres to provide input from the governed to the governors. Illiteracy was 
widespread, and the vast majority of the people in a country would have been pri-
marily concerned with their own survival. In fact, most social elites did not even 
have the time to understand science. An early historian of the Royal Society wrote 
that Descartes and Newton’s mechanistic view of the universe, “could be known 
but only to those, who would throw away all their whole Lives upon it. . . . It was 
made too subtle, for the common, and gross conceptions of men of business.”14
Moreover, the historians have focused on elites, and thus on systemic knowl-
edge conflict, because the common folk, in Numbers’ explanation, “left little evi-
dence of their thoughts, and much of what we have is filtered through the writings 
of those who observed them.”15 Of course, historians have tried to get as close to 
the public’s views as possible. Peter Bowler’s book is almost exclusively about elites, 
but he tried to get some information about the public by examining how many 
books were sold to the public. For example, he examined sales of popular novels 
by HG Wells, but unfortunately this cannot tell us too much about what ordinary 
people were thinking.16 Bernard Lightman has similarly written about the popu-
larizers of science in the Victorian era, and these popularizers, while elites, were 
one step closer to the public than other elites.17 James Secord was able to painstak-
ingly compile evidence of readers’ responses to the Vestiges of the Natural History 
of Creation, a naturalistic pre-Darwin British account of human origins. Letters, 
diaries, publicity for events, and even handwritten marginalia were all obtained—
but this sort of study is the exception, not the rule, because these data rarely exist, 
and certainly would be extremely fragmentary before the nineteenth century.18
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The second reason that historians have focused on knowledge conflict, besides 
their necessary focus on elites, is that it is quite plausible that the farther one goes 
back in time, the more the debate between religion and science was about systemic 
knowledge for both the elites and the public. As Harrison and other historians 
have so convincingly shown, what “science” and “religion” have been over time 
has changed. The rise of our contemporary version of science in the nineteenth 
century, and its separation from religion, has meant that science is responsible for 
the vast majority of knowledge about the world. I would argue that while religion 
used to see one of its tasks as explaining the natural world, religion in the U.S. has 
moved away from this task, and that this long process has accelerated within the 
lifetimes of many of the current scholars in the religion and science debate—or so 
I will argue in Chapter 5. So, the focus of historians on knowledge conflict may not 
only be due to the focus on elites, but because there was knowledge conflict fifty 
or more years ago.
SO CIOLO GY AND SYSTEMIC KNOWLED GE C ONFLICT
If I am right about the differences in reasoning between elites and the public, we 
would expect that since social scientists often study the contemporary public, they 
will not describe conflict between religion and science as between two hierarchi-
cally organized knowledge systems. However, they have, up until the most recent 
years, assumed the same conflict that other academics see. In part this is because, 
at least historically, many of the social science studies of religion and science have 
been of elite scientists. However, even those who study public opinion surveys 
have assumed systemic knowledge conflict. As I will explain later in this section, 
this is a result of the deep assumptions of social science derived from its origins 
in the nineteenth century. While a variety of social scientists have contributed to 
these debates, and I will touch upon this variety, the debates about religion and 
science in the industrialized West have been dominated by sociologists.
Before engaging in my interpretation of the impact of the sociological litera-
ture, I should acknowledge the one study that more directly examines the extent 
to which social scientists believe in, and pass on to students, the idea of a systemic 
knowledge conflict between religion and science. An empirical examination of the 
content of contemporary anthropology textbooks shows that they depict a situa-
tion where “science and religion have always been, and will continue to be, bitter 
adversaries.” The author did not design his study to examine knowledge vs. moral 
conflict, but it is quite clear from his quotations that these anthropology textbooks 
depict the irredeemable conflict as concerning knowledge. For example, when 
anthropology textbooks depict religious reaction to Darwin, depictions include 
“the intense conflict between the new evolution paradigm in science and an out-
moded static worldview in religion” and “evolution and the principle of common 
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descent demolished the scientific plausibility of creation and design for the uni-
verse.” This conflict is depicted as continuing to this day, as “evolution remains an 
active source of debate in many societies due to the fundamental contradictions 
between religious interpretation and scientific investigation.”19 The author’s inves-
tigation of sociology textbooks reaches a similar conclusion.20 At least these two 
social sciences directly teach the systemic knowledge conflict to their students.
Sociological Theory
The tendency to depict the relationship between religion and science, and there-
fore any conflict, as concerning knowledge has been most marked in sociological 
theory. To be fair, most of this high theory is making historical claims, or was writ-
ten long ago, and knowledge conflict may well have been the situation in the past. 
However, without exposure to studies of contemporary religious people, students 
learning these theories will presume that the depiction of religion and science is 
accurate today.
Consider as an example the theory of the rationalization of religion. German 
social theorist Max Weber, writing at the turn of the twentieth century, viewed 
religion as becoming more rationalized with time, and believed that the 
Protestantism of the Reformation was a particularly strong example of this pro-
cess. In the words of Peter Berger, one of the most influential interpreters of 
Weber’s sociology of religion:
The Catholic lives in a world in which the sacred is mediated to him through a variety 
of channels—the sacraments of the church, the intercession of the saints, the recur-
ring eruption of the “supernatural” in miracles—a vast continuity of being between 
the seen and the unseen. Protestantism abolished most of these mediations.  .  .  . 
This reality then became amenable to the systematic, rational penetration, both in 
thought and in activity, which we associate with modern science and technology. 
A sky empty of angels becomes open to the intervention of the astronomer and, 
eventually of the astronaut. It may be maintained, then, that Protestantism served as 
a historically decisive prelude to secularization, whatever may have been the impor-
tance of other factors.21
Rationalization in religion had resulted in a situation where mysterious forces and 
powers were replaced by the calculation and technical means embodied in mod-
ern science. This then leads to religion reducing the number of truth claims about 
the world that are not compatible with the “systematic, rational penetration” that 
we “associate with modern science and technology.” This may well be an accurate 
depiction of how religions have changed in the West over time. Note that in this 
account religion is resolutely about knowledge, and a religious perspective on how 
the world operates is in conflict with the scientific perspective.
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Studies of the Religiosity of Scientists
Many participants in the historical or theological debate about religion and science 
will be most familiar with the sociological studies of the religiosity of scientists, 
which have been the most consistently used research design in the sociology of 
religion and science over the past fifty years. These studies not only presume that 
any conflict between science and religion is about knowledge, but are testing for 
the presence of the strong version of the systemic knowledge relationship between 
religion and science. They assume that scientists are metaphysical naturalists, 
holding a rigidly coherent belief system up to first principles—a similar strength of 
coherence that Dawkins demands where believing in scientific fact-claims means 
you cannot have one non-scientific belief (such as the existence of God). Thus, this 
research design is used to determine if scientists have any religious belief. Since it 
is assumed that the most elite scientists are those who have thought the most about 
how scientific knowledge is justified, the assumption of this research is that they 
should then be much less religious than the public.
Early twentieth-century studies of the religious beliefs of scientists found that 
scientists were less religious than were the public, and that higher-status scientists 
were the least religious of all.22 A study of graduate students in the early 1960s also 
came to the same conclusion, and found that the students who were better edu-
cated and who were doing what was necessary to achieve higher scientific status 
were less involved with religion.23
But later studies found that social scientists were even less religious than natural 
scientists, despite their being less “scientific.”24 While this evidence still supported the 
knowledge conflict thesis, it subverted the linearity of the model, and being more sci-
entific did not necessarily mean being less religious. Scholars explained this variously 
as an effect of “scholarly distance from religion,” or as a “boundary posturing mecha-
nism” by social scientists trying to appear more scientific by being less religious.25
Current research suggests that while scientists are less religious than the public, 
just as in the early twentieth century, religiosity (in varying forms) is persistent 
among scientists.26 Elite scientists at top research universities remain much less 
conventionally religious with, for example, 28 percent of the population being 
evangelical but only 2 percent of elite scientists identifying with this tradition. 
Similarly, 27 percent of the population but only 9 percent of elite scientists are 
Catholic. More generally, 16 percent of the public but 53 percent of elite scientists 
do not have a religious identity.27 (Studies of super-elite scientists, such as mem-
bers of the National Academy of Sciences, find very few who believe in a personal 
God.)28 Differences in religiosity across the scientific status hierarchy are lessen-
ing, so that being in a more “scientific” discipline is a less useful predictor of the 
religiosity than many other characteristics of the scientist, such as age, marital 
status, and childhood religious background.29
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Ecklund and Scheitle critique the literature in this tradition by writing that it 
“supports the perception there is a conflict between the principles of religion and 
those of science, such that those who pursue science tend to abandon religion, 
either because of an inherent conflict between knowledge claims or because sci-
entific education exerts a secularizing force.”30 This literature then presumes that 
religious people will not only avoid areas of science that make contrary claims to 
religion—as is the case with conservative Protestantism and biology—but all sci-
ence, because people are assumed to be logically consistent and cannot believe one 
scientific claim without believing in all of them.31 This literature has traditionally 
been part of the debate about the causes of secularization, because it was thought 
to be a test of whether scientific belief leads to a decline of religious belief.
The most recent studies of elite scientists have begun to look for reasons 
beyond the idea that religion and science are conflicting knowledge systems 
where the conflict is relieved by abandoning religion. For example, more recent 
studies by Ecklund and her colleagues have shown that religiosity of the home 
when one is a child is the most important predictor of present religiosity among 
elite scientists, that science is more like an identity that is threatened by a reli-
gious identity, and that most elite scientists do not perceive a conflict between 
science and religion.32
Sociological Survey Researchers
In later chapters, I will be showing evidence from surveys about whether contem-
porary religious people are in different types of conflict with science. However, 
up until very recently it has not been possible to demarcate types of conflict due 
to a lack of data on anything beyond the amount of scientific knowledge held by 
a religious respondent. Moreover, sociological survey researchers have been able 
to determine whether contemporary religious people avoid science in various 
ways, but do not know why avoidance is occurring. The dominant assumption in 
this research is that which sociology inherits from its intellectual origins and the 
broader academic debate—avoidance is due to systemic knowledge conflict, where 
religious people avoid science because they disagree about some scientific facts 
and do not want their belief system to be threatened.
When survey researchers generalize, this conflict is often described as the strong 
version of systemic knowledge conflict, where religion and science are incom-
patible at the highest level of the pyramid. For example, sociologists Ellison and 
Musick, before critiquing the view, summarize the dominant academic assump-
tion about the incompatibility of any religious belief with science:
Over the years, many observers have asserted that scientific materialism, as the 
guiding ideology of the scientific community, is ontologically and  epistemologically 
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 incompatible with conventional Western religious belief  .  .  . In simplest terms, 
 scientific materialism holds (1) that matter (or matter and energy) is the fundamen-
tal reality in the universe, and (2) that the scientific method is the only reliable means 
to disclose the nature of this reality. . . . In contrast, Western religious traditions gen-
erally assume that the universe and its inhabitants have been created by, and often are 
guided by, a supreme intelligence that transcends the material world. . . . Moreover, 
religious adherents embrace these tenets despite the lack of (a) public data, (b) exper-
imental testing, and (c) standard evaluative criteria for ascertaining their validity.33
Empirical sociologists tend to limit their claims to particular religious groups, and 
have focused on conservative Protestants because the elites in this tradition have 
had the most public conflict with science. The assumption is that conservative 
Protestants are in systemic knowledge conflict with science because they reject 
the very basis of all science and instead look to God’s revelation for truth about 
the natural world. The best place to view this assumption is in the social science 
literature on educational attainment, where one central question is: why is there 
a somewhat lower level of obtaining undergraduate and graduate degrees among 
conservative Protestants?
In general, the exact reason cannot be assessed due to lack of data, so instead 
scholars determine if people from particular religions really do have different 
attainment, and then speculate about why, based on what is otherwise known 
about society. (This is a common approach in social science.) The traditional 
explanation is that conservative Protestants have less educational attainment 
because they want to avoid scientific knowledge, which they are in conflict with. 
For example, sociologist of religion Darren Sherkat, who generally claims that 
conservative Protestants “view secular knowledge with considerable suspicion and 
disdain,” writes that:
In line with fundamentalist orientations towards knowledge, assessments of valid-
ity are most often generated a priori—requiring little assessment of the relative fit 
between events or data and abstract concepts. For many committed fundamental-
ists the “truth” is known based on understandings and interpretations of funda-
mentalist Christian sacred texts.  .  .  . The orientation towards knowledge which 
tends to permeate conservative Christian belief systems precludes a systematic ex-
amination of the complexities of human conflict or the natural world. . . . abstract 
processes like disease, plate tectonics, or the scientific method can have diminished 
cognitive consequence, since ultimately the gods are responsible for the dynamics 
of earthly matter.34
Again, this is not propositional belief conflict where religion and science only con-
flict over a few fact claims. Rather, religious people’s lack of belief in scientific 
claims is due to their different method for justifying claims, which is systemic 
knowledge conflict.
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A slightly different argument is that conservative Protestants are opposed to 
knowledge acquisition not generated through the method of biblical exegesis, and 
thus would not want to learn about any science. In explaining what leads people 
to obtain a graduate degree in science, two economists posit that conservative 
Protestants will be less likely to obtain such a degree because “to the extent that 
science is incompatible with a set of core Christian beliefs, and/or is antagonistic 
to beliefs about the Bible as an inerrant source of truth, differences in belief among 
individuals about the truth content of the Bible can generate differences in the util-
ity and cost of acquiring a science education.”35 The authors continue by claiming 
that conservative Protestants will be opposed to obtaining any knowledge itself, 
and particularly any knowledge based upon materialism.36
Similarly, Sherkat writes that “according to some activists and adherents in con-
servative Christian communities, the search for knowledge is often equated with 
a sinful predisposition toward self-love and pridefulness—and juxtaposed with 
the fundamentalist ideal of faithful and unquestioning servitude.”37 Again, this is a 
claim of conflicting systems of belief, not individual fact-claims, as it is claimed that 
conservative Protestants are opposed to all secular knowledge, because of how it 
was generated, not just claims that contradict fact claims conservative Protestants 
see in the Bible.38
Most of the sociological data cannot distinguish between knowledge and moral 
conflict, so scholars offer explanations that reflect their assumptions. If what I say 
in subsequent chapters is correct—that the dominant form of conflict among the 
religious public is moral—it would be surprising if the sociologists who study con-
temporary members of the general public did not see moral conflict at all in the 
data. What we find is that these sociologists, particularly in more recent years, 
unreflectively combine what I am calling knowledge conflict and moral conflict 
explanations. My approach in later chapters will be to pull apart these two expla-
nations and test them separately.
As an example of this unreflective and untheorized mixing of explanations for 
conflict, sociologists Andrew Greeley and Michael Hout imply that knowledge 
conflict leads to moral conflict. In a survey analysis, they find that conservative 
Protestants are less likely to agree that “science will solve our social problems,” and 
more likely to agree that “science makes our way of life change too fast,” “scientists 
always seem to be prying into things that they really ought to stay out of,” and 
that “science breaks down people’s ideas of right and wrong.” Each of these state-
ments is not about knowledge or facts about nature, but about the moral effect 
of science. However, they interpret the responses to these moral questions not as 
moral conflict, but as indicators of knowledge conflict. They write that “it is hardly 
unexpected that the conservatives are skeptical about science” and “conservative 
Protestants take their stands not because they are uneducated but because they 
hold strong religious beliefs that take precedence over scientific facts.”39 In this 
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passage, not only do religious beliefs take precedence over scientific facts—the 
knowledge conflict assumption—but the moral conflict is actually a knowledge 
conflict.
In another example of such mixing of explanations, Sherkat theorizes that 
he will find that conservative Protestants are less scientifically literate. The rea-
son is their opposition to scientists’ claims about evolution, which are in conflict 
with biblical claims, and “unscientific views of seismic events” like Pat Robertson 
claiming that an earthquake hit Haiti because Haiti made a pact with Satan. But 
in Sherkat’s argument for why conservative Protestants have less scientific knowl-
edge, he unreflectingly includes disagreements that have nothing to do with 
knowledge claims, such as “opposition to embryonic stem cell research,” and that 
the students avoid “not only basic science courses, but also courses in social stud-
ies and literature that may question conservative Christian values about tolerance, 
social relations, sexuality and gender roles, and cultural diversity.”40
Similarly, a study of religion and wealth, unable to distinguish the mechanism 
connecting the two phenomena, unreflectively asserts both moral and knowl-
edge conflict in explaining what is seen as a pattern of conservative Protestants 
attaining less education. The author writes that conservative Protestant “cultural 
orientations tend to be at odds with the approaches of nonreligious schools and 
universities that propagate secular humanist values  .  .  . and promote scientific 
investigation rather than acceptance of divine truths.”41
Sociologist Kraig Beyerlein does offer a moral conflict explanation for a lack of 
educational achievement for conservative Protestants in which the basic conflict 
is the culture of universities more broadly. Beyerlein, citing Sherkat, says that one 
possible reason conservative Protestants avoid college is “the scientific method 
practiced in state colleges and universities threatens such conservative Protestant 
world views as a creationist understanding of human origins and a literal interpre-
tation of scripture.” But, he then adds a moral reason, which is that “the empha-
sis on emancipation from traditional authority stressed in public institutions of 
higher learning undercuts a variety of core theological and familial precepts of 
conservative Protestantism, especially submissiveness of children to God and to 
their parents.”42
Like the others in this research area he lacks the data to determine which con-
flict is actually keeping conservative Protestants from college, but his conclusion 
undermines the idea that it is only knowledge conflict. He finds that evangeli-
cals have the same level of educational attainment as mainline Protestants as well 
as higher attainment than fundamentalists or Pentecostals. This he attributes 
to the fact that the “the cultural traditions of fundamentalist Protestantism and 
Pentecostal Protestantism advocate withdrawing from the broader culture,” while 
“the cultural tradition of evangelical Protestantism generally stresses engaging the 
broader culture.”43
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THE ORIGINS OF SO CIOLO GICAL BIAS TOWARD 
SEEING KNOWLED GE C ONFLICT
I will spend more time on explaining sociological bias toward seeing knowledge 
conflict than I spent on the other academic fields because sociology appears to 
be such an anomaly. Assuming that the analysis I report in later chapters is cor-
rect, and the contemporary religious public is primarily concerned with a moral 
relationship with science, why have the sociologists who study the public not seen 
moral conflict?
It is important to recognize that social science thinks of itself as a science. Many 
social scientists do not like that term because it implies they have the same positiv-
ist epistemology as natural scientists. However, social science can be interpretiv-
ist or positivistic; its analyses quantitative or qualitative; its methods observation, 
interview, survey, or the summation of records—but social scientists share with 
the natural scientists the basic Enlightenment ideal of making claims on the basis 
of observation and reason.
Therefore, it is not just that social scientists observe a relationship between nat-
ural science and religion—they have their own relationship as a science with reli-
gion. Using my pyramid metaphor in Figure 1 in Chapter 1, there would be a social 
science pyramid and a religion pyramid, and as I will show below, the inherited 
theories of social science presume that social science is in an extreme form of sys-
temic knowledge conflict with religion. Both social science and religion are seen 
as systems of justified beliefs about the world, with methods and theories halfway 
up each pyramid. Therefore, when sociologists see natural science in relationship 
with religion, they presume that religion is a hierarchical system of belief about the 
super-natural, and that empirically observed facts about the world by science will 
undermine the foundations of this belief. Put simply, both natural and social sci-
ence see religion as a really inaccurate system of developing fact-claims about the 
world. How did social science—and sociology in particular—develop this view?
The answer is that sociology was born with the strong version of systemic 
knowledge conflict in its DNA—akin to that of the scientific atheists—and thus 
this perspective is built into sociological theories. Like the scientific atheists, sociol-
ogy depicts religion as a hierarchical system of justified belief that can be shown to 
be false by (social) science. With this assumption built into sociology, it is hard for 
sociologists to see any debate involving religion and science that is about morality.
To understand this bias in sociology, we should remind ourselves of the dis-
tinction between the strong and weak systemic knowledge conflict—between 
methodological naturalism (“a disciplinary method that says nothing about God’s 
existence”) and metaphysical naturalism (which “denies the existence of a tran-
scendent God.”)44 Sociology was born in the Enlightenment era, assuming both 
methodological and metaphysical naturalism.
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The social science version of methodological naturalism is that a social scientist 
cannot invoke the supernatural in explanations of social behavior. For example, a 
social scientist cannot claim that God causes wars. The social science version of 
metaphysical naturalism is that if we believe social scientific explanations of social 
behavior we also cannot believe that God exists. With metaphysical naturalism 
built into sociology, it is easy to see why sociologists have not seen moral conflict 
with science. Like other scientists, they define religion as that which makes (false) 
knowledge claims about the world.
The Origins of Social Science and Methodological 
and Metaphysical Naturalism
Historically, the natural sciences adopted methodological naturalism, and much 
later a small subgroup of atheist scientists began to promote metaphysical natu-
ralism. In contrast, social science was born as a challenge to religious authority, 
and thus began by assuming metaphysical naturalism. Metaphysical naturalism 
presumes or subsumes methodological naturalism. Social scientists, not natural 
scientists, were the original scientific atheists.
For our purposes, the origin of social science is in the Enlightenment of 
seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe. One of the central concepts in 
Enlightenment thought was that people should use their own senses and reason 
to evaluate the physical and social worlds, and not tradition, faith, or religious 
authority. The first proto-social scientists were Enlightenment figures such as 
Montesquieu, Smith, Condorcet, and Herder, whose work was premised on the 
idea that history was caused by human action. While this seems obvious today, 
this was a change from earlier conceptions in which humans influenced history 
but history was ultimately under God’s control. By the early nineteenth century all 
of reality, including what had previously been seen as immutable and unchanging, 
came to be seen in contextual historical terms.45
Building on earlier Enlightenment ideas, the “scientific” aspirations of the first 
social scientists were the result of the natural science triumphs of the era. Natural 
scientists had been seen as successful in explaining all sorts of natural phenomena, 
and the proto-social scientists wanted to transplant those successes to understand-
ing the social world. For example, French philosopher Auguste Comte (1798–1857) 
is often portrayed as the founder of both sociology and positivism. He looked to 
natural science as an inspiration for understanding society, and invented “sociol-
ogy” to “complete the scientific revolution by bringing human phenomena within 
the orbit of positive study.” Moreover, reflecting the metaphysical naturalism of 
the Enlightenment-era social scientists, he tried to make positivism a “new world-
religion to replace Christianity,” complete with an ecclesiology—with social scien-
tific experts at the apex of priestly authority. His metaphysical naturalism—which 
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held that religion is a set of beliefs about the world that are false—was clear in his 
depiction of the stages of history, stages that reflected standard nineteenth century 
beliefs about progress. The first stage, infancy, was based in theology that assumed 
religion is about claims to nature (“the anthropomorphic projection of fictive 
causes”). The second, adolescence, is based on metaphysics, the rule of abstract 
ideas. The third, maturity, is “positive,” and based on “evidential knowledge hav-
ing the form of laws.”46 In this scheme, belief in transcendent force is evidence of 
a backward society.
Enlightenment-era social scientists gathered social facts in the pursuit of moral 
causes. Social science was designed to “liberate humankind from ignorance and 
oppression,” with Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for example, arguing against inequality 
and for the dignity of the person.47 As contemporary sociologist Malcolm Williams 
writes, there was an important “difference between the natural and social sciences 
in the nineteenth century—even at their most avowedly scientific. The latter were 
not just about how the world ‘is’ but how it ‘ought’ to be.”48 One of these “oughts” 
was demonstrating that religion is false.
Anthropology is like sociology in its presuppositions about religion and indeed, 
“throughout its entire history as an academic discipline, anthropology has been 
perceived as having an ethos that is predominantly hostile to religious convictions, 
especially those of Christianity.” Founding anthropologists of the time shared 
Comte’s view of progress and the idea that religion was based on false claims about 
nature. Edward Tylor, the first person to hold a faculty appointment in anthro-
pology and often called “the father of anthropology,” saw three stages of human 
history: savage, barbaric, and civilized. In his theory, “religion is fundamentally 
the erroneous thought of ‘savages’ that has continued into civilized contexts by 
sheer, unreflective conservatism, even though its false intellectual foundations 
have now been exposed.” In fact, “anthropology should be a ‘reformer’s science,’ 
which actively worked to eradicate religion from modern civilization.”49
The most famous anthropologist of the generation after Tylor was James Frazer, 
whose stages of history were magic, religion, and science. Religion and science 
were locked in a battle over true knowledge, as he thought that “religion gives 
primitive, irrational answers to questions correctly answered by science.” He too 
saw one purpose of this social science as demonstrating that religion is a set of 
false beliefs, believing that “anthropologists should work to ensure that science 
would increase and religion decrease,” writing that “it is for those who care for 
progress to aid the final triumph of science as much as they can in their day.”50
The first sociological theorists, building on Enlightenment thought, devel-
oped more elaborate theories that promoted metaphysical naturalism, using 
social science reasoning to explain how religious belief was false, and actually 
reducible to social forces. Karl Marx (1818–1883), Max Weber (1864–1920), and 
Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) later became known as the “classical theorists” of 
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sociology or, pejoratively but tellingly, the “holy trinity” of classical sociological 
theorists. These three would ultimately be more directly influential than the earlier 
Enlightenment figures, and were clearly engaged in an agenda of metaphysical 
naturalism.
What these three shared was an assumption that individual humans were alien-
ated from the objective world, and that therefore people do not realize that the 
social forces that act upon them are actually the result of human activity. The cen-
tral purpose of the classic sociologists was then “demystification”—to make people 
aware of humanity’s own control over itself. Critically, religious belief was one of 
the primary institutionalized ideas that people needed to become aware was not a 
force outside of humanity, but something that humans had invented. For example, 
for Marx, religious beliefs are caused by the relations of the means of production 
in a particular era, and religion is one aspect of false consciousness that humanity 
needs to see through in order to experience true liberation. In its bumper-sticker 
version, religion is the “opiate of the masses” depriving humanity of the correct 
perception of who is oppressing them.
Durkheim similarly argued that people do not realize that it was they who cre-
ated religious symbolism, not some transcendent force, and that religion was a 
metaphorical representative of the society. If people would agree with Durkheim’s 
insight that sacred symbols were actually a reflection of social relationships, this 
fact would undermine religion in the same way that showing humans had evolved 
from lower primates would do. The general goal of the classic sociologists was to 
show “that the force believed in as divine entities were merely reflections of social 
experience.”51 Classical sociology argued that not only should social science use 
methodological naturalism, but also that social scientists have an obligation to 
promote metaphysical naturalism to further human freedom. Social science and 
religion were not compatible or capable of synthesis—the point of social science 
was to show that religion is false. To this day, sociology PhD programs in the U.S. 
begin the first semester with a class devoted to these classical theorists.
Sociology in America
At the same time the classical sociologists were writing in Europe, on the west 
side of the Atlantic social science was coming into its own. Historians point to this 
period, between the end of the American Civil War and World War I, as a trans-
formative time for naturalist thought in American academia. Before this period, 
American natural scientists tended to believe that science described the details of 
God’s creation, and thus science was ultimately supportive of theological claims.52 
But, “increasingly after 1870,” write historians Jon H. Roberts and James Turner, 
“scientists preferred confessions of ignorance to invocations of supernaturalism.”53 
It helped that the dominant version of Christianity in academia of the time was 
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what would now be called liberal Protestantism where, for example, the Bible was 
not thought of as literally true in all details.
The growing specialization within academia contributed to the emergence of 
distinct social science disciplines, and what we would now consider social science 
was at the time embedded in courses on moral philosophy. Specialization meant 
carving off the social aspects of the field of moral philosophy, and the proto-social 
scientists of the time thought this specialization was critical for their future growth 
in the universities.54 The proto-social scientists allied themselves with the increas-
ingly powerful natural sciences which, by this time, were reaching consensus on 
methodological naturalism. Roberts and Turner describe it well:
As disciplines that self-consciously sought to ally themselves with the natural sci-
ences, the human sciences were in a very real sense born with a commitment to 
methodological naturalism, as . . . the natural sciences had already rendered exclu-
sion of the supernatural from discourse quite conventional. Indeed, the notion that it 
was essential to restrict discourse and patterns of explanation to natural agencies and 
events had become one of the reigning assumptions in conceptions of what it meant 
to do science. Disciplines with aspirations to anchor themselves within institutions 
dedicated to scientific inquiry and production of knowledge could ill afford to incur 
the taint of “speculation” by incorporating God into their analysis.55
American sociologists reached back to European figures like Comte, and built 
metaphysical naturalism and systemic knowledge conflict into the bedrock of 
American sociology. Ironically, American sociology started as a field that col-
lected social data for the Social Gospel movement—a late nineteenth-century 
religious social reform movement.56 As Northern Baptist pastor and influential 
social gospel advocate Walter Rauschenbusch wrote, “we need a combination of 
the Kingdom of God and the modern comprehension of the organic development 
of human society . . . So directing religious energy by scientific knowledge that a 
comprehensive and continuous reconstruction of social life in the name of God is 
within the bounds of human possibility.”57 These religious social reformers were 
methodological but not metaphysical naturalists. As contemporary sociologist 
Michael Evans writes, “most Social Gospel writers committed themselves to scien-
tific approaches and knowledge without committing to the underlying secularism 
of Comte or Spencer.”58
A competing faction of sociologists that wanted to be seen as forwarding an 
objective science of society regarded any association with religion as detracting 
from that goal.59 This made metaphysical naturalism attractive. Moreover, nearly 
all of the scientific sociologists in America during the discipline’s establishment 
“were personally hostile to religion per se,” writes contemporary sociologist 
Christian Smith. “These were skeptical Enlightenment atheologians, personally 
devoted apostles of secularization.”60
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The motivation for promoting metaphysical naturalism was a combination 
of the personal anti-religiosity of the founders and the need to draw very strong 
intellectual boundaries against the competing group of religious social gospel 
sociologists. By delegitimating religious belief writ large, this latter faction could 
be convincingly defeated and sociology could be a “science,” given that natural 
scientists, with their naturalistic assumptions, controlled what was considered to 
be legitimate knowledge in universities.
In his examination of sociology textbooks published from the 1880s through 
the 1920s, Christian Smith concludes that they were devoted to the idea that reli-
gious knowledge-claims were false. In the words of a nineteenth-century textbook 
writer, emphasizing that religion is about knowledge claims about nature, “All . . . 
phenomena are now satisfactorily explained on strictly natural principles. Among 
people acquainted with science, all . . . supernatural beings have been dispensed 
with, and the belief in them is declared to be wholly false and to have always been 
false.” Echoing Comte, another textbook states that religion is the anthropomor-
phic projection of “savages,” and that this projection constitutes “the basis of all 
religious ideas.” Smith concludes that the textbooks claim that “religion is con-
cerned with the spiritual realm, which is beyond sociology’s ability to examine, 
but . . . all religions are finally reducible to naturalistic, material, and social causes, 
and are clearly false in their claims.”61
In sum, while metaphysical naturalism is not dominant in the natural sciences, 
the European social scientists such as Comte advocated for metaphysical natural-
ism, and this was adopted by American social science. Later European theorists 
like Marx, Weber and Durkheim reinforced this vision. American social science 
was born with methodological naturalism in its DNA, and sociology was born 
with a commitment to advocating metaphysical naturalism as well.
Committed to showing that religious beliefs are false, sociologists saw religion 
as about knowledge about the world, and therefore any conflict with science must 
be about knowledge. Moreover, it was not just a few religious beliefs that were 
false, but the entire religious system of knowledge, further encouraging soci-
ologists to see systemic knowledge conflict. Of course, most sociologists are not 
consciously engaged in promoting metaphysical naturalism or cognizant of the 
systemic knowledge assumptions embedded in classic sociological theory. Rather, 
when needing to go beyond their data, they must turn to theoretical assumptions 
to complete their claims, and they turn to theories which assume systemic knowl-
edge conflict.
C ONCLUSION
In the previous chapter I showed that the elite scientists and the theologians—the 
advocates—are having a debate about systemic knowledge conflict. In this chapter 
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I showed that the academics who are observing or analyzing the conflict between 
science and religion also see systemic knowledge conflict. Historians primar-
ily examine elites from the past, so it is not surprising that they have primarily 
observed systemic knowledge conflict. This could be because they inevitably study 
elites, or because religion and science in the past were engaged in systemic knowl-
edge conflict.
We might expect that sociologists, who do study the public, would not portray 
the religion and science relationship as one of systemic knowledge conflict. What 
we find is that theories that originated a hundred or more years ago, but are still 
influential to this day, promote the idea that any relationship concern systemic 
knowledge. These have left a legacy of difficulty in seeing anything but knowledge 
conflict.
Elites in the literatures portrayed in the past two chapters are portrayed as reso-
lutely concerned about knowledge conflict. However, the historians are studying 
debates of more than fifty years ago, and the sociological theories I reviewed are 
similarly aged. If we look at elite debates of the past fifty years, we will see a pre-
sentation of religion and science that does not imply conflict over knowledge, a 




The Recent Transformation of Elite 
 Academic and Public Debates
My claim is that the religion of the American public has changed in the past 
fifty years—within the lifetimes of many current participants in these debates. 
Moreover, the public’s view of science as primarily a means of generating facts 
about nature has similarly changed. These changes have resulted in the current 
relationship between religion and science being primarily concerned with moral-
ity. In this chapter I will show that religion and science conflicts of the past fifty 
years, as well as sociological theory developments in the same time frame, have 
already demonstrated the same change—although this has not been recognized by 
scholars. I cannot demonstrate that the public’s new view changed the elite debate 
or vice versa, but when the information in this chapter is combined with that of 
the next, we will see that overall the relationship between religion and science has 
indeed changed.
I first examine the recent history of academic sociology debates that are not 
about religion and science per se, and are therefore not beholden to existing cat-
egories, but which do suggest that sociology is unconsciously moving away from 
the systemic knowledge conflict perspective. I then turn to the recent history of 
public debates between elite scientists and theologians, akin to the bulk of histori-
cal studies of religion and science, and show that these are primarily about moral-
ity, with the religious accepting the knowledge claims of science as true.
Of course, nobody tripped a historical switch in 1967 that transformed soci-
ety. The antecedents of this moral debate existed for a century, as has been recog-
nized by historians, particularly those examining debates about Darwin. However, 
since historians do not examine the present, they have largely not seen that these 
were indeed antecedents of a transformation that is only evident from looking at 
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contemporary society. I therefore re-narrate the history of debates over Darwin 
from a moral perspective.
In the systemic knowledge conflict account, the supposed clash in the seven-
teenth century between Galileo and the pope over claims about the physical world 
is a totemic object. To be provocative, the recent conflicts between science and 
religion described in this chapter will eventually be a replacement for the Galileo 
account—a shorthand way to say that history shows there has “always” been an 
“inevitable” conflict between religion and science over morality.
RECENT SO CIAL SCIENCE THEORIES
Definitions of Religion That Do Not Focus on Knowledge of Nature
The definitions of religion that are used when people see types of knowledge con-
flict are those that see religion as concerning distinctions between “nature” and 
“super-nature,” or, more commonly, the “supernatural.” Since science is tasked 
with explaining nature, this ends up defining religion as that which is not science, 
thus setting the stage for seeing systemic knowledge conflict. However, since the 
1960s there has been a competing family of definitions of religion which opens 
the possibility that contemporary religion is not centrally about knowledge-claims 
about nature. If the authors of these competing theories are reflecting the beliefs of 
ordinary religious people, this suggests that “religion” is ultimately something that 
does not clash over knowledge.
There are two dominant traditions in defining religion: the substantive and 
the functional.1 Substantive definitions divide the world into sacred and profane, 
where the profane world is explicable by human reason. The sacred world operates 
outside of the power of human reason (e.g., science) to explain it—this is typically 
called the transcendent or supernatural. Thus, substantive definitions of religion 
generally “refer to transcendent entities in the conventional sense—God, gods, 
supernatural beings and worlds, or such metaempirical entities,” with Max Weber 
defining religion as “a cumulative rational systematization of ideas concerning the 
supernatural.”2
This results in religion being defined as the “irrationalities,” as the “not- science.” 
Defining religion as that which is not demonstrable with human reason fits quite 
well with metaphysical naturalism, and focuses the analyst on claims about the 
natural and supernatural world. With this definition in hand, religion is about 
beliefs and knowledge claims, and therefore any conflict with science is bound to 
be over beliefs and knowledge claims.
This is what religion “is” in the religion and science debate. If religion is based 
on fact claims about nature, as that which is above or beyond nature, then it is easy 
to see religion as a failed attempt to explain the natural world. As the new atheists 
are fond of pointing out, a fundamentalist Protestant exegesis of the Bible makes a 
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conflicting fact claim about the natural world—the age of the Earth—and a supe-
rior system called science has come along to show that religion is a faulty system 
of explanation.
In contrast are functional definitions of religion, which became more influential 
in the 1960s, where religion is any cultural system at its most abstract. Functional 
definitions of religion identify a religion as that which does certain things for a 
group of people, independent of content, transcendent, or otherwise. One of the 
most influential of these definitions among sociologists is that of anthropologist 
Clifford Geertz, who in the late 1960s defined religion as “(1) a system of symbols 
(2) which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and moti-
vations in men (3) by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and 
(4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods 
and motivations seem uniquely realistic.”3
Geertz further explains each of these elements in his definition. “A system of 
symbols” is like a program “for the institution of the social and psychological pro-
cesses which shape public behavior” that is based in a social group. “Moods and 
motivations” are about how we are supposed to live, our sense of direction, and 
what we aspire to. Religious symbols “express the world’s climate and shape it,” 
shaping it “by inducing in the worshiper a certain distinctive set of dispositions 
(tendencies, capacities, propensities, skills, habits, liabilities, pronenesses) which 
lend a chronic character to the flow of his activity and the quality of his expe-
rience.” Religions formulate “conceptions of a general order of existence,” where 
the entire world and our values make sense.4 Creating an “aura of factuality” that 
makes the “moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic” are, for my purposes, 
that these socially oriented moods and motivations are come to be thought of as 
true through social interaction. In this definition, religion is not about knowledge 
of the natural world.
Others, such as sociologist Peter Berger, published similar and equally influ-
ential conceptions of religion during this same era.5 Religion in these functional 
definitions is a combination of understanding the social world and telling us what 
we should do in the social world. Again, religion is not about facts of nature.
I could be easily convinced that premodern religion concerned fact claims 
about nature, since surviving in nature was probably central to most people’s expe-
rience. However, in the contemporary Western world, nature is not the problem 
for our survival, but our social relationships are. Therefore, using this definition 
of religion, religion is much more about morality and social relationships than 
it is about facts. For example, from this perspective on what religion is, while an 
evangelical will tell you that the Genesis account of creation is true, that does not 
really matter in their life, and this ritual enactment of this truth actually exists to 
deliver a social or moral lesson, such as “we are not God.” Did Job of the Hebrew 
Bible and Christian Old Testament exist? Some churches would say yes to this 
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fact-claim, but that does not matter to an ordinary congregant as much as the fact 
that the collective belief in Job teaches the community a social and moral message 
about suffering.
A study of secularization on a Danish island nicely demonstrates how chang-
ing the definition of religion can allow the analyst to see a relationship between 
religion and science in the public quite differently than has historically been por-
trayed. Anthropologist Andrew Buckser concluded that the decline in religious 
activity on the island was not because of science. Rather, it was due to how social 
relationships on the island had changed due to agricultural mechanization, which 
had, in turn, reduced the population of villages and weakened social ties. He con-
cludes that the problem with using the then-dominant secularization theory to 
understand his case is that it uses a definition by which religion is “a method of 
explaining the physical world through the supernatural.” But, he concludes, citing 
Geertz, that “in any religion, explaining the physical world is only a subordinate 
task; it is explaining the social world, giving it meaning and moral value, which is 
religion’s primary concern.”6
While the established and older definition of religion was pushing him to see 
systemic knowledge conflict, by adopting the newer functional definition of reli-
gion he saw that any conflict between religion and science was social or moral. 
To the extent that this definition of religion was generated through observing the 
most recent religious public, this strand of social science theory suggests that we 
are right to question whether the contemporary religious public is in knowledge 
conflict with science.
Questioning Science as Neutral Knowledge
From the other side of the religion-science relationship, scholarship in the field 
of the sociology of science evolved in the mid 1970s to challenge the idea that sci-
ence is a value-free investigation of the truth of nature independent of influence 
from the social and moral worlds. Intellectually, this was largely a reaction to a 
Whiggish historiography of science, which portrayed today’s scientific truths as 
inevitably coming to be realized. Sociologists and other academics involved in the 
nascent field of science studies came to agree with Hegel, who wrote that “truth is 
not a minted coin which can be given and pocketed ready-made.”
One of the basic insights of the late 1970s Edinburgh School of science stud-
ies was that social situations and interests influenced the fact claims about nature 
that are made by scientists. While there is an extremely strong version of this view 
that suggests that truth does not exist, I think most academics would agree with 
the milder form, which is that truth does exist, but that human access to truth is 
limited and influenced by our social relationships. Part of the intellectual strategy 
of the Edinburgh School was to bracket whether a truth claim was later agreed to be 
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true by scientists, and to show how scientists had to use various social mechanisms 
to convince their colleagues of claims that would eventually be considered true 
(the double-helix structure of DNA) and false (phrenology).
The early academic statements in this field made the case that the establishment 
of a scientific knowledge claim as true was a social achievement, not something 
that would just emerge on its own.7 Severed from the truth of nature, science had 
to make efforts to establish truth and authority, not unlike how religious lead-
ers had to establish truth and authority. There have been sporadic studies in sci-
ence studies that do not start with the assumption that the science is correct and 
the religion is incorrect. For example, one set of studies examined how scientists 
struggled to demarcate “science” from “non-science,” and therefore establish social 
authority for their knowledge claims.8
The eventual term for this academic field—the sociology of scientific 
 knowledge—indicates that while science was still thought of as concerning knowl-
edge, it certainly also was about social relationships and morals, in service of creat-
ing authentic knowledge. This field, developed within the past fifty years, reflects 
the post-1960s public skepticism about all institutions, and suggests that the public 
might not be as confident as they were in the past that scientists are only engaged 
in the morally neutral discovery of truth about the natural world.
New Secularization Theory Without Systemic Knowledge Conflict
Recent secularization theory also has shifted away from a focus on knowledge. The 
classic studies of secularization presumed systemic knowledge conflict—that the 
growth of certain types of rationality embodied in modern science—were central 
to secularization. In one summary, “the era of the Enlightenment generated a ratio-
nal view of the world based on empirical standards of proof, scientific knowledge 
of natural phenomena, and technological mastery of the universe. Rationalism was 
thought to have rendered the central claims of the Church implausible in modern 
societies, blowing away the vestiges of superstitious dogma in Western Europe.”9
The most explicit version of this knowledge conflict account of secularization 
comes from Anthony Wallace, who saw science as directly causing secularization. 
He wrote that “the evolutionary future of religion is extinction. Belief in super-
natural beings and supernatural forces that affect nature without obeying nature’s 
laws will erode and become only interesting historical memory. . . . Belief in super-
natural powers is doomed to die out, all over the world, as the result of the increas-
ing adequacy and diffusion of scientific knowledge.”10
However, a twenty-first-century strand of secularization theory avoids assum-
ing that religion is centrally concerned with knowledge about the world, but 
focuses on religion as an institution with multiple tasks and interests, struggling 
against other institutions. The focus here is on power and agency of individuals 
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within institutions, and empirical study of public interactions supports a different 
view that is incompatible with knowledge conflict. Secularization is not the result 
of a creeping habit of thought but rather due to secularizers—people who have an 
interest in discrediting religion.11 Since it is not science per se that has a seculariz-
ing effect, these secularizers do not need to be scientists. For example, journalism 
as a profession secularized as subjective religious perspectives in newspapers were 
jettisoned in order for the media to have an impact on public education.12
The recent use of rational choice secularization theory also ignores science. 
This strand of theory was developed as a reflection of social reality—it was devel-
oped in part to explain the empirical reality that science had not destroyed religion 
in the U.S., one of the most scientifically advanced countries in the world. This 
theory assumes a constant demand for religion from the public, and seculariza-
tion happens where religious organizations do not effectively meet this demand.13 
Europe is then more secular than the U.S. because of its religious monopolies, as 
represented by national churches, which result in lazy, ineffective religious suppli-
ers. America is then more religious because our diverse and competitive religious 
market maintains efficient religious organizations.14 Secularization is then not the 
result of science.
Even secularization theories that seem based on religion being a faulty under-
standing of nature have been tweaked to make them not about nature per se, but 
about the typical human response to nature. For example, Norris and Inglehart 
created a theory of secularization based on existential security where, in tradi-
tional societies, a lack of existential security comes from nature, and thus religion 
explains nature. However, in the U.S., a lack of existential security comes from 
society, where people could die due to a lack of healthcare. The existence of reli-
gion in the U.S. would then be due to this social threat, and the reason the U.S. has 
not secularized like Western Europe is, essentially, the absence of a welfare state. 
Scientific knowledge does not cause secularization per se, rather science causes 
secularization by allowing for the technology that provides existential security. 
This appears to be a clear case where a theory reflects society, in that the persis-
tence of religion in the U.S.—in spite of claims that science should have wiped it 
out—led to a new theory that does not include science per se.15
The secularization literature has been the location of much of the sociologi-
cal work on the relationship between science and religion. The earlier tradition 
assumes systemic knowledge conflict between science and religion, with an 
increase in science mechanically leading to a decline in religion. Secularization 
theories of the past fifty years no longer presume that the decline of religion is 
due to the spread of scientific knowledge. This suggests that when these theorists 
examine the contemporary religious public they do not see a religion centrally 
concerned with knowledge.
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THE RECENT HISTORY OF ELITE SCIENTIST S AND 
THEOLO GIANS IN C ONFLICT
We have extensively examined the historical literature in the previous chapter. 
How about the recent history of the past fifty years, which is typically not cov-
ered by historians? We saw evidence in the previous chapter that when historians 
more informally shift to discussing the contemporary era, they unreflectively 
start describing moral conflict, not knowledge conflict. In my examples below, 
we see conflict that lacks any knowledge component whatsoever, and only con-
cerns morality. These conflicts are often prefigured in earlier periods. If it was 
true that pre-1960s American religious elites were in conflict with elite scientists 
over knowledge, I would argue that scientists won that contest, and scientists 
are now moving on to try to take the one remaining jurisdiction of theology— 
morals or values.
Scientists Trying to Produce Meaning for Humanity
What should be the source of the social norms that underpin a society? In the 
West these underpinnings have been religion. But, at various points in the past 
100 years scientists have gained a level of confidence to assert that science should 
be the source of the norms that undergird society. By the late nineteenth century, 
a number of elite scientists and other intellectuals had created the rationale for 
a pseudo-religious “ethic of science” that would replace religion—what intellec-
tual historian David Hollinger calls “the intellectual gospel.”16 This ethic of science 
included disinterestedness, objectivity, universalism, and veracity, and sociologists 
will recognize the similarity with what Robert Merton in the early 1940s consid-
ered to be the norms of science.17 This ethic, epitomized and replicated by the 
best of the scientific community, could have religious potential for the society.18 
In one particularly evocative formulation of the advantage of this religion of sci-
ence, an advocate wrote in 1916 that “the truly scientific mind ‘cannot be brought 
within the bounds of a narrow religious formulary . . . yet it is essentially devout, 
and it influences for good all with whom it comes into contact.’” As a popular 
book written by a biologist stated in 1922, “‘the scientific habit of mind’ would 
‘satisfy the ethical and philosophical desires which have been hitherto formulated 
as religion and theology.’”19 Intellectual historian Andrew Jewett writes that this 
group “reasoned that, because science carried with it a set of ethical resources, it 
could ground a democratic culture in the absence of a central religious authority, 
and thereby take over the core political functions of the pan-Protestant establish-
ment.”20 Hollinger implicitly endorses my thesis that this moral conflict has largely 
been ignored by historians when he writes that “the intellectual gospel may not 
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have been an episode in any ‘warfare’ of science and religion, but it did function 
in a real struggle between rival claimants to the cultural leadership of the United 
States.”21 Quite obviously, this has little to nothing to do with knowledge.
There was a very similar elite debate between religion and science from the 1950s 
forward that has also not been described as a debate between religion and science. 
Like the earlier “ethics of science” debate, the reason for its invisibility is probably 
that it was not about fact claims about nature, but about morality, so it did not fit 
into scholars’ conception of what an actual religion and science debate is.
This 1950s and 1960s era debate between theologians, scientists, and others 
eventually became what is now called the “public bioethical debate.” In previous 
texts I have examined the history of this debate, and what is most important for 
my present purposes is that I am unaware of any instance in all of that deliberation 
where a theologian challenged a scientist or physician about a fact claim about 
the natural world.22 Instead, the theologians wanted to discuss either the morality 
behind, or the moral implications of, the scientists’ activity.
Starting in the 1950s, scientists and physicians had made huge progress with the 
degree to which they could intervene in the human body. Scientists came to think 
that they would soon be able to engage in mind control, human cloning, human 
genetic engineering, test-tube babies, parthenogenesis, human/animal chimeras, 
organ transplantation, and much more. This led to deeper questions, such as what 
a human was and when would you know someone was actually dead so that you 
could remove their organs. Some of the elite scientists of the time were not content 
with making fact claims about nature, but were trying to have science answer the 
questions that had typically been associated with theology.
As Robert Edwards, co-inventor of in-vitro fertilization would later recall, 
“many non-scientists see a more limited role for science, almost a fact-gathering 
exercise providing neither values, morals, nor standards. . . . My answer . . . is that 
moral laws must be based on what man knows about himself, and that this knowl-
edge inevitably comes largely from science.”23 Similarly, Jacob Bronowski would 
state in 1962 that “I am, therefore, not in the least ashamed to be told by somebody 
else that my values, because they are grounded in my science, are relative, and his 
are given by God. My values, in my opinion, come from as objective and definitive 
a source as any god, namely the nature of the human being.”24 Like the advocates 
of the “intellectual gospel” before them, elite scientists argued that science could 
set the morals of society.
Some of the theologians of the time recognized that they were being chal-
lenged on moral grounds by biologists. For example, Methodist theologian Paul 
Ramsey was opposed to some of the planned activities of the scientists on moral 
grounds, but was primarily opposed to the moral system being promoted by the 
scientists, recognizing that these scientists posed a challenge to theology’s jurisdic-
tion over determining meaning and morality. He was opposed to what he called 
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the “surrogate theology” of the “cult” of “messianic positivism” of the scientists. 
Reacting to scientists like Edwards and Bronowski, he thought the scientists’ goal 
was not to be an “exact science” of knowledge generation, but to provide the mean-
ing of life:
Taken as a whole, the proposals of the revolutionary biologists, the anatomy of their 
basic thought-forms, the ultimate context for acting on these proposals provides a 
propitious place for learning the meaning of “playing God”—in contrast to being 
men on earth.
[The scientists have] “a distinctive attitude toward the world,” “a program for ut-
terly transforming it,” an “unshakable,” nay even a “fanatical,” confidence in a “world-
view,” a “faith” no less than a “program” for the reconstruction of mankind. These 
expressions rather exactly describe a religious cult, if there ever was one—a cult of 
men-gods, however otherwise humble. These are not the findings, or the projections, 
of an exact science as such, but a religious view of where and how ultimate human 
significance is to be found. It is a proposal concerning mankind’s final hope. One is 
reminded of the words of Martin Luther to the effect that we have either God or an 
idol and “whatever your heart trusts in and relies on, that is properly your God.”25
Scientists soon realized that they had over-reached, and many influential scien-
tists called for an end to scientific claims to remake humanity for fear that such 
talk would threaten funding for the science that most scientists wanted to do. For 
example, Harvard bacteriologist Bernard Davis agreed with the other scientists 
that science had “replaced earlier supernatural and animistic explanations of the 
universe” and thus “split the rock underlying Judeo-Christian morality.” But, the 
“failure of science to provide a basis for a replacement, underlies much of the trag-
edy, anxiety, and rootlessness of the present age,” precipitating attacks on science.26 
He began a 1970 article by decrying the statements of influential scientists by argu-
ing that “some of these statements, and many articles in the popular press, have 
tended toward exuberant, Promethean predictions of unlimited control and have 
led the public to expect the blue-printing of human personalities.” Moreover, the 
“exaggeration of the dangers from genetics will inevitably contribute to an already 
distorted public view, which increasingly blames science for our problems and 
ignores its contributions to our welfare.” This “irresponsible hyperbole has already 
influenced the funding of research.”27 A few years later he would explicitly reject 
the moral project of other elite scientists. He wrote that scientists had accepted a 
“naive” view that “failed to recognize the fundamental distinction between empiri-
cal questions, concerned with the nature of the external world, and normative 
questions, concerned with moral values.”28
The theologians and others were successful at getting the public focused upon 
these new moral challenges from the scientists’ newfound abilities. They were so 
successful that they got the attention of the U.S. government, which eventually 
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established government ethics commissions that would advise the government on 
what to allow, stripping direct control from the scientists. This was also the begin-
ning of the end for the theologians’ involvement in what would come to be known 
as public bioethical debate. The ultimate consumer of ethical advice regarding sci-
entific experimentation on the human body was now the government, and there-
fore this ethics had to be in a bureaucratic and calculable form. Debate turned to 
thinner questions more amenable to regulation, such as safety and the informed 
consent of research subjects. Theologians were uninterested in such a debate, 
wanting to talk about the “big questions,” such as what it means to be human and 
debating what the ends or goals of medicine and science should be. A bureaucratic 
ethics does not want to debate the ends or goals of medicine but wants to set cer-
tain goals or ends as undebatable and then ask whether the scientific activity most 
efficaciously forwards those goals or ends. The profession of bioethics emerged to 
serve this role.
My point here is that the history of the field of bioethics reveals an elite, exclu-
sively moral conflict between religion and science that has nothing to do with 
knowledge about the natural world. The bioethics debate was triggered by the 
moral stance of scientists and physicians of the 1950s and 1960s, despite the ideol-
ogy of science as a knowledge-gathering enterprise, and the scientists had a moral-
ity that conflicted with that of the theologians. In the later years of the debate, with 
the theologians gone, members of the bioethics profession effectively and implic-
itly forwarded the moral perspective of scientists. Yet, this debate is not generally 
considered a “conflict between religion and science,” because, I would argue, it 
does not fit our preconception that such debates will be about knowledge.29
Other scholars have pointed out that this attempt by some elite scientists to 
create a religion of science continues to this day. In historian Peter Harrison’s 
analysis, the new atheists argue that “the biological sciences provide the ultimate 
guide to life’s most profound questions.” One new atheist writer insists that “ques-
tions ‘about meaning, morality, and life’s larger purpose’ are ultimately questions 
that science, and not religion, can answer.” Science, that writer insists, “will gradu-
ally encompass life’s deepest questions.” Richard Dawkins similarly claims “that 
whereas theology had once provided the wrong answers to questions about the 
meaning of life, ‘the right answers now come from evolutionary science.’”30
Harrison’s analysis continues with Harvard biologist E. O. Wilson, who simi-
larly claims that “scientific materialism ‘presents the human mind with an alter-
native mythology that until now has always point for point in zones of conflict, 
defeated traditional religion.’” Science has finally been able “to provide an alterna-
tive account of ‘man’s place in the universe,’ relying upon ‘the scientific method.’” 
Moreover, for Wilson, “it is biology that has become ‘foremost in relevance to the 
central questions of philosophy, aiming to explain the nature of mind and reality 
and the meaning of life.’”31
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Transhumanism as a Pseudo-Religion
A critical component of the debate that birthed bioethics was centered on reform 
eugenics, advanced by scientists who wanted to perfect the human species through 
genetic engineering. Theologians were skeptical of this effort. The debate about 
reform eugenics paused for a few decades because it appeared to be scientifically 
impossible to modify the human genome in any truly substantive way.32 However, 
after a few decades’ pause, a remarkably similar set of eugenic arguments emerged 
from the “transhumanists.” Transhumanism is another example of science that is not 
solely about knowledge, but has a moral perspective that can conflict with religion.
Transhumanism is the application of technology such as genetic engineering, 
robotics, nanotechnology, and computers to surpass human limitations.33 The central 
idea is that “the human species can and should transcend itself ‘by realizing new pos-
sibilities’ of and for human nature.”34 This imperative to “improve” ourselves is well 
expressed by British philosopher John Harris, who writes that “taking control of evo-
lution and our future development to the point, and indeed beyond the point, where 
we humans will have changed, perhaps into a new and certainly into a better species 
altogether, is ‘nothing short of a clear imperative to make the world a better place.’”35
Transhumanism is not a movement in the public, but a movement of elite sci-
entists and philosophers. The scientists are the Silicon Valley “visionaries” who 
want to change the world through technology. For example, human genome 
mapping pioneer J. Craig Venter recently announced the formation of a com-
pany called Human Longevity to, in the words of one newspaper writer, “cheat 
aging and death.”36 The cofounder of Human Longevity is Peter Diamandis, who 
is cofounder and Executive Chairman of Singularity University, a transhumanist 
educational institution in Silicon Valley.37
Transhumanism considers itself to be “the apotheosis of science and technol-
ogy,” and, going further, represents the ultimate form of faith in science—“a secu-
larist project that displaces religion.”38 In the words of one influential proponent: 
“fundamental changes in our very natures have become both possible and desir-
able. . . . [H]umans could become like gods, and in so doing may put conventional 
religion out of business. Thus it is in the vital interests of Christianity and the other 
great world faiths to prevent human technological transformation.”39
Theologians agree that transhumanism is implicitly religious. Theologian Brent 
Waters considers transhumanism and Christianity to be “contending salvific reli-
gions,” and he cites the same idea from Martin Luther that Ramsey cited forty 
years earlier when arguing with an earlier generation of proponents of scientifi-
cally reshaping humanity. Transhumanism is:
not a religion in a formal sense, but as Martin Luther suggests, wherever one places 
one’s confidence is necessarily one’s god—or, more broadly, one’s object of faith or 
74    Chapter Four
ultimate concern. In this respect, transhumanism and Christianity appear to have 
a number of similarities, particularly with regard to soteriology and eschatology. 
Transhumanists and Christians agree, for instance, that the finite and mortal hu-
man condition is far from ideal. For transhumanists humans have fallen short of 
achieving their true potential, whereas for Christians humans have not yet become 
the kinds of creatures God intends them to be. In response both agree that humans 
require release from their current condition. . . . Both agree that death is the final en-
emy; transhumanists conquer this foe by achieving the immortality of endless time, 
whereas Christians are resurrected into eternity, where there is no time.40
The existence of transhumanism shows the continuation of the moral project of 
finding meaning and purpose through science, and that this effort is a competitor 
with religion, not for knowledge claims about nature, but for morality. Again, in 
this “recent history” of debates between religion and science, there is no debate 
about knowledge whatsoever.
Scientists’ Hidden Moral Projects in Political Campaigns
Studies of contemporary elite scientists in the public sphere show that they often 
have a moral agenda and act to forward it—often against religion. Scientists in 
these campaigns imply that they are simply describing reality in a neutral way, but 
since these descriptions sound like science, their moral projects largely remain 
hidden from scholars. However, close studies show that scientists tend to select 
“neutral descriptions” quite consciously to further a moral agenda.
Public debates about embryonic research are a good example. An analysis of 
British debates from decades ago shows that the debate was framed as “a conflict 
between those who wish to enforce unthinking obedience to out-of-date religious 
beliefs and those who are determined to defend scientists’ right to continue their 
search for truth.” Despite this framing, a close academic analysis revealed that the 
arguments on the two sides “cannot be distinguished in terms of their rationality, 
their reliance on dogma, or in terms of other features central to the stereotyped 
contrast between religious and scientific styles of thought.” So, in this debate, sci-
entific views portrayed as morally neutral were actually in moral conflict with reli-
gious views.41
A similar pattern can be seen in recent U.S. debates about embryos. Science 
studies scholar J. Benjamin Hurlbut shows how in the numerous American bio-
ethics commissions concerning human embryos from the 1970s forward, scien-
tists created scientific descriptions of embryos that implicitly served a particular 
moral agenda. Hurlbut’s best example is the scientists’ invention of a new scien-
tific-sounding category of the “pre-embryo” to distinguish it from the “embryo.” 
The “pre-embryo” could still twin, but why this trait matters is obviously moral 
and not based on facts. More importantly, with “embryo” distinguished from 
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“pre-embryos,” research on “pre-embryos” could proceed apace, which is some-
thing that the scientific community was interested in doing. Similar efforts were 
made by scientists to change the terms used in the cloning debate from “cloned 
embryo” to “therapeutic cloning” (to distinguish from “reproductive cloning”). 
Later cloning would be relabeled “somatic cell nuclear transfer,” which avoids the 
“cloning” term altogether. Scientists tried to take the same ontological object—
the cloned embryo—but create different terms based upon people’s intended uses 
of the object—therapy or reproduction. This is not a description of nature, but a 
distinction based on people’s intentions, with some uses being implicitly moral 
or immoral.42
Hurlbut also examines the political debate in California surrounding 
Proposition 71, which proposed to have the state of California spend three bil-
lion dollars on embryonic stem cell research and explicitly allow the use of cloned 
embryos to produce stem cells (but not produce babies). It is hard to imagine 
that any citizen of California would think after this campaign that scientists were 
merely producing facts about nature. Rather, elite scientists campaigned for politi-
cal positions that were consistent with their moral agenda.43
To start with the obvious, Proposition 71 was centrally about ethics. It implicitly 
took a position on the moral status of human embryos, which was that they were 
not as important as potential medical treatments that could come from embryonic 
stem cell research. Moreover, three billion dollars of state money was three billion 
that was not spent on schools, roads, and health care that used currently available 
technology. To say that California should spend three billion dollars on medical 
research is a moral choice—a moral choice that a majority of the voting citizens of 
California eventually agreed with.
The campaign to pass Proposition 71, which involved many scientists, was also 
not about scientific facts. Whereas some people questioned whether cures would 
come as fast as the scientists implied, nobody claimed that scientists do not know 
how stem cells work or that the opponents of the proposition had better fact claims 
about nature. The campaign was, as political campaigns are, about moral choices.
The beginnings of the campaign were meetings with Hollywood couples who 
had children with Type 1 diabetes, wealthy disease research advocates, public 
officials, and prominent stem cell scientists. They saw an opportunity in using 
California’s ballot initiative process, and a coalition formed around this project. 
The campaign suggested that all Californians would benefit from stem cell research 
because over 70 different diseases and injuries could be cured with stem cells.44
Scientists played a central public role because they had the credibility to say 
that this research would indeed cure disease. Stanford stem cell biologist Irving 
Weissman said during a TV interview that scientists could make human embry-
onic stem cell lines that “represented each and every human disease” and that “the 
chances of disease to be cured by stem cell research are high, but only if we start.” 
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In television ads for the campaign, Nobel laureate Paul Berg described the research 
as “an important scientific and medical breakthrough.” University of California 
San Francisco diabetes expert Jeff Bluestone said that he was “absolutely confi-
dent” that stem cells would cure Type 1 diabetes.45
While the scientists were making claims within their area of expertise con-
cerning whether this technology would work, more importantly for this book, 
many of these scientists portrayed themselves as being in conflict with religion. 
Many religious organizations opposed Proposition 71, and the motivation for 
the proposition in the first place was the perception that federal funding for this 
research had been blocked by religious conservatives’ influence on the Republican 
Party. As an advocate testified in one of the public hearings, it “was the responsi-
bility of the state of California to rectify the failure of the Bush administration to 
fund embryonic stem cell research,” which was the result of “an administration 
that has ignored science and all its potential in favor of politics and religious 
extremism.”46
The scientists did not challenge religion for making false claims about nature, 
but instead invoked past supposed conflict between religion and science over 
nature to say why religious morality was also wrong. As we would expect from ear-
lier pages of this book, Galileo was the favored symbol for the scientists. Consider a 
special issue of the Stanford Medical Magazine. Hurlbut concludes that “the image 
and the majority of the articles . . . characterized the political battle as a struggle 
between the antimodern, antidemocratic forces of religion and the enlightened, 
secular democratic forces of science.” The Dean of the Stanford Medical School 
wrote of the conflict that “it’s as if we have entered a time warp, and are specta-
tors at the Inquisition’s reading of charges against Galileo for his view of the solar 
system.”47
In a 2002 hearing on stem cell research, the president of an advocacy organi-
zation for California’s biomedical industry said that “much of the opposition is 
rooted in a set of particular religious worldviews.” Moreover, “historically religion 
has not been the handmaiden of science and scientific progress . . . Now, on the left 
is someone you all know—Galileo. On the right is Pope Paul the Fifth, who’s not 
much remembered, except in his role in the Inquisition and the containment, if 
you will, of Galileo’s astronomical ideas.” Similarly, Stanford’s Nobel laureate Paul 
Berg gave a talk titled “Stem Cells: Shades of Galileo.”48
What is striking in all of the references to Galileo is that scientists are not 
just using Galileo to justify their role as the preeminent observers of nature, as 
I described in Chapter 2, but in this case to say that their morality is superior to 
religious morality. In sum, embryonic stem cell research has probably been the 
most recent, highly publicized clash between religious and scientific elites, and it 
was over morality, not knowledge.
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ELITE PUBLIC DEBATES AB OUT DARWINISM HAVE 
BEEN AB OUT MOR ALIT Y NOT KNOWLED GE
It is important to renarrate the debate about Darwin from my perspective because 
this debate is thought of as conclusive evidence for the systemic knowledge con-
flict perspective. The debate about Darwin is also the most prominent debate 
between contemporary religion and science for the public.49
Again, I am not the first to note the moral nature of debates about Darwin. 
For example, historian Peter Harrison notes that “what religiously motivated anti-
evolutionists fear is not the ‘science’ as such, but the secularist package of values 
concealed in what they perceive to be the Trojan horse of evolutionary theory.”50 
Rather, the moral narrative is usually submerged beneath a surface-level knowl-
edge conflict narrative, and I want to highlight the moral.
For scientific elites this debate is about knowledge—they say we should look 
at the fossil record to look where humans came from, whereas conservative 
Protestants supposedly look to their Bibles to see where humans came from. There 
are of course conservative Protestants who do look to their Bibles for a knowledge 
claim about the origins of humans, and most would probably say they do so if 
asked. My point is not that they do not state a belief in knowledge conflict, but 
rather that if it were not for the moral conflict over Darwin they would not bother 
to raise the knowledge conflict. The moral conflict is the controlling force here, 
and the knowledge conflict is subsidiary to it. Moreover, as these debates have 
progressed over time, they reveal religious activists both making fewer religiously 
based fact claims and their growing acceptance of the epistemology of science. 
What is left for the religion side of the debate is a concern with the moral.
While such varied positions as Young Earth Creationism, Old Earth 
Creationism, Day-Age Creationism, Gap Creationism, Progressive Creationism, 
and Intelligent Design can be more or less treated as “creationist,” it is their quali-
ties as moral criticisms of Darwinism that most tightly bind them together, both 
historically and sociologically speaking. The concern of creationists in each of 
their historic incarnations is that when you teach evolution, you are implicitly 
teaching a certain philosophy at the same time, and that this philosophy under-
mines some forms of morality.
At the same time, Darwinism has often been the grounds for making moral 
claims by scientists. It is not that religious challenges erroneously mix morality 
and science because challengers don’t understand science. Rather, challengers 
understand full well that scientists are also making moral claims, and are acting 
to counter these claims—and thus we have moral conflict. This contrasts sharply 
with the self-image of scientists in which they pursue knowledge in a value-free 
manner.
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The Young Earth Creationist Scopes Trial Era
I will highlight these points by reviewing the history of debates about Darwin, 
broken into three eras. After the publication of The Origin of Species in 1859, both 
supporters and critics recognized that Darwinism had moral implications, a con-
cern that became even more prominent following the publication of the Descent 
of Man in 1871. Scholar of Victorian literature Gowan Dawson concludes that “it 
was regularly avowed that the growing licentiousness of modern culture . . . actu-
ally gave warning of the repulsive direction in which society was being taken by 
the increasingly influential doctrines of Darwinism.” One of the most problematic 
components of Darwin’s theory for Victorian moral sensibilities was that the 1871 
book noted “that the ‘whole process of . . . the reproduction of the species, is strik-
ingly the same in all mammals,’ even down to ‘the act of courtship by the male,’ 
who, whether baboon or human, responded similarly to the smell and appearance 
of the opposite sex.” This led to the “disquieting” implication of “rooting human 
sexuality in animal behavior.”51 While philosophers might question the simple 
move from “is” to “ought,” it is clear that for many contemporaries, Darwinism 
implied some moral challenges, especially when articulated in Herbert Spencer’s 
terms as “survival of the fittest.”
In America, concerns over moral implications of Darwinism led to legal 
restrictions on the teaching of evolution in public schools.52 Biology textbooks of 
the time, such as the popular A Civic Biology by George William Hunter, often 
contained only a limited amount of material on evolution. But even that limited 
amount discussed moral problems. A Civic Biology, for example, suggested that “if 
the stock of domesticated animals can be improved, it is not unfair to ask if the 
health and vigor of the future generations of men and women on the earth might 
not be improved by applying to them the law of selection.”53 That is, the book pro-
moted eugenics.54
In May 1925, in order to test the constitutionality of an anti-evolution law, the 
American Civil Liberties Union provoked the State of Tennessee into prosecut-
ing high school science teacher John Scopes for teaching the evolution lessons 
from A Civic Biology in a public school classroom. Creationists saw an opportunity 
to demonstrate that Darwinism implied an unacceptable and dangerous moral 
position that should not be publicly considered at all, much less taught to school-
children.55 The defender of the creationist view was populist former Democratic 
Party presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan. According to Ron Numbers’ 
canonical analysis of creationism, for Bryan:
World War I  .  .  . exposed the darkest side of human nature and shattered his illu-
sions about the future of Christian society. Obviously something had gone awry, and 
Bryan soon traced the source of the trouble to the paralyzing influence of Darwinism 
on the conscience. By substituting the law of the jungle for the teachings of Christ, 
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it threatened the principles he valued most: democracy and Christianity. Two books 
in particular confirmed his suspicion. The first  .  .  . recounted firsthand conversa-
tions with German officers that revealed the role of Darwin’s biology in the German 
decision to declare war. The second . . . purported to demonstrate the historical and 
philosophical links between Darwinism and German militarism.56
According to historian Mark Noll, Bryan’s “strident opposition to evolution arose 
not so much from a threat to traditional interpretations of Genesis 1 but because 
evolution threatened human dignity. A godless theory of evolution . . . would, if 
generally adopted, destroy all sense of responsibility and menace the morals of the 
world.” Moreover, Bryan “saw clearly that the greatest problem with evolution was 
not the practice of science but the metaphysical naturalism and consequent social 
Darwinism that scientific evolution was often called upon to justify.”57
In the late paleontologist Steven J. Gould’s turn-of-the-twenty-first-century 
assessment, when Bryan “said that Darwinism had been widely portrayed as a 
defense of war, domination, and domestic exploitation, he was right.”58 According 
to historian Edward Larson, “many Americans associated Darwinian natural 
selection, as it applied to people, with a survival-of-the-fittest mentality that justi-
fied laissez-faire capitalism, imperialism, and militarism.” Reflecting his decades 
in politics defending the common man, Bryan would in 1904 dismiss Darwinism 
as “the merciless law by which the strong crowd out and kill off the weak.” Larson 
concludes that “everywhere the public debate over eugenics colored people’s 
thinking about the theory of human evolution.”59 It appears that the most famous 
opponent of Darwinism was not primarily motivated by the debate about facts.
Indeed, it has been argued that the law that John Scopes violated, signed by the 
Tennessee governor in 1925, was not even motivated by the evolution issue, but the 
evolution issue became a totemic symbol of the larger issue of the declining rural life 
in the state. The content of high school biology of the time is summed up with the title 
of the book Scopes was accused of using: Civic Biology. “Civic Biology, with its focus 
on such issues as quarantine, alcohol, food safety, and the improvement of human 
society (including a substantial section on eugenics), was geared toward America’s 
growing cities,” writes historian Adam Shapiro. Indeed, the new curriculum began in 
New York City. He concludes that “many rural residents saw the expansion of public 
education in Tennessee as an attempt to change their culture and to instill foreign 
values. Civic biology taught students to prepare for a life away from their traditional 
upbringing. Consequently, parents took exception to the presence of biology as well 
as its content. The fact that the books taught the historical development of species 
was a small concern. The overall discipline of civic biology and the presence of new 
schools intended to bring social progress were much more objectionable.”60
The Scopes case drew immense attention as a clash over questions of religion 
and morality.61 Though technically Bryan won the case, creationists failed to 
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win public support for their moral concerns. In popular culture, the creationists 
emerged from the Scopes trial as ignorant bumpkins, while evolution supporters 
came across as proponents of reason and science. These impressions were solidi-
fied by the 1960 Academy Award-nominated film depicting the Scopes trial named 
Inherit the Wind.62
But while it seemed that Darwinism had triumphed in the popular imagina-
tion, the empirical fact is that the teaching of evolution in public high schools, 
and the inclusion of Darwin in biology textbooks, actually declined after the 
Scopes era, be it due to the trial itself or the anti-evolution movement. Textbook 
publishers voluntarily self-censored their materials in order to avoid offending 
dominant sentiments.63 For all of the flash of the Scopes trial, there was little 
interest in, and much public resistance to, expanding the teaching of evolution 
in public schools.
Without Darwinism moving into the sphere of public morality through the 
education system, creationists kept to themselves and their own organizations 
after Scopes. Creationists still worried about the moral claims of Darwinism, but 
by and large kept their arguments within the creationist community rather than 
public debate.64
Continuing across this era was the eugenics movement, a scientific effort that 
tried to implement a particular moral vision. In the 19th century Francis Galton, a 
half-cousin of Darwin, drew heavily on Darwin’s theories to promote eugenics, the 
systematic intervention into human reproduction for the purpose of improving 
“racial hygiene.”65 Of concern to many proponents of eugenics was the idea that 
society could succumb to degeneration, making it less fit for survival and there-
fore doomed to extinction. Yet many were confident that Darwinism provided the 
answer. As John Haycraft said in his lectures to the Royal College of Physicians in 
1895: “We can improve our race by adopting the one and only adequate expedient, 
that of carrying on the race through our best and most worthy strains. We can be 
as certain of our result as the gardener who hoes away the weeds and plants good 
seed, and who knows that he can produce the plants he wants by his care in the 
selection of the seed.”66
Early American eugenics drew on Spencer, Darwin, and Galton to justify pro-
grams of forced sterilization for “mental defectives,” “moral degenerates,” and 
other “undesirables” to prevent the inheritance of their bad traits to later gen-
erations. The Eugenics Record Office, founded in 1910 at the Cold Spring Harbor 
Laboratory, promoted forced sterilization as good public policy.67 By 1930, half of 
the states in the U.S. had some sort of eugenic sterilization law on the books. In 
Arizona, inmates of the State Hospital for the Insane could be sterilized if they 
were the “probable potential parent of socially inadequate offspring,” and in Kansas 
any inmate of the state, including prisoners, could be sterilized if “procreation by 
him would be likely to result in defective or feeble-minded children with criminal 
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tendencies.”68 Often, however, “degenerate” meant nonwhite or immigrant. By 
1924, the U.S. Congress passed the Immigration Reform Act, setting quotas for 
immigrants according to their seeming fitness and levels of “social inadequacy.” 
Immigration levels did not recover until the late 1980s.69
Of course, the most severe example of eugenics was the systematic steriliza-
tion and extermination of those deemed degenerate by the Nazi regime, par-
ticularly embodied by the 1933 Law for the Prevention of Genetically Diseased 
Offspring. The Nazis “regularly quoted American geneticists who expressed 
support for their sterilization policies . . . [and] frequently invoked the large-
scale California experience with sterilization,” writes historian Diane Paul.70 
It is clear that Nazi policies drew on ideas about racial hygiene and degen-
eracy, and it is clear that many American scientists admired such firm poli-
cies. Of course, the use of Darwin’s ideas to legitimate prejudices reached its 
apotheosis in the Holocaust where, in Kevles’ words, “a river of blood would 
eventually run from the [German] sterilization law of 1933 to Auschwitz and 
Buchenwald.”71 Of course, the point is not that Darwin would have approved, 
but rather that these immoral acts were being justified by others by referencing 
Darwin’s ideas.
Creation Science Era
With the launch of Sputnik in 1957, the American government turned to fund-
ing science education in a concerted and systematic way. The Biological Sciences 
Curriculum Study brought together, perhaps for the first time, practicing sci-
entists and practicing teachers to create a biology curriculum to be used in the 
nation’s public schools.72 The Biological Sciences Curriculum Study program made 
Darwinism, and evolution more generally, the cornerstone of biology education 
in America.
In response to the increase in teaching of Darwinism in public schools, cre-
ationists mounted challenges to Biological Sciences Curriculum Study textbooks 
on many different grounds, including indecency of images depicting reproductive 
organs, violation of remaining state anti-evolution laws, and violation of the First 
Amendment.73 The tactics varied in their approaches, but the common concern 
remained that Darwinism had dangerous moral implications and should not be 
taught in schools.
One of the strongest challenges came from “creation science,” where creation-
ists dismissed Darwinism based on scientific claims stemming from the Bible. 
Creation science proponents agreed that students should learn science, but not 
that they should learn Darwinism. In 1961, Whitcomb and Morris published The 
Genesis Flood, an account of geology and human origins based on Biblical expla-
nations of the world-girdling Noachic flood.
82    Chapter Four
For Whitcomb and Morris, the claim to being engaged in science was as much 
about the need to replace Darwinian morality with a God- and human-centered 
morality as it was about floods and geology. In The Genesis Flood, they wrote:
The morality of evolution, which assumes that progress and achievement and “good” 
come about through such action as benefits the individual himself or the group of 
which he is a part, to the detriment of others, is most obviously anti-Christian. The 
very essence of Christianity is unselfish sacrifice on behalf of others, motivated by the 
great sacrifice of Christ himself, dying in atonement for the sins of the whole world!74
These sentiments were echoed by local activists, such as one group that distrib-
uted a flyer with a pictorial diagram of the “evolution tree” of “evil fruits” grow-
ing from the root of Darwinism. These “evil fruits” include (but are not limited 
to) communism, racism, terrorism, abortion, socialism, crime, and inflation. The 
accompanying text concludes “What is the best way to counteract the evil fruit of 
evolution? Opposing these things one-by-one is good, but it does not deal with the 
underlying cause. . . . A more effective approach is to chop the tree off at its base by 
scientifically discrediting evolution.”75
In 1968, the decision in Epperson v. Arkansas rendered anti-evolution laws 
unconstitutional. In 1974 Morris produced Scientific Creationism, a guide to 
teaching creation science without explicit reference to biblical authority or even 
religious language.76 Without the advantage of anti-evolution laws, creationists 
promoted the idea of “equal time” and “balanced treatment” for creation science 
and Darwinian science, and even obtained legal protection for such treatment in 
Arkansas and Louisiana.77
In 1982, however, McLean v. Arkansas marked the beginning of the end for 
creation science in public science classes. The McLean decision struck down 
the Arkansas law on the basis that creation science violated the American 
Constitution’s First Amendment prohibition on the establishment of religion. 
The judge acknowledged that creation science was in part a reaction to the intro-
duction of the Biological Sciences Curriculum Study curriculum, even citing the 
moral concerns driving the challenge in the official opinion: “Creationists view 
evolution as a source of society’s ills [and that] it has served effectively as the 
pseudo-scientific basis of atheism, agnosticism, socialism, fascism, and numerous 
other false and dangerous philosophies over the past century.”78
Yet the judge focused his legal decision on knowledge issues, itemizing the ways in 
which creation science did not accord with scientific method or practice, and empha-
sizing that creation science was not, in his opinion, science at all. While this was not 
strictly necessary for rendering an opinion on the religious grounds for creation sci-
ence, it nonetheless reinforced the perception in the public sphere of systemic knowl-
edge conflict. From McLean forward, the success of creationist challenges would be 
measured based on whether or not creationist theories were included in “science” 
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as defined by judges in landmark legal cases, rather than the extent to which moral 
concerns resonated with a broader public. In 1987, Edwards v. Aguillard came before 
the U.S. Supreme Court, and—largely based on the reasoning about the establish-
ment of religion in McLean—the court rendered a decision to strike down Louisiana’s 
Creationism Act, the last remaining “equal time” law in the nation.
The centrality of morality to conservative Protestant anti-evolution movements 
up through the creation science era is summarized by anthropologist Christopher 
Toumey, who wrote that “creationism is a moral theory that the idea of evolution is 
intimately involved in immorality, as cause or effect or both.” It is “much more than a 
narrow doctrine extrapolated from a handful of biblical verses. It represents a broad 
cultural discontent, featuring fear of anarchy, revulsion for abortion, disdain for pro-
miscuity, and endless other issues, with evolution integrated into those fears.”79
The Intelligent Design Era
McLean and Edwards instituted a legal regime wherein any hint of religious moti-
vations could invalidate an attempt to promote an alternative to Darwinism. In 
response, advocates reworked an existing creation science textbook to remove 
all references to creationism and replace them with the term “intelligent design” 
(ID). They published the resulting text in 1989 as Of Pandas and People.80 The term 
“ID” refers to the idea that the world we observe is so complex that it could not 
have arisen without intelligent guidance, an idea that traces its roots back to Isaac 
Newton and William Paley.81 Notably, however, ID does not necessarily require 
specific claims about God or a particular religious belief system.
The most visible and active proponents of ID are fellows of the Discovery 
Institute, and their strategy for promoting ID is revealed in the “Wedge Document,” 
a text originally intended for internal use, but copied and widely circulated by 
opponents seeking to discredit ID. The Wedge Document cites as motivation for 
ID the serious moral concerns implied by the materialist conception of reality 
promoted by Darwinism, which:
eventually infected virtually every area of our culture, from politics and economics 
to literature and art  .  .  . materialists denied the existence of objective moral stan-
dards, claiming that environment dictates our behavior and beliefs. Such moral rela-
tivism was uncritically adopted by much of the social sciences. . . . Materialists also 
undermined personal responsibility by asserting that human thoughts and behaviors 
are dictated by our biology and environment . . . In the materialist scheme of things, 
everyone is a victim and no one can be held accountable for his or her actions.82
As with creation science, ID proponents seek equal time for their position in 
public school science classes. Unlike creation science advocates, ID proponents 
take special care to minimize the possibility that ID will be seen as religious. So 
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far, this strategy has met with limited success. In 2004, a school board in Dover, 
Pennsylvania voted to require a statement about ID as part of the public school 
curriculum. Shortly thereafter, a group of parents filed suit against the district, and 
the resulting decision, in Kitzmiller v. Dover, once again struck down a creationist 
challenge based on the First Amendment Establishment Clause.
ID proponents have once again taken up the idea of “equal time” and “teach-
ing the controversy,” but in the public rather than the legal arena. A documentary 
film titled Expelled: No Intelligence Allowed claims that alternatives to Darwinism 
have been suppressed, and that Darwinism is of grave moral concern. An accom-
panying text for the documentary claims that “In a Darwinian framework, human 
beings are no better than any other animal and ultimately may be treated as ani-
mals by those who consider themselves to be greater, more human, enlightened 
or evolved . . . Hitler and the Nazis followed Darwinian eugenics to an extreme, 
carrying ‘survival of the fittest’ to the radical conclusion of exterminating ‘unfit’ 
and ‘inferior’ races like the Jews and Gypsies, and ‘weak’ members of society like 
the handicapped.”83
Unsurprisingly, reaction to ID from defenders of science in popular and aca-
demic venues has focused on ID’s religious origins, as this is now the most effec-
tive legal way to prevent ID from inclusion in public school curricula.84 However, 
the central claim at the heart of ID remains consistent with Bryan, Whitcomb, 
and many other creationists since Darwin. For creationist challengers past and 
present, Darwinism implies a morality that devalues human life, causes unneeded 
conflict and competition, and pushes society in an actively harmful direction. 
Religion and science debates about Darwin are largely moral.
C ONCLUSION
In the previous two chapters I have shown how those who write about the relation-
ship between religion and science presume a systemic knowledge conflict between 
religion and science. In this chapter I have examined contemporary social sci-
ence definitions of religion, secularization theory and the sociology of science. 
These should in principle be at least somewhat based on contemporary American 
society, and these do not portray religion and science as in systemic knowledge 
conflict.
As I showed in the last chapter, historical studies of conflict between elite rep-
resentatives of religion and science largely show systemic knowledge conflict. In 
this chapter I examined the recent history of the past fifty years or so—debates 
that evolved into modern bioethics, transhumanism, and scientists’ political activ-
ism. All show moral and not knowledge conflict. Finally, I re-narrated the history 
of conflict over Darwin. This debate is particularly significant because it is really 
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the only religion and science conflict today that is conceivably about knowledge 
claims. I show that this debate has always been largely moral.
In Chapter 6, I will present my own data analyses concerning the contemporary 
public. In this chapter, by showing that even contemporary elites—who are prone 
to seeing science and religion as structures of knowledge—do not see religion and 
science as arguing about knowledge, I have bolstered my interpretation in that 
later chapter. Before starting that analysis, I turn in the next chapter to existing 
research on the general public, which also should make us skeptical that ordinary 
religious people are in systemic knowledge conflict with science and suggests it is 
likely that they are instead in moral conflict with science.
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Existing Research on the Public
In Chapters 2 and 3, we saw that the vast majority of academics assume that the 
relationship, and any conflict, between religion and science is based on systemic 
knowledge. In this view, both science and religion are hierarchically organized 
systems of justifying concrete truth claims about nature. These systems are logi-
cally coherent, so that if you believe in the scientific method to determine how 
electrons move, you should not also be able to believe that God caused the emer-
gence of humans. In the last chapter I also focused on elites, but looked at recent 
history, which may be different from the elite debates from more than fifty years 
ago. We see that among these elites, the debate is more about morality than it is 
about knowledge.
In this chapter I turn to the public and review existing research, research that 
would be largely unknown to scholars in the religion and science debate because 
it is spread across disparate fields. This research suggests, consistent with the last 
chapter, that it is not plausible that the religious public is in systemic knowledge 
conflict with science. Propositional belief conflict and moral conflict is likely. This 
existing research allows me to lay the groundwork for my own data analyses in the 
next chapter.
Now that I am turning to the public, I begin by offering more detail about the 
diversity of religion in the U.S. I start by showing that if you look at the official 
teachings of religions in the U.S., there is only one tradition where the religious 
public would get support from religious elites for knowledge conflict with sci-
ence, and that tradition is conservative Protestantism. I then turn to somewhat 
abstract social science research about the public’s use of systemic knowledge, 
which suggests that the general public would not have such structures. Thus, 
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systemic knowledge conflict is even less likely. I then turn to what we know 
about the religion actually practiced by the contemporary American public, and 
how this has changed in the past fifty years. Contemporary American religion 
is quite different from the idealized conceptions of academics, and has features 
that also make systemic knowledge conflict unlikely. In the final section, I exam-
ine research on what the public thinks about science and scientists. People are 
likely to think of scientists in moral terms, and the general public is prone to see 
scientists as at minimum not like themselves, and at maximum immoral people 
who need to be controlled. These disparate studies all suggest moral and not 
knowledge conflict.
ONLY C ONSERVATIVE PROTESTANT ELITES TEACH 
A BELIEF SYSTEM THAT C OULD HAVE KNOWLED GE 
C ONFLICT WITH SCIENCE
Most of the larger religious traditions in the U.S. teach that there is not a conflict 
between their religious belief system and the methodological naturalist version of 
a scientific belief system. For example, lightning is not due to God’s wrath, but due 
to differential electrical charges in the atmosphere. One way to describe this is that 
in most traditions the theological synthesizers examined in Chapter 2 have been 
successful, so religious people in these traditions would be encouraged by elites 
to not make a supernatural claim about anything that a scientist makes a claim 
about. Anything about the natural world that is potentially demonstrable will have 
a naturalistic explanation (like the cause of hurricanes), but non-demonstrable 
claims that no scientist cares about—like the Resurrection—may have a supernat-
ural explanation. But, since the resurrection is not a violation of methodological 
naturalism, there is no conflict between religion and science.
I generally will not describe the views of religious minorities, because these 
groups are too small to be observed using the sociological data that I use in later 
chapters. The exception is Judaism, which I briefly describe, because there is an 
extensive academic literature on Judaism and science, and because scholars of 
Christianity use Judaism as a comparison due to Christianity’s emergence from 
Judaism.
To the extent that we can say there are official theologies for American reli-
gions, Catholicism, Judaism and mainline Protestantism all have mechanisms for 
integrating faith with observation and reason. More specifically, their position is 
that a scientific claim that has come to be thought of as true needs to be incor-
porated into theological belief. Synthesis is the official stance. It is then unlikely 
that members of these traditions would have systemic knowledge conflict with 
science—nor would they have propositional belief conflict with science, as they 
would be encouraged to think that what scientists claim is true.
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Judaism
I begin my tour of American religion with Judaism, which has long held that if 
 science makes one claim and religion another, either could be wrong, and either 
could be corrected. So, a central feature of Judaism is to account for scientific claims. 
Historians show that this view goes back farther than my version of  history requires, 
with nineteenth-century Jews seeing themselves as “bystanders” to the debate 
among Christians in the U.S. For example, in a mid-nineteenth-century authori-
tative traditionalist Jewish journal a prominent Jewish leader repeatedly asserted 
that “Judaism, unlike Christianity, was utterly at ease with science.” The founder 
of the Reform Rabbinical School of the Hebrew Union College, and arguably the 
most influential Reform Jew in 19th century America, wrote that “Christianity, by its 
nature, is belligerent towards ‘philosophy, science, and criticism,’ while Judaism, by 
its nature, is ‘in profound peace’ with them.”1
By the twentieth century, this view of science became interwoven with Jewish 
aspirations to integrate into America. Historian Noah Efron writes that science 
promised to rattle the complacency of exclusionary elites, dissolve sectarianism, 
and expand universal education. Jews saw science as making fact and data the 
basis of social policy, rather than tradition and prejudice. So, resistance to sci-
ence “was taken as resistance to the complex of changes that many Jews advocated 
explicitly, and many more saw as needed, if Jews were to thrive in America.”2 To 
this day, it is extremely difficult to find Jews in the public sphere who are opposed 
to any scientific claim, with the exception of some Orthodox Jews. The Orthodox 
comprise only 10 percent of the 2 percent of Americans who are Jewish.3
Catholicism
At least officially, Catholicism incorporates scientific discoveries into its theology, 
often with a time-lag, and modern Catholic leaders have claimed that they have no 
methodological conflict with science. For example, every pope since Pius XI (1929–
1939) has affirmed the autonomy of science. Similarly, contemporary Catholic 
teaching holds the doctrine of “two truths,” that scientific knowledge cannot con-
tradict supernatural knowledge, since both emerge from the same source.4 As one 
prominent Catholic intellectual wrote in the late nineteenth century, “truth cannot 
contradict truth.”5 This has long been supported by Papal statements, including that 
of Pope Pius XI, who stated in 1936: “Science, which consists in true recognition of 
fact, is never opposed to the truths of the Christian faith.”6 More than fifty years 
later, Pope John Paul II wrote, “science can purify religion from error and supersti-
tion; religion can purify science from idolatry and false absolutes.”7
Catholicism also has no tradition of biblical literalism or inerrancy. One rea-
son that Catholics did not get boxed in as Protestants did, as we will see below, is 
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that Church teaching served as a mechanism for an alternative source of religious 
authority outside of Scripture.8
The one instance of what appears on the surface to be a knowledge conflict for 
Catholicism in the past two hundred years is instructive. In the 1890s and the first 
decade of the twentieth century, the newly emerging science on the age of the Earth 
was not problematic because Church teaching—different from the Bible—had suf-
ficient precedent for seeing the days of creation as either allegorical or representa-
tive of another length of time. However, a number of Catholics got in trouble for 
the endorsement of evolution during these two decades before the Church reverted 
to its more standard stance of endorsing evolution. It is notable that the conflict 
was influenced by non-scientific issues and reflected concerns about evolutionary 
theory outside the realm of biology, disagreements over Augustine and Thomas 
Aquinas, and growing tensions between liberals and conservatives. For example, 
Darwinism became controversial when it seemed to move beyond science to 
claims, such as Herbert Spencer’s social evolutionism, that religious thought also 
was subject to “evolution.”9 In other words, at the turn of the twentieth century, the 
Church was not opposed to the scientific claims of Darwin per se, but opposed to 
how these claims were used to influence a social theory and theological truth.
Contemporary Catholic leaders are the theologian-synthesizer types examined 
in the previous chapter. There has been some ambiguity about evolution, with the 
Church seeming at times to move toward agreeing with intelligent design theory, 
then moving back to agreement with neo-Darwinism, which has been more typi-
cal of twentieth-century Catholicism.10 Reflecting this somewhat ambiguous his-
tory, in February of 2009 a Vatican analyst wrote that the Vatican had just “dealt 
the final blow to speculation that Pope Benedict XVI might be prepared to endorse 
the theory of Intelligent Design.”11 As an example of synthesis, consider this state-
ment by Pope John Paul II to a conference held to commemorate the three hun-
dreth anniversary of Newton’s Principia Mathematica. The Pope wrote:
If the cosmologies of the ancient Near Eastern world could be purified and assimilat-
ed into the first chapters of Genesis, might contemporary cosmology have something 
to offer to our reflections upon creation? Does an evolutionary perspective bring any 
light to bear upon theological anthropology, the meaning of the human person as the 
imago Dei, the problem of Christology—and even upon the development of doctrine 
itself? What, if any, are the eschatological implications of contemporary cosmology, 
especially in light of the vast future of our universe? Can theological method fruitful-
ly appropriate insights from scientific methodology and the philosophy of science?12
So, Catholic elites do not teach either systemic knowledge or propositional belief 
conflict, but instead defer to science for fact statements about the contemporary 
natural world. It is then less likely that Catholic members of the public would be in 
any kind of knowledge conflict with science.
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Protestantism
Unlike the differences between greatly distinct traditions like Catholicism and 
Protestantism, Judaism and Christianity, or Islam and Protestantism, the dif-
ferences between types of Protestants in America are quite subtle. The major 
Protestant traditions overlap with each other, and many contemporary Protestants 
would have a hard time placing themselves in a particular tradition. Moreover, 
many Protestant denominations have people from more than one Protestant tradi-
tion within them. For example, people who would be considered part of the evan-
gelical tradition are found in what are considered to be mainline denominations. 
Nonetheless, the differences between Protestant traditions are real, and are best 
visualized as three overlapping bell curves on a two-dimensional space, with “lib-
eralism” and “fundamentalism” as the end points and evangelicalism in between 
them. Whereas it is difficult to tell people apart in the overlapping areas, if you 
talk to a liberal Protestant and a fundamentalist, the differences are quite obvious.
In some parts of Protestantism in the modern U.S., a church member could 
find support from elites in their tradition for a knowledge conflict with science. To 
understand why Protestants could be in knowledge conflict with science, I must 
delve into history. The story of the splits within Protestantism, and how current 
institutionalized views came to be, has been well told by many historians, and these 
splits often involved science. For my purposes I will skip to the late  nineteenth 
century, when there was a systemic knowledge conflict underway between reli-
gious and scientific elites for what would be at the pinnacle of the pyramid of 
a legitimate science. One group of scientists was advocating for a purely secular 
science that we could call materialist positivism. The other set of scientists, more 
open to religion, were advocating for Baconian science, which was supported by 
Scottish Common Sense Realism.13
Baconian science had been the dominant science in the first part of the  nineteenth 
century. The primary goal of Baconianism was to accumulate facts through obser-
vation and, crucially, avoid speculations about that which was not observable. “Such 
speculations and preconceptions Baconians condemned roundly with their worst 
pejorative: ‘hypotheses,’” writes sociologist Eva Garroutte.14 The fine-grained tax-
onomies could be developed through accumulating facts and patterns observed, 
eventually inductively resulting in the laws that govern the detailed facts.
One of the attractions of this particular epistemology of science in the mid-
nineteenth century was its democratic nature, since it implied that any rational, 
intelligent person could make a contribution to scientific knowledge. This was the 
influence of Scottish Common Sense Realism, which appealed in America because 
it was an antidote to “the scepticism of the modern age,” which was itself the result 
of abstract speculations by philosophers. Historian George Marsden writes that 
“Common Sense philosophy could thus combat one of the nineteenth-century 
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threats to certainty—Germanic speculations—by appealing to the American faith 
in the common person.” Therefore, in this epistemology, “all normal people were 
endowed by their Creator with various faculties that produced beliefs on which 
they must rely.” Basically, you could trust in your sense-perceptions.15 This fit par-
ticularly well with American notions of democracy and the wisdom of the ordi-
nary people.
During this era, the Protestant churches “were populist, democratic, and lib-
ertarian, and the churches were strongly identified with the common people.”16 
The Protestants, who dominated the public sphere, saw the Bible and nature as 
the two books of God, and believed that: “Nature constituted one set of facts and 
that the biblical Scriptures constituted another, and that scientists and theologians 
could apply the very same scientific method to the study of both.”17 The Baconian 
method of induction was then seen as a “divinely sanctioned mode of reasoning 
that characterized both true religion and genuine science.”18
It is important to be clear that conservative Protestant theologians were not 
reading Bacon or delving into Scottish Common Sense philosophy, but were 
simply using the dominant definition of science at the time, which was based on 
these ideas. As Ronald Numbers summarizes in his canonical study, creationists 
“cobbled their populist epistemology independently of philosophical experts and 
acquired their definition of science from the obvious place: the dictionary.”19
“So in the first heyday of evangelicalism in the United States, objective scien-
tific thought was not tinged with the guilt of fostering secularism,” writes histo-
rian of evangelicalism George Marsden. “Rather it was boldly lauded as the best 
friend of the Christian faith and of Christian culture generally.”20 The detailed 
study of God’s creation through direct observation would reveal the truth of God’s 
other revelation—the Bible.21 In summary, this nineteenth century Conservative 
Protestant version of science was opposed to abstraction, and held that the things 
worth understanding were not opaque and were as they appeared to be. Therefore, 
theories, hypotheses, and metaphysical thoughts were unnecessary.22 Ordinary 
people could use their common sense to observe nature, build up generalized 
understandings from these observations, and trust in their observations, and not 
in theories or models.
According to Marsden, interpreters often have attributed the American empha-
sis on inerrancy of Scripture to the influence of Common Sense philosophy and 
Baconianism. While inerrancy was not invented by Baconianism or Scottish 
Common Sense Realism, it contributed to this hermeneutic approach. God’s truth 
in nature and the Bible were revealed in the same way: Baconianism meant simply 
looking at the evidence, determining what were facts, and classifying these facts. 
One could scrupulously generalize from the facts, but a good Baconian avoided 
speculative hypotheses. Therefore, the interpretation of Scripture involved care-
ful determination of the facts—what the words mean. “Once this was settled the 
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facts revealed in Scripture could be known as surely and as clearly as the facts dis-
covered by the natural scientist” writes Marsden.23 Historian Mark Noll concurs, 
writing that the principles of Scottish Enlightenment rationality had become so 
influential “that it was increasingly easy for evangelicals to treat the Scriptures as 
a ‘scientific’ text whose pieces were to be arranged by induction to yield the truth 
on any issue.”24
In Marsden’s depiction of the approach to Scripture of one prominent theolo-
gian of the time we can see echoes of the good Baconian scientist gathering and 
classifying specimens to inductively generate a law about insects. This theologian, 
“like many of his contemporaries, treated Scripture quite frankly as a compilation 
of hard ‘facts’ that the theologian had only to arrange in systematic order.” The 
conclusion was that “God would do nothing less than reveal the facts of Scripture 
with an accuracy that would satisfy the most scrupulous modern scientific stan-
dards.”25 Like nature being self-evident to common sense, “the Scriptures fairly 
translated need no explanation.”26
Protestants in the post-Civil War period were then consistent with the best of 
science of the day. However, a faction of positivist scientists associated with the 
modern universities soon developed different ideas, wanting to separate them-
selves from religious ideas, and by 1910 the isolation of the sciences from religious 
considerations had become a strict requirement.27 The positivists were successful 
in destroying the idea that there was a direct connection between your observa-
tions of the world and truth. More importantly, they eliminated the idea that any-
one with “common sense” could conduct science, replacing it with what we would 
today call “expertise.” The connection with religion, that the Bible and nature were 
both to transparently reveal the same truth, was severed—“the old synthesis of 
evangelical convictions, American ideals, and a common-sense Baconian sci-
ence faded rapidly away.”28 With the eclipse of the Baconian synthesis, science and 
Protestant religion were then, at least according to scientists, separate systemic 
knowledge systems and, in principle, capable of being in conflict.
Contemporary conservative Protestant knowledge conflict with science—at 
least among elites—has its origins in this transition when, for social reasons, con-
servative Protestants had to remain committed to the earlier Baconian version of 
science. Historian Mark Noll narrates this transition through responses to Darwin 
and through the rise of fundamentalism. Evangelicals had a choice, he argues. 
They could “follow time-honored Christian practice” of adjusting traditional con-
clusions to evolution as they had earlier done in response to proposals about the 
age of the Earth and the nebular hypothesis.” Or they could “draw the line against 
this new challenge,” he writes. The latter path was to reject evolution out of hand, 
because it did not fit with standard interpretations of the Bible.29
The challenge was how to square the idea that both the Bible and the best of sci-
ence were both true. Part of the problem was that the fundamentalists had created 
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a biblical exegesis built upon the best science from an earlier Baconian era—on the 
idea that “properly scrutinized results of the main culture’s scientific enterprises 
should assist biblical interpretation.”
This was the result of “an ominous weakness” in the Common Sense Baconian 
outlook. In order to obtain interpretive stability in the face of Protestantism’s focus 
on individual interpretation, “theologians leaned the weight of divine Biblical 
authority squarely against the wall of humanity’s current scientific knowledge 
and assumed that the two would support each other.” However, now that science 
had become autonomous, problems emerged, as it was not clear that the current 
scientific understandings of nature would be consistent with reverent scientific 
interpretations of Scripture.30 Noll considers this move to be a huge error for con-
servative Protestant theology, because it locked his tradition’s theology into nine-
teenth-century science.
Therefore, “goaded on by the questionable use of science in the larger culture, 
fundamentalists and their evangelical successors dropped the nineteenth-century 
conviction that the best theology should understand and incorporate the best 
science.”31 Synthesis was out, potential for conflict was in. The way forward was 
American fundamentalism, and fundamentalists remained committed to the old 
Baconian definitions of science. Marsden writes that “the old balance between sci-
entific rationality and Scripture was shored up. The objective authority of Scripture 
and its inerrancy were affirmed and accentuated. Science and reason continued to 
be regarded as confirming Scripture, but Darwinian theories were declared specula-
tive hypotheses and not true science.”32 This foray through the history of American 
Protestantism’s relationship to science explains why contemporary conservative 
Protestants—to the extent they have been influenced by  fundamentalism—could 
be opposed to at least some propositional beliefs claimed by scientists.
The other path forward during this transition period for science and 
Protestantism was taken by Protestant liberals, also known as mainline Protestants 
or modernists, who were the other half of the divide that would define American 
Protestantism for over one hundred years. In contrast to the conservative approach, 
they engaged in separating religious truths entirely from dependence on scientific 
data. Therefore, the Bible’s authority did not need to rest on any scientific claims, 
and religion was authenticated by personal experience.33
Disputes over science were just part of the divide between these two traditions of 
Protestantism, and the conflict over the application of Enlightenment reason to the 
Bible was probably even more divisive. For example, perhaps a greater divide than 
whether Protestants could believe Darwin was the question of whether Mary was a 
“virgin,” as the Bible had traditionally been thought to say, or whether she was a “young 
woman,” as some modernist theologians using Enlightenment reason would assert.34
Mainline Protestants did not reject all of traditional theology, but remained 
committed to what they thought of as essential tenets of Christianity. I would say 
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that these tenets were those not threatened by a methodologically naturalistic 
 science—like the idea that there is a God. For example, Roberts points out that late 
nineteenth-century mainliners had consensus on the idea that humans were made 
in the image of God, which is an unfalsifiable belief.35
But, in general, mainline Protestants “maintained that the progress of scientific 
investigation required Christians to make significant revisions in their apologetics, 
doctrine, and biblical interpretation,” and that this “has rightly been viewed as one 
of the defining features of the American liberal Protestant theological tradition.”36 
This is the synthesizing approach we examined in Chapter 2.
Mainline Protestant elite thinking eventually evolved into what Barbour would 
call an independence relationship with science, similar to Gould’s notion of non-
overlapping magisteria. Scientists were responsible for the “how,” and theologians 
for the “why.” This general strategy, which emerged from the divorce from fun-
damentalist Protestantism, accounts for the fact that there has been no conflict 
between mainline Protestant elites and science over knowledge. Indeed, you could 
say that the entire mainline tradition was invented to make religion consistent 
with modern Enlightenment rationality—including science. To return to the point 
of this chapter, this means that a mainline Protestant is not going to find support 
from the elites in their tradition for opposing a concrete scientific claim about the 
natural world.
This leaves the largest religious group in contemporary America for last—the 
evangelicals, who I have been lumping together with the fundamentalists under 
the term conservative Protestants. In the early twentieth century, the divide 
was between the fundamentalists and the modernists (also called mainline 
Protestants). But, in the 1940s, within conservative Protestantism, the fundamen-
talists splintered off a group of relatively more liberal members that would form a 
compromise movement between what they saw as the rigidity and separational-
ism of fundamentalism and the wishy-washy compromising of the mainline. This 
movement is called evangelicalism.37
Evangelicalism ended up being a far more successful movement than either fun-
damentalism or mainline Protestantism because it found the most efficient niche 
in American culture.38 It thoroughly embraces the individualism of American cul-
ture and its love of technology. It is engaged and not separatist, so people can be 
exposed to the tradition and potentially join it. But, its views of the relationship 
between religion and science is ambiguous and still in flux, best described as fall-
ing between the orientations of the fundamentalists and the liberals.
A major difference between fundamentalist, evangelical, and mainline elites is 
in their orientation toward synthesizing science with theological belief. The mark 
of the fundamentalist is that they are the only one of the three to sometimes sim-
ply state that science is wrong. At the other extreme, a mainliner would have long 
ago abandoned the idea of the Bible as containing accurate fact-claims about the 
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natural world. An evangelical wants to be a synthesizer like the liberals we have 
examined earlier, and wants to say that our observation and reason through sci-
ence is also correct, while maintaining that what the Bible says is true. To make 
the fact-claims of science and the Bible both true often requires high-powered 
hermeneutic feats that are probably lost on ordinary members.
These hermeneutic efforts are exemplified by views of human origins. Nowadays, 
being a young-earth creationist—who believes that scientific claims about the age 
of rocks are totally wrong and the earth is six thousand years old—might be the 
best operationalization of fundamentalism we have. Evangelicals are those who 
have found a way to make the Bible and contemporary geology both true, by say-
ing, to take one of the many hermeneutic formulations, that each “day” in Genesis 
actually means millions of years because the Hebrew word in the original Bible 
can also mean “time period.” So, God still did create the Earth and humans, like 
Genesis says, just not in a way that contradicts a bottom of the pyramid claim of 
modern science. Mainliners would not bother with any of this, and simply say that 
the Genesis writer was from a different era and was struggling to understand the 
mystery of God, so none of Genesis is meant to be taken literally. While evangeli-
cal members of the public are unlikely to get support from leaders for a knowl-
edge conflict, they may well be in knowledge conflict because the fundamentalist 
approach is influential among the masses and simpler for people’s busy lives than 
learning the more subtle hermeneutics of evangelicalism.
Finally, African American Protestantism is considered by scholars to be a tradi-
tion distinct from all of the essentially white traditions I describe above. African 
American Protestants generally follow a conservative Protestant and not a liberal 
Protestant biblical hermeneutic. However, African American Protestant elites 
have been uninvolved with debates about science but have rather focused on 
more pressing issues for their communities, like civil rights. They have also not 
had the modernist/fundamentalist theological split that in many ways created the 
science debate among white Protestants, with the conservative theological posi-
tion remaining hegemonic.39 So, while examining attitudes, African American 
Protestants will appear similar to white conservative Protestants, but it is unlikely 
that African American Protestants would be centrally concerned with issues of 
religion and science.
To conclude this section, the elites of Judaism, Catholicism and mainline 
Protestantism do not teach members to be in knowledge conflict with science, nor 
do they teach a religious belief system that has incompatibilities with at least the 
methodological naturalist version of modern science. Protestant fundamentalism 
is different, and elites would support at least propositional belief conflict with sci-
ence over a few claims, mostly having to do with human origins. We can imagine, 
for example, fundamentalist Pastors saying that scientists are wrong about the age 
of the Earth because the Bible disagrees with the scientists. Whether members 
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would also learn systemic conflict is the open question. I will leave further dis-
cussion of this to the empirical chapters. Evangelicals are an unclear case. On the 
one hand, the leaders would not advocate either type of knowledge conflict with 
science. On the other hand, their solutions for making their religious belief system 
consistent with modern science are so subtle that ordinary members probably lack 
the time to understand it, and may well adopt the more straightforward funda-
mentalist approach.
THE PUBLIC L ACKS SYSTEMIC KNOWLED GE 
STRUCTURES
Having addressed which religious traditions would teach its members either 
systemic knowledge or propositional belief conflict with science, I now turn to 
what is in many ways the preceding question. Would the public even use systemic 
knowledge? Contemporary social science research suggests, in general, that it is 
unlikely that members of the general public are using deductive logical decision-
making pyramids, as I described in the Introduction, regardless of whether they 
are religious or not. Elites do in their areas of focus, but that is because they are 
rewarded for doing so. Therefore, it is unlikely that religious people see it as incon-
sistent that they believe a biblical claim about human origins but believe scien-
tists about climate change. A number of disparate social science writings can be 
brought together to support this claim.
People’s Knowledge Systems Have Low Coherence
You could argue that academics have coherent pyramids of logical justification 
because this is what being an academic is all about, but academics have also 
assumed that the public also has these structures. The reason for the difference 
is that the only people who have the motivation and the time to create logically 
consistent beliefs all the way up to first principles are those who are rewarded for 
doing so. Academics are so rewarded, with philosophers being an extreme case. 
Theology is similar, and theologians specialize in what Max Weber called theo-
retical rationality, rationalizing “the values implicit in doctrines into internally 
consistent constellations of values.”40 Traditionally, this was also the case with poli-
ticians, to the extent that journalists were scouring their every statement looking 
for inconsistencies. Importantly, if you made an issue important for the man or 
woman on the street, they would come up with a logically consistent belief system. 
But, given that scientific beliefs are not important to most people, the difference 
with elites will remain.
There are many terms for these structures, such as “belief system,” “ideology,” 
and “worldview.” As one scholar writes about the attitudinal version of these 
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structures, they are “organized in a hierarchical fashion, in which more specific 
attitudes interact with attitudes toward the more general class of objects in which 
the specific object is seen to belong.”41 For example, in political decision making, 
ideologies “assume that causation flows from the abstract to the specific,” so that 
individual preference is “based, in part, on more general principles.”42
The worldview version of these structures implies the strongest hierarchical 
influence, with the belief at the top being the one that is so deeply assumed that 
it is tantamount to your sense of reality, and from which flows your sub-beliefs. 
This is very similar to the imagery in the religion and science debate, where the 
pinnacle would be something akin to a statement of faith, such as “truth about the 
natural world is best obtained through observation and reason.” Worldviews have 
been thought to be so coherent that merely encountering someone who uses a dif-
ferent one—like two people with different religious ideas at the pinnacle—would 
make one lose faith in one’s own worldview.43
That elites construct these structures but the public does not has long been 
known by social scientists. As early as 1964 it was demonstrated that political opin-
ions are not organized by more abstract ideologies. Only those with more educa-
tion and more political involvement—that is, those with the motivation on this 
topic—have somewhat more coherent constellations of ideas.44
Similarly, and much more recently, sociologist Paul DiMaggio summarized 
cognitive psychology as concluding that “our heads are full of images, opinions, 
and information, untagged as to truth value, to which we are inclined to attribute 
accuracy and plausibility.”45 It therefore does not bother people that much of this 
information is contradictory. Morever, it has been shown that people use incom-
patible ideologies depending on their social context, such as having one form of 
reasoning in church and another in their workplace.46
Other studies show that the highest level elements in worldviews are very weak 
predictors of more concrete attitudes on social issues at the bottom of the pyra-
mid.47 This suggests that logical entailment from the most abstract justificatory 
principle to the concrete claim is at best very weak. Other studies of supposedly 
mutually exclusive worldviews show that they are more diffuse in practice than the 
worldview imagery suggests.48
The result of these investigations of the last few decades is that sociologists 
are now counselled to avoid assuming that ordinary people hold these logically 
deductive pyramid structures. For example, William Sewell Jr. states that “our 
job as cultural analysts is to discern what the shapes and consistencies of local 
meanings actually are and to determine how, why, and to what extent they hang 
together.”49 Similarly, sociologist Ann Swidler has written that scholars should “no 
longer build into our assumptions and our methods the notion that culture is by 
definition a ‘system’” (like an ideology or a worldview), and instead describe the 
amount of structure that is observed.50
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So, while philosophers may say that it is not logical to have a scientific explana-
tion for how flowers move but a nonscientific explanation for the emergence of 
humans, regular people do not have a problem with this reasoning because they do 
not reason back to first principles. For regular people, there is no scientific belief 
that matters enough to their lives to spend the effort on creating a coherent logical 
structure like an expert would. But, Darwin is very important to religious biolo-
gists like Francis Collins, so they definitely spend the time to make their religious 
and scientific beliefs coherent.
Studies of Religion and Science as Knowledge Systems
For over forty years, nobody has spent more effort describing change in the 
American public’s religious beliefs and practices than sociologist of religion 
Robert Wuthnow, so this chapter will extensively reference his voluminous work. 
Wuthnow was early in calling for sociologists to not assume that members of the 
general public have logically coherent belief structures based in deductive reason. 
In various essays, Wuthnow applied this vision to religion, and occasionally sci-
ence, but he did not systematically develop a theory of the relationship between 
the two.
Wuthnow argued that since people do not use high-level concepts to justify 
lower-level beliefs, any knowledge clash between religion and science is unlikely. 
He started by rejecting the idea that ordinary people’s religion is based on the logi-
cal knowledge pyramids required for systemic knowledge:
Elaborate philosophical and theological doctrines sometimes supply rational an-
swers that satisfy canons of logic and empirical evidence. Certainly the great creeds 
and confessions  .  .  . give precise, rational answers to the perplexing questions of 
human existence and those answers are said to be integrated into larger, internally 
logical systems. But in daily life the enduring questions of human existence are more 
likely to be addressed through narratives, proverbs and maxims, and iconic repre-
sentations rich with experiential connotations. Religious orientations are likely to be 
structured less by abstract deductive reasoning than by parables that raise questions 
but leave open precise answers, by personal stories that link experience with wider 
realities, and by creeds and images that have acquired meaning through long histo-
ries of interpretation in human communities.51
Since people’s religion is not structured through deductive logic from first princi-
ples, Wuthnow concludes that science (and philosophy) does not strongly impact 
the religious beliefs of the general public. That is, if a person learns that science 
says the Earth is four and a half billion years old, this will not cascade through their 
other beliefs and wipe them out. Religious orientations will not be immune from 
“the naturalistic attacks of scientists,” but “the influence of science and philosophy 
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will be felt more at the level of story than in terms of rational argument alone.”52 
“Story” would be, for my case, his explanation for how people make conclusions 
about on-the-ground-level beliefs, and I will address this specific possibility in 
subsequent chapters.
Other sociological studies also throw the existence of systemic knowledge con-
flict into question. If people really reason with systemic knowledge, and the sys-
temic knowledge of religion and science are incompatible, then learning science 
should cause people to have less religious belief. By extension, education is thought 
to orient people to science, so education and religion should be incompatible. 
However, one study shows that education in general does not lead to the decline of 
religious belief, and the greatest decline in religiosity among youth occurs among 
those who do not go to college. The authors cautiously conclude that the greatest 
cause of a decline in religiosity among youth is a clash between moral expectations 
in religion and the moral experience of most youth of today.53
Similarly, another study shows that taking classes in the natural sciences does 
not cause a greater decrease in religious belief compared to classes in other fields.54 
Moreover, having more education only leads to stronger belief in evolution for 
nonbiblical literalists. For biblical literalists, more education does not change one’s 
views.55 Apparently, learning science does not impact religious belief, suggesting 
that there is no systemic knowledge conflict between religion and science.
Turning far afield from sociology, psychological research deeply assumes the 
systemic knowledge conflict model. Psychologists Cristine Legare and Aku Visala 
have a similar assessment as I do of at least the philosophical and theological liter-
ature, saying that these literatures produce theories that “tend to be highly abstract 
and operate at the level of ideal rationality rather than in the reality of actual 
believers.”56 They do assume that both religion and science are about knowledge—
both are an “attempt to explain and influence the working of one’s everyday world 
by discovering the constant principles that underlie the apparent chaos and flux of 
sensory experience.” The authors also presume that people strive for logical coher-
ence, that “the cognitive task of coordinating multiple explanatory frameworks is a 
general cognitive problem” and that “people in all societies are faced with the task 
of conceptualizing potentially contradictory explanations for biological phenom-
ena.”57 That is, they are testing the systemic knowledge conflict model.
In my terms, the authors conclude that when people start with on-the-ground 
beliefs about nature and engage in logical entailment up the pyramid, they do 
not get very far, and have no problem with holding two seemingly contradictory 
high-level concepts like “evolution occurred naturally” and “evolution was caused 
by God.” The authors conclude that “the common assumption that natural and 
supernatural explanations are incompatible is psychologically inaccurate,” and 
that “there is considerable evidence that the same individuals use both natural 
and supernatural explanations to interpret the very same events and that there 
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are multiple ways in which both kinds of explanations can coexist in individual 
minds.”58 That is, for the public, the systemic knowledge conflict model is psycho-
logically inaccurate.
Religious Americans Avoid Appearing to Be in Systemic Knowledge 
Conflict with Science
Wuthnow recently published a study of what he calls “The God Problem,” and that 
problem is how to express your faith and seem reasonable in a secular society at 
the same time. His study is a bit difficult to integrate into other studies because he 
does not make claims about what people’s motives are, or whether they are truly 
in conflict with science, but rather is concerned with the arguments they use. For 
my purposes, I would describe his study as a description of the discourse people 
use to fulfill the social requirement of providing a scientific account of the world 
by making sure their propositional belief conflict is not perceived to be a systemic 
knowledge conflict. That religious people seem to accept this social requirement 
suggests that if there are people in systemic knowledge conflict with science they 
are not teaching this perspective to others.
Due to the fact that scientific reason is so dominant in the public sphere, 
Wuthnow concludes that “the very notion of God raises intellectual difficulties. 
It is not something that can be studied scientifically or proven logically: It con-
flicts with ordinary ways of thinking about the affairs of daily life.” As noted previ-
ously, one of Wuthnow’s premises is that people do not engage in deductive reason 
back to first principles. He writes that “we need not assume that thoughtful people 
are amateur philosophers to see that there is a problem in reconciling God with 
ordinary life.” Therefore, “the typical middle-class American is not so philosophi-
cally wedded to naturalism as to deny the possibility of a supernatural reality. And 
yet the tacit epistemology of everyday life is quite naturalistic. We do not expect 
demons to speak, tumors to disappear instantly, or pigs to fly.  .  .  . Yet the vast 
majority of middle-class Americans believe that God exists, pray fairly often, and 
claim that miracles can happen.”59
In my metaphor, he is asking how, for ordinary people, conflicting beliefs at 
the bottom of the religion and science pyramids can be publicly presented as not 
resulting in systemic conflict. An example of these claims would be that “God heals 
people’s diseases” and “diseases heal only through naturalistic processes.” So, how 
is it that religious people maintain belief in the transcendent without seeming to be 
insane by implying they do not believe scientists regarding how diseases function?
The answer is that there are a number of discursive devices that at least well-
educated people learn in the public sphere. These language devices provide ways to 
acknowledge the uncertainty about God while also expressing the convictions that 
religious people hold. For example, how is it possible to claim that you communicate 
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with God through prayer and not appear to be mentally ill? The answer is that 
religious people use devices of language that express a degree of doubt or ambiva-
lence about prayer and what it accomplishes. For example, in a discursive device 
Wuthnow calls “schema alignment,” people talk about God’s actions in a way con-
sistent with common sense ideas about human action. In one study, evangelical 
college students are more likely to pray for psychological interventions from God 
than mechanical or physical interventions, which are less culturally plausible. Or, 
in another example, people are not praying for God’s direct healing of someone 
with cancer, but praying for the doctors to be extra wise in dealing with cancer. 
Believing that God acts through doctors is a lot more sane than believing that God 
directly intervenes and removes cancerous cells from the body.60 It also keeps con-
flict lower in the pyramids by accepting more of the scientific pyramid.
Similarly, in religious ways of talking about natural disasters, “people who believe 
in God find ways to think about large-scale catastrophic events that keep God in the 
picture,” while avoiding viewing God as magician, God as an explanation, or God 
as a comforter. Religious people have “a kind of script or cultural device that makes 
it possible to believe God exists and is in charge of everything that happens with-
out having to assume that God intervenes specifically and deliberately in particular 
events.” One strategy is to invoke inscrutability—the inability to know God’s plans.61
Of course there are some religious people who make what Wuthnow calls “weird 
and spooky” claims about the nature of reality that violate scientific fact claims, 
such as that God directly and thoroughly healed their paralysis in an instant. 
Or, more spectacularly, claims such as those of Pat Robertson, who claimed that 
his prayers steered a hurricane away from Virginia Beach, where his broadcast-
ing business was located. My point, consistent with Wuthnow’s data, I believe, is 
that such people are far and few between—not a large enough population around 
which to build an entire religion and science debate. By far the dominant move is 
to make religion compatible with science.
Religious Americans Do Not Think They Are in a Knowledge 
Conflict with Science
Finally, at one level of abstraction above Wuthnow’s study of how people talk 
about events in the world are studies of whether the public thinks religion and sci-
ence are in conflict over knowledge. One survey found that when asked whether 
“science and religion are incompatible,” 17 percent of the public agreed, 14 percent 
were undecided, and 69 percent disagreed.62 While this question does not say what 
conflict is about, someone holding the systemic knowledge conflict view would 
not see any compatibilities.
Similarly, sociologists Elaine Howard Ecklund and Christopher Scheitle con-
ducted a survey of the general public’s views of religion and science, asking “which 
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of the following BEST represents your view. For me personally, my understand-
ing of science and religion can be described as a relationship of: Conflict  .  .  . I 
consider myself to be on the side of religion; Conflict . . . I consider myself to be 
on the side of science; Independence . . . they refer to different aspects of reality; 
Collaboration . . . each can be used to help support the other.”63
While this question also does not indicate whether conflict is about knowledge 
or moral values, the questions that proceed this one in the survey frame any con-
flict as concerning knowledge conflicts for the respondent. The most basic finding 
is that it is the respondents with no religious identity who see knowledge conflict, 
not the religious respondents. In these data, 53 percent of the nonreligious see 
conflict. Only 30 percent of evangelicals see conflict, whereas 21 percent see inde-
pendence and 48 percent see collaboration. This relatively low level of seeing con-
flict for conservative Protestantism is even lower for other Christians, with only 
19 percent of mainliners and 19 percent of Catholics seeing conflict.64 I take this to 
mean that contemporary religious people do not think that they are in knowledge 
conflict with science. All in all, the research in this section casts doubt on the 
likelihood that the religious public is in systemic knowledge conflict with science.
WHAT WE KNOW AB OUT C ONTEMPOR ARY 
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS PEOPLE
The idea of a knowledge conflict between religion and science is very old, and 
came into place with a particular notion of what “science” and “religion” are. The 
nature of science has roughly stayed constant from the twentieth century forward, 
but I will argue in this section that “religion” has changed in the past fifty years. 
Sociological research of recent decades suggests that American religions, including 
conservative Protestantism, are not perceived by their members as being centrally 
about truth or belief, making conflict over systemic knowledge highly unlikely. 
And, to segue into my point about moral conflict, this recent research also sug-
gests that American religion—and particularly conservative Protestantism—is 
more about social relationships and morality than belief or knowledge. Like the 
recent history examined in the last chapter, research suggests that this is a post-
1960s change in American culture, so it is not surprising that many academics in 
the religion and science debate would not even be aware of it, given that many of 
them were adults by this point in American history.
The Collapse of Truth
You cannot be in systemic knowledge conflict unless you believe something to 
be true, or what would there be to be in conflict over? The idea at the top of the 
pyramid in my analogy has no justification—there are no locations higher in the 
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pyramid. That is, “God acts in the world” is a statement of faith, but so is “knowl-
edge should be ascertained via observation and reason.” Logical deduction of 
belief only works if you deeply assume your top statement is true.
But, the contemporary world discourages the public from thinking they know 
what is true. Sociologists of religion may recognize hints of Peter Berger in this 
argument, who famously described modernity as a situation in which communi-
ties with incompatible notions of ultimate truth or ultimate reality come to inter-
act with each other. He conceived of Catholicism, for example, as ultimately based 
upon a certain perception of reality, about truths that were so unquestioned, you 
were not even aware that you believed in them. Science was another worldview 
with a distinct conception of truth, from which flowed various beliefs. These were 
just the way the world “is,” as everybody in the communities that held them knew 
and could not even question. Muslims had a different version of truth, as did 
Buddhists, and so did the scientific secular worldview.
For Berger, the problem with modernity was the increasing ease of interaction 
between people with disparate truths. First the wheel, then the train, the airplane, the 
telephone, television, and then the internet—all make it possible to become aware 
that there are other people who have ultimate assumptions about truth and reality 
that differ from yours. Critically, encountering someone who has a different ultimate 
assumed truth makes you wonder if you should so deeply assume your own truth. 
This lack of certitude about ultimate truth was, for Berger, the tragedy of modernity.65
This meant that since religions were idea systems based upon notions of ulti-
mate truth, the lack of certitude would result in secularization. While Berger may 
have been wrong about immanent secularization, I think that his view of the 
decline of certainty in belief in truth—in the top of any pyramid—was accurate. 
Religion does exist in the U.S., even at nearly the same level of participation as a 
century before, but in my opinion members of religions have less certitude about 
truth. Berger’s only error, in my mind, was to assume you need absolute certi-
tude to keep going to church. Observing this lesser level of truth, Chris Smith has 
labeled this as a shift from Berger’s “Sacred Canopy” to “Sacred Umbrellas.”66
Wuthnow concurs, arguing that the public has “a kind of tentativeness, even 
cynicism, about truth,” that most people think both science and religion are true, 
and have no problem with the supposed inconsistency. One reason for cynicism 
about truth is the normative emphasis in American culture on tolerance of oppos-
ing viewpoints. We can imagine someone saying, “If you want to say that the Earth 
is six thousand years old, that is fine, and I’ll just say that the Earth is billions of 
years old. We are all entitled to our view.” Partly, this is civility. But, Wuthnow 
points out that in the contemporary world, “a person has difficulty holding fast to 
a conviction because it is no longer possible to know what is true.”67
As an example of this loss of certitude about truth, for fifteen years or so I 
regularly taught an undergraduate class in the sociology of religion, where I taught 
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Berger’s ideas. In earlier years, I tried to use examples from Christianity or science 
to find students who assumed some facts to be unquestionably true, such as “Jesus 
rose from the dead,” or “the Earth goes around the Sun.” The students never quite 
understood what I meant by an absolute assumption of truth, and I came to realize 
that this was because they were not absolutely certain about any of their own reli-
gious or scientific beliefs. After a few years I found examples of absolute truth that 
they were absolutely certain about—which were physical properties of reality that 
they themselves had experienced, not simply a truth that some authoritative figure 
told them. My new question for the students was: “How many of you are absolutely 
certain I cannot jump through this wall without making a hole in it?” Finally, I 
had found a truth that contemporary students, religious and secular, believed in. I 
could then explain that Berger’s theory is premised on religious beliefs having the 
same status as beliefs about my inability to jump through walls.
In sum, systemic knowledge conflict between religion and science requires 
people to believe strongly in the truth at the apex of their knowledge pyramid. If 
people even have such pyramids, which above I suggest they do not, in this section 
I suggest that their confidence in the truth at the top would not be strong enough 
to lead them to conflict with competing knowledge claims. You would have to have 
very high certitude about the earth being six thousand years old to see the claim of 
a billions-of-years-old earth to be a threat to your entire knowledge structure. Yes, 
such people do exist, but again, there are not enough of them on which to build a 
theory of religion and science.
The Collapse of Religious Doctrine
In recent decades, sociologists of religion have also noted the related phenomena 
of the collapse of doctrine in American religion. Doctrine is “a set of ideas or 
beliefs that are taught or believed to be true.”68 In the assumed systemic knowledge 
conflict, scientific facts disrupt religious doctrine. One of my favorite examples 
of science impacting doctrine is an early twentieth-century British elite debate 
between scientists and theologians. One of the concerns of the theologians was 
that if Darwin was right, there was then no Adam, and then the doctrine of the Fall 
of humanity69 and original sin was moot, and thus most of Christian doctrine—
the belief structure—would have to be re-done:
Since the late nineteenth century, liberal Anglicans had accepted the general idea 
of evolution on the assumption that the progressive development of life could be 
interpreted as the unfolding of a divine plan. But while this position was compatible 
with a general theism, it was not widely appreciated that to accept the human race 
as improved animals was to undermine the foundations upon which the traditional 
notion of the Fall and the need for redemption were based. Putting it bluntly, even 
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if evolution was conceived as the unfolding of God’s plan, the element of progress 
made nonsense out of the idea of original sin (since there could be no Fall from an 
earlier state of grace), and if there was no original sin, one would have to ask what 
the point of the Atonement would be within the new theology. It would be easy 
enough to see Christ as a messenger from God pointing the way to future spiritual 
development, but what was the point of His death on the Cross if there was no need 
for redemption?70
This is the standard concern among elites, that logically believing in one piece of 
knowledge leads to needing to change another piece of knowledge. These doc-
trinal claims such as the Fall are midway up the pyramid in my metaphor, and 
the fact claim of Darwinism is only a problem because the theologian sees that 
this is inconsistent with the fact claim that God created humans. The knowledge 
conflict—what motivates the angst and actual human action—is that believing the 
wrong fact destroys Christian doctrine.
This conflict makes sense for theologians. But, what if contemporary Christians 
do not know or care about doctrine? In this particular example, they may see that 
there are two contradictory fact claims about where humans come from, but not 
be bothered by it, because it does not have any implications for anything—if you 
do not believe in Christian doctrine. Perhaps they do not know about the doctrine 
of the Fall.
In a chapter titled “The Strange Disappearance of Doctrine from Conservative 
Protestantism,” social scientist Alan Wolfe says of fundamentalists: “doctrinaire 
they may be but interested in doctrine they are not,” due to their belief that the 
words of the Bible alone are all you need. Evangelicals too have a “lack of confi-
dence in doctrine,” and are then “sometimes hard pressed to explain exactly what, 
doctrinally speaking, their faith is.” Wolfe concludes that “these are people who 
believe, often passionately, in God, even if they cannot tell others all that much 
about the God in which they believe.”71
Studies of “new paradigm” or “seeker” conservative Protestant churches show 
something similar. These churches are those that eschew all symbols and trap-
pings of traditional American religion—no steeples, no organs, no formal dress. 
Rather, churches like this try to make themselves look more like office parks, pre-
fer informal dress, and definitely have no pipe organs. One study of these churches 
concludes that although the churches in this growing segment of conservative 
Protestantism “are insistent on the belief in Christ, they disavow dogma. . . . The 
emphasis is on the individual’s relationship with God rather than on holding the 
correct theological doctrine.” In a telling quote that reveals what is important, one 
pastor in this tradition said “there are a lot of people who have their theology 
down but are not in love with Jesus,” while another said “purity of heart is more 
important than purity of doctrine.” The author of the study concludes that for 
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these churches, “Christianity is not primarily a matter of cognitive assent; it is an 
attitude and a relationship between the individual and God.” The people in these 
churches “express their emphasis on personal conviction over doctrine.”72
Survey data also suggests this shift. In a 1999 survey, when asked to choose 
between church doctrine and personal experience as the best way to understand 
God, about 66 percent of young adults aged 21–39 picked personal experience 
and about 25 percent picked doctrine. Among those over age 65, about 50 percent 
picked experience and 40 percent picked doctrine.73 While the older respondents 
could be different because they are in a different stage of life, given its consistency 
with other data, the fact that younger people are rejecting doctrine seems more 
likely to reflect a change in American culture.
In my terms, doctrine is the religious systemic knowledge structure. If contem-
porary conservative Protestants are unconcerned with doctrine, they do not have 
a religious systemic knowledge structure, or at best have a very loose one, and thus 
cannot be in systemic knowledge conflict with science. However, conservative 
Protestants picking beliefs from the Bible without regard to doctrine could lead to 
propositional belief conflict with science.
The Rise of the Bricoleur
Perhaps there was a time in American history—say, the 1950s—when ordinary 
people’s religious beliefs were more likely to be organized like a hierarchical pyra-
mid. But, if so, that has changed. Religious knowledge in recent history is much 
more fragmentary. If contemporary religious people do not have doctrine or a 
religious belief structure, what do they have?
According to Wuthnow, since the 1950s there has been a shift from “dwelling” 
to “seeking” conceptions of the sacred. He writes that “people have been losing 
faith in a metaphysic that can make them feel at home in the universe and that they 
increasingly negotiate among competing glimpses of the sacred, seeking partial 
knowledge and practical wisdom.”74 The “seeking” conception then is “partial” and 
“practical,” not so concerned with whether disparate ideas taken from different 
places are all logically consistent with each other. A “dwelling religion” is more 
cohesive and based on tradition, and a “seeking religion” involves “picking and 
choosing what they consider personally meaningful rather than feeling a need to 
accept entire traditions or universal truths.”75
The growth of this amorphous, less organized seeking conception of the 
sacred is best exemplified by belief in angels. According to Wuthnow, encoun-
ters with angels are “relatively fluid, personalized, ephemeral, and amorphous, all 
of which fits with the complex, homeless world in which spirituality is currently 
sought.” There is no well-organized theology of angels: they are the sort of frag-
mentary sacred experience of the seeking variety. Wuthnow also does not think 
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that belief in angels and other seeking conceptions of the sacred is the basis of a 
new hierarchical belief structure—a “profound epistemological transformation in 
Western thought.” Rather, “such conclusions are drawn by elites,” where spiritual-
ity “often generates thinking that does challenge Cartesian philosophy or Freudian 
psychology.”76
For ordinary citizens, a seeking religion with little to no structure in its knowl-
edge fits with the limited time most of the public has. Beliefs in angels and other 
supernatural phenomena prominent in the new seeking notion of the sacred can 
be reconciled with the scientific knowledge that also characterizes American cul-
ture because “most people live from day to day, focusing on the realities of daily 
life, rather than thinking about scientific images of the universe.”77 That is, as I 
have previously noted, most people do not have the time to create hierarchical 
knowledge structures.
Other sociologists of religion describe contemporary religion similarly. “Sheila,” 
the now infamous interviewee in the canonical 1985 study of American culture 
titled “Habits of the Heart,” would be one of Wuthnow’s seekers, and represented 
a strain of contemporary religious belief scholars now call “Sheilaism.” She treated 
religious beliefs like a smorgasbord of ideas to pick from, with the principle that 
moved her fork to the steam pan being “that which makes me feel good.”78 At 
this point I will also just gesture to the massive literature on the rise of religious 
individualism, which is essentially documenting the same change in American 
religion.79
The underlying cause of this change, and thus the change in the relationship 
between religion and science, is the structure of American society. The “dwelling” 
religion idea is less plausible in a society where people experience their social lives 
as compilations of changing events. People do not have one job from college grad-
uation to retirement, but rather multiple jobs across multiple industries. There 
is not one family to reside in, but rather your original family, your step parents, 
your step siblings and step step siblings, as well as various living situations outside 
of the “traditional” family. People do not live in one neighborhood their whole 
lives but in a series of neighborhoods in different cities and states. The change is 
even reflected in how people obtain information: an old fashioned book is very 
“dwelling,” clicking through links quickly on the internet is very “seeking.” In a 
world perceived as endless freedom and choice—of fifty types of cereal and two 
hundred TV channels—people are not going to believe in an inherited knowledge 
structure when they can believe in something they construct through their own 
idiosyncratic choices.
In a 2007 summary of myriad data sources, with a focus on younger adults, 
Wuthnow concludes that those aged twenty-one to forty-five are “a generation 
of tinkerers” who put “together a life from whatever skills, ideas, and resources 
that are readily at hand.” They are more likely to be a bricoleur (handyman), 
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producing a bricolage—“a construction improvised from multiple sources.” 
Thus, in the contemporary world, and particularly for the younger generation, 
“we piece together our thoughts about religion and our interests in spiritual-
ity from the materials at hand.” And, critically for my point, a bricolage is not 
the airtight logical structure that the academics use: “ordinary people are not 
religious professionals who approach spirituality the way an engineer might 
construct a building. They are amateurs who make do with what they can. .  .  . 
Bricolage implies the joining together of seemingly inconsistent, disparate com-
ponents.”80 To continue the metaphor, the constructed machine does not have to 
make sense, it just has to work.
Wuthnow uses a man in his late twenties as an example. He started his journey 
by thinking “I believe in Christianity, but that’s all I’ve ever known, so how can I 
know it’s the truth if I don’t look around and see what else is out there?” He con-
tinues to try to “develop a satisfactory faith of his own” by “piecing together ideas 
from any source that comes his way,” including ideas from a Muslim friend, a book 
about the Buddha, New Age ideas, Orthodox Judaism, and music.81
Again, if Americans are seekers, bricoleurs, or religious individualists, taking 
pieces from different religious traditions without regard for how they would be 
embedded in a larger logical structure, it is hard to imagine that they have the logi-
cal structures about religion and science that elites assume they have.
Conservative Protestantism Increasingly Focused on  
Individualistic Therapy
The immediately preceding sections described how contemporary religious 
Americans do not have hierarchical, logically organized belief structures. They 
have belief, but this belief is not organized like elites would assume. This is still 
consistent with the idea of propositional belief conflict in that we can imagine 
conservative Protestants disagreeing about the age of the Earth, but this religious 
belief would not be related to other scientific or religious beliefs. Contemporary 
American religion does not include systemic knowledge, but does it even focus on 
any beliefs about the natural world?
People think of conservative Protestantism as the most doctrinaire of the 
Christian traditions, and to the extent there has been any conflict about beliefs 
with science by elites, it is primarily with conservative Protestants. However, a 
number of studies show that if conservative Protestantism was ever about truth 
claims, it is increasingly an instrument of individualistic therapy and fulfillment. 
That is, conservative Protestantism is increasingly about people’s social relation-
ships and, more specifically, helping people with their problems. Jesus has been 
transformed from the messenger of God’s truth into a friend who helps you in 
your time of need.
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In a strongly worded critique, Alan Wolfe’s study of the transformation of 
American religion in the late twentieth century concludes that conservative 
Protestantism has joined the culture of narcissism. This religion is no longer about 
worshiping a transcendent God, but has transformed “already individualistic wor-
ship styles into ones even more capable of helping believers with the mundane 
practicalities of modern life.” As many a contemporary critic has noted, gone are 
the days of Jonathan Edwards talking about how you are barely perched above 
the fiery pit of hell. Today, Jesus is your friend, here to solve your social problems.
Wolfe describes a prayer group at one Baptist church where the group does not 
offer prayers of adoration or devotion, but prayers about the health and healing 
of members, financial difficulties, real estate, and issues facing the church. The 
group keeps a large tablet that serves as “God’s scorecard” where prayers God has 
acted upon are put in the “praise” column and those not acted upon yet are put in 
the “petition” column. Wolfe concludes that “the concerns that so many believers 
express in prayer suggest that, in their minds, God helps those who focus on them-
selves.” In fact, a survey shows that this is a broadly accepted idea. Eighty percent 
of Americans believe that Benjamin Franklin’s aphorism “God helps those that 
help themselves” actually comes from the Bible.82
Similarly, a sociological review of what is known about the growing number 
of American megachurches, which are largely conservative Protestant, states that 
these churches are based in “the therapeutic personalism that marks Baby-Boomer 
religiosity,” with the “seeker” sub-variety of church emphasizing “the personalis-
tic aspects of faith—a believer’s personal relationship with Jesus and the ways in 
which faith can help individuals address numerous domestic or personal issues.” 
One of the explanations for the rise of these churches is that Americans have come 
“to expect religion to be a tool in the individual’s quest to develop the self.”83
This narcissistic approach to religion has apparently reached epidemic pro-
portions among the young, where religion is almost exclusively about social and 
moral relationships. In an extensive study of American teenagers, Christian Smith 
concludes that if you generalize across the religions of American youth, their 
beliefs are best described as “moralistic therapeutic deism.” The principles of this 
new dominant form of religion include: “A god exists who created and ordered the 
world and watches over human life on earth;” “God wants people to be good, nice, 
and fair to each other, as taught in the Bible and by most world religions;” “The 
central goal of life is to be happy and to feel good about oneself;” “God does not 
need to be particularly involved in one’s life except when God is needed to resolve 
a problem;” and “good people go to heaven when they die.”84
Religion in the modern age is thus about being moral to each other, about 
God helping you feel good about yourself, and about God solving your problems. 
Smith concludes that in this view of religion, God is “something like a combina-
tion Divine Butler and Cosmic Therapist: he’s always on call, takes care of any 
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problems that arise, professionally helps his people to feel better about themselves, 
and does not become too personally involved in the process.”85
Therapeutic religion reaches its peak in a conservative Protestant movement 
called the Prosperity Gospel. While roundly condemned by evangelical elites who 
see Prosperity preachers as heretical charlatans, it is the logical extension of the 
aforementioned trends in conservative Protestantism. The movement is based on 
the idea, at its most crass, that if you give the pastor ten dollars, God will somehow 
give you one hundred dollars.
More generally, the central message of the Prosperity Gospel is that God and 
religion exist for your happiness. In her extensive study of the origins of the 
American Prosperity Gospel movement, Kate Bowler defines it as “a wildly popu-
lar Christian message of spiritual, physical, and financial mastery.” She sees some 
of the unifying themes of the Prosperity Gospel as faith, wealth, and health. Faith 
is “an activator” that “unleashes spiritual forces and turns the spoken word into 
reality,” and proper faith is demonstrated by a person’s wealth and health.86
The “hard” version of the Prosperity Gospel makes a mechanistic connection 
between your action and the good outcome. This is the “give me ten dollars and 
God will give you one hundred dollars” variety. This “hard” version is nowhere 
near as prevalent now, at least in the U.S., as is “soft prosperity,” embodied in 
phrases like “God is a good God!” and “Expect a Miracle!” and “Something good 
is going to happen to you!”87 Bowler describes megachurch pastor Joel Osteen sit-
ting down on the TV talk show The View and providing a “confidence that God 
provides the tools to reach into the heavenlies and pull out a blessing: a promotion, 
weight loss, a lovely home, a happy marriage or top-flight schools for their kids.”88 
Bowler sees this movement as the culmination of the trends I have been discussing 
in this chapter, writing that the soft version “rose to popularity in the 1990s with 
the turn toward therapeutic religion and the desire for language of sweet certainty. 
It was the perfect theological language for an experiential and consumptive gen-
eration who longed for a God who not only showed up but whose blessings could 
be measured.”89
Some of the most famous conservative Protestant pastors fit into this mold. 
Joel Osteen has a thirty-eight-thousand-member congregation and is the author 
of self-help bestsellers such as “I declare! 31 Promises to Speak Over Your Life.” His 
television show is ubiquitous. Nielsen Media has determined him to be America’s 
most-watched inspirational figure, with a weekly audience of seven million. T. D. 
Jakes was described by Time magazine as “one of America’s most influential new 
religious leaders” with a thirty-thousand-member church, media conglomerate, 
and more than two dozen books on emotional healing. Creflo Dollar is the pastor 
of a thirty-thousand-member congregation in Atlanta.90
While you would be hard pressed to find an evangelical theologian who agrees 
with this movement, it seems to be very influential among the conservative 
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Protestant public. While a recent poll found that only 17 percent of Christians 
identified themselves as part of the prosperity gospel movement, this underes-
timates the more generalized acceptance of these ideas. In the same poll, 31 per-
cent believed that “God increases the riches of those who give.” Two-thirds agreed 
that “God wants people to prosper.” Another survey showed that 43 percent of 
Christians agreed that the faithful receive health and wealth.91
Needless to say, this is not the only version of Christianity that is possible. A 
nice counterpart for our thinking is an older “gospel” movement, the social gospel 
movement. Found among mainline and liberal Protestants in the early twentieth 
century, the point of this movement was to create the Kingdom of God on earth by 
eradicating social evils like poverty that befell others.92 Religion was not supposed 
to make you happy, but you had a religious obligation to make others happier.
I refer you to Bowler’s fascinating book for more details about the Prosperity 
Gospel. Suffice it to say that adherents of the Prosperity Gospel probably “know” 
that as evangelical Protestants they are supposed to believe that evolution is incor-
rect. But, this seems like it would be a very minor aspect of their faith. Front and 
center is a concern about social relationships—most notably, for this movement, 
how they themselves are doing socially compared to everyone else in the world. 
Again, this is not a religion dedicated to fact claims about nature, but to social and 
moral relationships, making knowledge conflict unlikely.
It is only because the religion and science debate started so long ago, when a 
different version of conservative Protestantism was in place, that we think that a 
conflict between religion and science for the public would be about fact claims 
about the natural world. If we restart the debate today, as I am advocating, we 
would instead be looking at the moral values of science and religion to see how 
and when they clash.
THE PUBLIC IS  LIKELY TO THINK SCIENCE AND 
SCIENTIST S ARE C ONCERNED WITH MOR ALIT Y
We should remind ourselves of what would be required for the religious public to 
be in systemic knowledge conflict with science. On the one hand, they would need 
to think of their religious belief system as a cohesive knowledge structure where a 
scientific claim like human evolution would threaten a religious belief such as the 
Resurrection. So far in this chapter, I have shown a plethora of disparate studies 
that collectively suggest that if American religion was once a coherent structure of 
belief that could be threatened by a scientific fact claim, that is no longer the case.
For moral conflict, religious people would need to think of religion as pro-
ducing moral claims. I think that it is uncontroversial that this is indeed the 
case. However, they would also need to see science as producing moral claims. 
While this is not what we find in the elite debate, and is contrary to scientists’ 
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self-perceptions, existing research across the social sciences and humanities sug-
gests that the public is likely to see science and scientists in moral terms.
Let us then start with what is obvious when we move our gaze from elites to the 
public. Where does the public learn about science? Not from science teachers, at 
least after they finish twelfth grade. Communications scholars conclude that after 
formal science education ends, the media is the most available and sometimes 
the only source of information about scientific discoveries and scientists.93 This 
media—such as TV, movies, and the news—describes science as deeply concerned 
with morality, so it is no surprise that religious people would interpret scientists as 
engaging in moral action.
For example, a study of the discursive frames found in media stories about 
 science-related policy debates included categories of: social progress (improving or 
endangering the quality of life); economic development; morality and ethics; sci-
entific and technical uncertainty; public accountability/governance; and “Pandora’s 
box/Frankenstein’s monster/runaway science.” Of these categories, only scientific 
and technical uncertainty could be described as concerning scientific knowledge 
per se.94 The remainder are largely about social relationships or morality.
Depictions of Scientists in Popular Culture
I suspect that most people’s view of scientists comes from popular culture, not 
newspapers. As of this writing, the BBC drama Orphan Black is in its third season, 
having won numerous awards. The premise is that in the 1980s, a group of scientists 
in the U.K. decided that the time was right to clone humans—illegally. The moti-
vation of the scientists was to use our human abilities to direct our own human 
evolution. The cloned embryos were placed in a large number of surrogates, born 
and grew up apart—but, each clone with a spy monitoring them to gather data for 
the scientists. Control of the human species was not the only motive of scientists, 
but written into the DNA of each of the clones, using code, is a patent statement. 
Not only would the species be perfected, but the perfection would be profitable.
The underlying theme of much of the show is the consequences of trying to 
control the nature of human life. That of course sounds like the eugenics move-
ment, and those who are aware of the history of the eugenics movement are given 
sly references as the plot of the show develops. For starters, one of the sinister 
scientists’ name is Aldous. This is a vaguely British name, but surely this is a refer-
ence to Aldous Huxley, author of the dystopian classic Brave New World. In fact, as 
clever bloggers with too much time on their hands have noted, if you look carefully 
in the beginning scene of the pilot episode, the name of the train station where the 
plot first develops is “Huxley Station.”95 Later we find that the scientific institute 
dedicated to creating the clones was called the “Cold River Institute.” In the real 
world, the Eugenics Record Office in Cold Spring Harbor, New York was the base 
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of the American eugenics movement of the early twentieth century. Much later we 
discover the inspiration for the cloning was a 19th century British eugenicist.
Part of the popularity of the show is undoubtedly that the same actress plays, 
as of this writing, seven different adult cloned women, each with different man-
nerisms, surface-level appearance, and accent. But the message of the show is not 
far under the surface. While perhaps the original scientists who created the seven 
female clones were just interested in what would happen, the team of scientists 
who took over and have been following the women are simply sinister, soulless, 
and have no problem killing people to protect their experiment. At minimum, 
scientists are portrayed as amoral and at maximum they are portrayed as wanting 
to flaunt the morality of the public in Promethean schemes for control of nature. 
The show does not show any knowledge conflict—no one questions the science of 
human cloning—only moral conflict.
The original Star Trek series is another great example of how the morality of 
scientists is portrayed as being at odds with public morality. The science officer for 
the Enterprise was Mr. Spock, a Vulcan who tried to enact the perfect emotionless 
rationality of his species. It makes complete sense given the tropes of American 
culture that he was the science officer and not the doctor, who was portrayed as 
having the expertise, values, and mannerisms of a small-town family practitio-
ner transported to space. A repeated theme in the show was that Spock’s radi-
cal utilitarianism, depicted as “rational” and thus scientific, was kept in check by 
Captain Kirk’s Kantianism. “The needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few,” 
Spock would proclaim when urging that someone be allowed to die to save others, 
whereas the emotional Kirk would risk the many to save the individual, which is 
depicted as the “human” response. Kirk channels his inner Kant when he turns 
Spock’s catchphrase on its head saying “because the needs of the one outweigh the 
needs of the many,” thus representing the “human” vs. the Vulcan (i.e., scientific) 
response. Science, logic, and rationality are thus put at odds with human values.
The scientist as utilitarian works for Star Trek because it has a kernel of truth 
to it. If we go back to the 1950s, medical research scientists were conducting 
experiments on prisoners and orphans without their knowledge. For example, the 
Tuskegee syphilis study was based on not treating poor African American men 
who had developed the disease to see what would happen to them. All of this 
was justified with the premise that medical knowledge that would benefit every-
one needed to be developed. Then, a social movement in the 1960s now called 
“bioethics” began to argue that individuals cannot be sacrificed for the greater 
good, rejecting the morality of many scientists at the time. People would have 
to give their informed consent to be experimented upon—they would have to 
agree to sacrifice themselves for the greater good. The degree of public outrage 
that occurred when the public found out about the Tuskegee experiment, as well 
as experiments on orphans and so on, is indicative of how the scientists’ morality 
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differed from the public’s morality, and entire institutions of research ethics were 
invented to rein in the questionable morals of the scientists. Indeed, the system of 
ethics that is now used to govern human experimentation is described by academ-
ics as “the public’s morality.”96
Star Trek and Orphan Black work because their portrayals of scientists are so 
deeply entrenched in American culture. For the public, the most famous scientist 
is probably not Francis Collins, or even inventor of the polio vaccine Jonas Salk, 
but Dr. Frankenstein. While the original 1818 novel had a different meaning, the 
movie version which most people know does not question whether Frankenstein 
knows his science, or whether he was making correct fact claims about the natural 
world. Rather, Dr. Frankenstein is famous for circumventing public morality to do 
what he wanted to do. As one scholar writes, “in the Hollywood tale, the fate of 
the Frankenstein monster becomes a moral lesson illustrating the punishment for 
ambitious scientists who seek to usurp the place of God by creating life.”97
The scientist who does what they want regardless of what the public thinks is 
a vision that continues to this day. For example, in the 1993 movie Jurassic Park, 
scientists figure out how to clone dinosaurs and bring them back to life, resulting 
in negative consequences, suggesting that scientists should not really be led by 
their own moral compass.
Frankenstein and Jurassic Park are not unique stories in this regard. One study 
of 990 horror movies from 1931 to 1984 found that “science is historically the most 
frequent type of monstrous threat in horror films.”98 Another analysis of 222 mov-
ies is even more clear that scientists are depicted as amoral or immoral people 
who cannot be trusted. The title of the study is telling: “Of Power Maniacs and 
Unethical Geniuses.” Science is portrayed as alarming because it concerns the 
modification of the human body and the violation of human nature. Scientists are 
portrayed as pursuing new knowledge in secret without social controls.99
Besides a reiteration of the finding that scientists are portrayed as having a 
moral agenda, and a negative one at that, this study is important because it also 
summarizes what morals the scientists are violating. Movies are not made about 
scientists measuring quarks or describing molecules. Rather, the immoral scien-
tists are intervening in humanity itself—in our human nature and in our bodies. 
The author of the study of the Frankenstein movies writes that “more than a moral 
lesson, the celluloid Frankenstein story is a powerful metaphor for addressing the 
ways in which American society responds to the rapid pace of discoveries in biol-
ogy and medicine, discoveries that challenge traditional understandings of what it 
means to be human.”100
As I will describe in Chapter 7, declining trust by religious conservatives in the 
scientists who run scientific institutions in the U.S. coincided with a shift in scien-
tific interest from the physical world (e.g., physics, nuclear power) to the human 
body (e.g., human genetic engineering). “The human” is religious territory, and 
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scientists are not only moving into that area in recent decades, but our popular 
culture is teaching the public that the morals of the scientists are particularly 
untrustworthy in this area.
It is even worse for scientists. In the study of 222 films, many of the scientists are 
portrayed as the “mad scientist” who trespasses ethical boundaries to gain forbid-
den knowledge or fame. However, even the scientists coded as “good” or “benevo-
lent” should not be trusted, because they are naive, meaning well but seeing their 
discoveries put to some unethical use.101 Cultural historian Christopher Frayling 
reaches similar conclusions, writing that in popular films “the mad scientists (the 
fictional ones) have outnumbered the saintly scientists (the real life ones) by a very 
wide margin indeed.”102
According to one review of this literature on science and popular culture, the 
overall picture is “a cinematic history expressing deep-rooted fears of science and 
scientific research in the twentieth century.”103 Frayling concludes that studies 
show “that the dystopias outnumber the utopias by a factor of about a hundred to 
one . . . the cinema has spent much of its history telling audiences that science and 
technology, actually or potentially, are likely to be very bad for them.”104
These depictions of scientists are not only found in television and movies. 
Western literature also teaches the public that science is primarily a moral or social 
enterprise, stocked with scientists whose morality is in contradiction to the moral-
ity of the public. In her sweeping analysis of scientists in Western fiction from the 
Middle Ages to the late twentieth century, Roslynn Haynes finds that “scientists 
as depicted in literature have, with few exceptions, been rated as “low” to “very 
low” on the moral scale. The early Faustian stereotype of the enchanter, versed in 
the black arts and most probably in league with the devil, has spawned a series of 
equally unattractive offspring: megalomaniacs bent on world destruction; absent-
minded professors shuffling in slippers and odd socks while disasters befall their 
beautiful daughter in the next room; inhuman researchers who think only in facts 
and numbers and are unable to communicate on any other level.” Haynes finds 
six archetypes of scientists that are reworked over the centuries, the majority of 
which “represent scientists in negative terms, as producing long-term liabilities 
for society.”105
These teachings from popular culture about the behavior and motivations of 
scientists appear to be already known by very young children. Scholars have been 
studying the images of scientists held by adolescents for over fifty years by hav-
ing them draw pictures of scientists. The classic study from 1958 determined that 
children viewed the scientist as an elderly or middle-aged man with glasses, beard, 
and a white coat in a laboratory surrounded by equipment. More importantly, a 
summary of more recent studies concludes that in addition to these physical traits, 
the stereotypical scientist is viewed as a genius “who may be antisocial, crazed, or 
even evil.”106
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These data are supported by some of the experiences of scientists tasked 
with improving their image. A scientist leading a project on the impact of the 
media on children’s attitudes about science tells of visiting elementary schools 
with scientists, and how the children do not believe they are actually scientists. 
The reasons are that they are “too normal,” and “too good-looking.” More strik-
ingly, some children say “I did not think he was real because he seemed to care 
about us.”107
There is not an extensive social science research literature on what the public 
thinks about the morality of scientists. One exception is a set of recent psychol-
ogy experiments where the subtitle of the paper is a good summary: “Scientists 
are associated with violations of morality.” Using a number of controlled 
experiments about the sort of person who would engage in extremely deviant 
acts, they find that scientists were perceived by Americans as more likely than 
others to engage in serial murder, incest, and necrobestiality. This finding is 
even more striking given that the experimental surveys were administered to 
samples from the population that are, in the authors’ own estimation, more 
similar to scientists than other Americans. The sample is far less religious, far 
more liberal, and more educated than the general public. If replicated with a 
nationally representative sample, the results would presumably depict scientists 
even more negatively.108
For my purposes, it is not only important that scientists in popular culture are 
depicted as people who are morally at odds with the rest of society. The more 
general point is that scientists are not depicted as sticking to conducting investiga-
tions about the natural world that society has asked them to do. Rather, scientists 
are portrayed, both positively and negatively, as people who act morally with a 
particular agenda, for good or bad. It is hard to imagine that any average citizen 
views science as just a morally neutral investigation of the natural world. Rather, 
they probably perceive scientists as a group promoting moral and social interests.
If Not Immoral, At Least Not Like Us
The scientist as madman portrays a particular morality of scientists. What is worse 
for scientists is that, even if portrayed as good or neutral, they are perceived as not 
like “ordinary” people. If scientists are not like you and me, as foreign, it is hard to 
imagine that scientists can be trusted to have the same values as you or me.
Consider one last TV show, The Big Bang Theory. This American comedy is 
about a group of young scientists at the paragon of American science  institutions—
the California Institute of Technology. The show and its actors have won mul-
tiple awards, such as the Emmy Award and the People’s Choice Award. It is in its 
ninth season, with between twenty and twenty-five episodes per season and about 
twenty million people watching each episode in the U.S. About 6 percent of the 
Existing Research on the Public    117
population of the U.S. is watching each original episode, and its global reach is 
further. Earlier seasons are now in syndication, suggesting that even more people 
are watching.109 In terms of what “an elite scientist is like”—the type that a citizen 
would read about in the newspaper—I have no doubt that The Big Bang Theory is 
far more influential than any other non-TV cultural work or movie in shaping the 
public’s views.
The show works with stereotypes of the nerd and the mad scientist.110 The show 
largely lacks the “scientists as evil” trope described above, with a sympathetic view 
of the mad scientist, but fully reinforces the view that scientists are not like you 
and me. The basic comedic premise of the show is to play off of all of the available 
tropes in American culture about how scientists are unlike the rest of us. “The rest 
of us” is played by a waitress from Nebraska who moves into the apartment across 
the hall from the two primary scientific characters in the show, and we see through 
her eyes how odd the scientists are compared to everyday people.
The star of the show is Sheldon Cooper, a brilliant theoretical physicist who 
started college at age eleven, studying string theory and quantum mechanics. He 
lacks the ability to understand social situations or others’ feelings and continu-
ously notes that he is smarter than everyone else. Sheldon’s friend is another physi-
cist, Leonard Hofsdtater, who plays the one scientist in the group who approaches 
a normal understanding of social relationships—which provides a continuous 
comedic well. Another physicist is Raj Koothrappali, who, at least in the earlier 
seasons, is so awkward that he cannot speak to a woman unless he drinks a lot of 
alcohol. The final member of the group is Howard Wolowitz, who is not quite the 
failure with women that Koothrappali is, but is nonetheless wildly inappropriate. 
The group of friends pass their time at the comic book store and watch a lot of sci-
ence fiction movies. The basic message one gets from the show—never explicitly 
said, but not needing to be—is that elite scientists are not like you and me. Since 
they are not like you and me, it seems unlikely that the public will assume they 
share the public’s values.
Social science research also finds that the public views scientists as not like the 
general public. The psychology study referenced a few paragraphs ago found that 
“scientists are perceived as significantly more nerdy, robot-like, goal-oriented, 
and emotionless than regular persons and atheists.”111 Similarly, the National 
Science Foundation conducted surveys in 1983 and 2001 that in part measured 
the public’s images of scientists. We only need to look at the questions they asked 
to see how scientists are thought of as “not like us.” The survey asked for evalu-
ation of the statements: “scientists have few other interests besides their work,” 
“scientists don’t get as much fun out of life as other people do,” scientists “are apt 
to be odd and peculiar people,” scientists “are not likely to be religious people,” 
and “scientific work is dangerous.”112 The conclusion is that scientists are not con-
sidered to be “like us.”
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C ONCLUSION
In Chapters 2 and 3 we saw that the systemic knowledge conflict view dominates 
academic thought. Academics either explicitly extrapolate this view to the public, 
or by not being explicit that they are only talking about elites, imply that this is 
what ordinary religious people would think. In Chapter 4 I showed a range of 
recent elite debates that throw the systemic knowledge conflict perspective into 
doubt, even for elites. In this chapter I summarized disparate existing research 
on the public that suggests that while we may find some instances of proposi-
tional belief conflict between religion and science, we are unlikely to find systemic 
knowledge conflict. Research has shown that the only people who have hierar-
chically structured belief systems controlled by logical constraint are those who 
spend the time to construct them, and the vast majority of regular citizens do not 
have the incentive to do so. Therefore, people are not “logical,” as the systemic 
knowledge perspective implies.
If we look at recent studies of American religious people, we see that they are 
not, if they ever were, concerned with systems of belief, but rather see religious 
belief as episodic, taking beliefs as they need them from various cultural sources. 
Moreover, conservative Protestantism has turned, probably in the past fifty years, 
toward being quite concerned with therapeutic individualism. If religion is, for the 
average person, “about” solving their problems, then even if they claim a fact that 
is opposed by science, it will not matter enough to them to actually act upon it.
For the religious public to engage in systemic knowledge conflict with science, 
they need to think of their religion as making fact claims about nature—and sci-
entists as doing the same. Whereas people probably know that scientists try to dis-
cover fact claims about nature, it is extremely unlikely that they view this pursuit 
as morally neutral. Given how science and scientists are portrayed in the popular 
culture, and the public sphere more generally, it is most likely that they see that 
fact gathering as having a moral agenda that is different from their own. Religion 
and science are primed to conflict—over social and moral issues, not knowledge.
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6
Empirical Tests of Knowledge and 
 Belief Conflict for the Religious Public
In Chapters 2 and 3 I showed that the academic religion and science debate pre-
sumes systemic knowledge conflict and that science and religion are logically 
coherent intellectual structures of justificatory belief about nature. If this were the 
case, conservative Protestants would be opposed to a fact-claim made by scien-
tists (such as humans evolving from other primates) because they hold a different 
higher-level justificatory belief than scientists do, such as “Facts can be determined 
through Biblical exegesis.” Critically, a conservative Protestant would be inclined 
to not believe in any scientific claim, since scientific facts were derived using the 
wrong higher-level belief.
A second position that is not advocated for or described by academics in the 
religion and science debates, but that is suggested by contemporary studies of 
American religion, is propositional belief conflict—that some religious people do 
oppose particular fact-claims of science (like humans evolving from other pri-
mates), but not because this fact was generated through a scientific way of know-
ing. They may just have been taught differently and believe religious authority and 
not scientific authority in this one instance. For elites, systemic knowledge conflict 
is plausible and propositional belief conflict is implausible, as elites are encour-
aged to create systemic knowledge structures. This is likely to be the reverse for 
the religious public. That is, it is likely that there is no systemic knowledge conflict, 
but there is possibly some propositional belief conflict. In this Chapter, I put this 
thesis about the public to the test.
In the previous two chapters I relied upon other scholarship to suggest the 
plausibility of my interpretation of the relationship between religion and science. 
This was necessary because data to precisely test my claims does not exist. I would 
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argue that this is because the academics who produce such data largely assume the 
systemic knowledge conflict when they gather data. In this and the next chapter I 
conduct indirect tests from available data that allow us to infer the existence of the 
relationships I posit. In the second half of this chapter, I try to explain the patterns 
I find.
SURVEY TEST S OF KNOWLED GE C ONFLICT
I ultimately want to make empirical claims about the U.S. public, and the best way 
to make a generalizable claim about the U.S. population is to use a nationally rep-
resentative survey. My first survey analyses use the General Social Survey (GSS), 
a high-quality nationally representative survey paid for by the National Science 
Foundation that has been fielded since the early 1970s. The basic logic of survey 
analysis is to see if one type of person (e.g., an evangelical) is more likely than 
another (e.g., a nonreligious person) to have a particular view, be engaged in a 
particular practice, or have a particular identity. The raw averages in response to a 
survey are usually not very relevant, because the percentage agreeing is so depen-
dent upon question wording. For example, the percent of the population who are 
Young Earth Creationists is very dependent on how that question is asked. The 
more analytic tradition is to compare two groups of people who have been asked 
the same question. That is, we could show that 60 percent of evangelicals were 
identified as Young Earth Creationists using our question, but only 35 percent of 
the nonreligious. This is the standard for scholarly analysis of surveys.
The power of being able to make nationally representative claims with a survey 
comes at a steep price—the thinness of how concepts are measured. For example, 
while scholars have written one-hundred-and-fifty-thousand-word books about 
what “creationism” means, a survey might be limited to ten words to describe the 
phenomenon. Surveys are ideally used in conjunction with more rich data, and 
that is why I have been building my case using the more expansive, yet typically 
nonrepresentative data from others’ research.
The first question I examine using survey data is the most basic: do religious 
people disagree with all scientific claims about nature? If so, then the strongest 
version of the systemic knowledge conflict perspective is correct. The first step is 
then to measure the religion of the respondent because, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, different religions have different relationships to science.
With the survey I can determine whether a respondent is a frequent church 
attender with an identity as a literalist conservative Protestant, nonliteral-
ist conservative Protestant, conservative Catholic, nonconservative Catholic, 
Black Protestant, or Mainline Protestant. The literalist/nonliteralist distinction 
is meant to distinguish between those who are most likely to be taught reli-
gious fact-claims that conflict with scientific fact-claims, and who would, if the 
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systemic knowledge conflict is truly operative, be most likely to be taught an 
alternative epistemology.
The attendance threshold for each of these religious identities is designed to 
identify respondents who actually participate in the discourse of the religion, 
not those who simply have an identity from their youth. For statistical reasons, 
groups of less than 4 or 5 percent of the entire sample cannot really be separately 
analyzed. Therefore, all of the religious minorities who do not fit into one of the 
categories above are put into one group that is not separately analyzed, due to its 
heterogeneity, but necessary to include in statistical calculations to make the cor-
rect comparisons.
But, compared to whom would committed literalist conservative Protestants 
be more likely to be opposed to scientific claims? Social science research either 
explicitly or implicitly makes comparisons, so what we need is a comparison 
group. For example, if the question is whether conservative Protestants avoid 
exposure to science to avoid knowledge conflict, we have to account for the fact 
that most Americans avoid exposure to science. The test, in this particular exam-
ple, is whether a religious group is avoiding science more than those who are not 
exposed to the religious teaching.
The comparison should be to the nonreligious, because the debate is implicitly 
framed as the religious having a different view than those who are not religious, 
who are then, implicitly, scientific. This is not about belief in God per se, as belief 
in God is compatible with all but the most extreme versions of metaphysical natu-
ralism held by scientific atheists. And, most Americans believe in God, so atheists 
are not the proper comparison group. Rather, the nonreligious comparison group 
should be people who are not exposed to religious teachings (even if they residu-
ally believe in God). In my first survey analysis, this nonreligious group is best 
represented by the 54 percent of the public who do not participate in religion. In 
that analysis, survey non-participation means claiming to attend services “several 
times a year” or less.1
Therefore, the systemic knowledge conflict thesis would predict that: Compared 
to the non-participants in religion, participating literalist conservative Protestants 
will tend to avoid being exposed to all science, presumably because their tradition 
has an alterative epistemology of biblical exegesis for all scientific claims. If there 
is propositional belief conflict, then we would see members of a religious tradition 
participate in science as much as anyone else, but not believe in the few claims that 
conflict with a religiously derived fact-claim (like human evolution).
To measure belief in religiously derived facts about the world, I create a cat-
egory I call “contested facts,” where science and a religion make contrary claims. 
Respondents were asked a series of fact questions and evaluated as to the extent 
they knew the scientifically correct answers. These included two “facts” that are 
actually contested by many conservative Protestants: whether the universe began 
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with a huge explosion; and whether human beings, as we know them today, devel-
oped from earlier species of animals. The answers to these two questions were 
combined into a numeric scale that ranged from getting both “wrong” to getting 
both “right.” Or, in the more neutral language I am trying to use, the scale mea-
sures belief in the conservative Protestant versions of facts on one end and scien-
tific versions on the other.
I have a number of ways to measure a respondent’s exposure to science. First, 
exposure is indicated by knowledge of uncontested scientific facts, which are those 
for which there is no known counter-claim in Christianity, and such knowledge 
would come from engagement with science. Responses to nine uncontested scien-
tific fact questions were added together to form an overall measure of the extent 
to which the respondent knows established scientific facts. These fact questions 
included whether: 1) the center of the Earth is very hot; 2) all radioactivity is man-
made; 3) the father’s gene decides whether the baby is a boy or a girl; 4) lasers work 
by focusing sound waves; 5) electrons are smaller than atoms; 6) antibiotics kill 
viruses as well as bacteria; 7) the continents on which we live have been moving 
their locations for millions of years and will continue to move in the future;2 8) the 
Earth goes around the Sun; and 9) how long it takes for the Earth to go around 
the sun.3
The survey also asked a number of questions about the scientific method, such 
as understanding experimental design and odds. These were combined into an 
overall measure of the extent to which the respondent understands the methods 
of science. Similarly, if a respondent is avoiding science because it violates their 
religiously-derived knowledge, they will not obtain scientific knowledge, and will 
claim less scientific knowledge. The survey also asked how informed the respon-
dent was about “science and technology,” “global warming,” and “the North and 
South poles.” These questions were combined to create an overall measure of 
claimed scientific knowledge.
Not pursuing scientific knowledge is also measured by how many college-level 
science classes the respondent has taken, and whether they hold an undergraduate 
degree in a natural science or engineering.4 I also measure whether the respondent 
is a full-time worker who has an occupation that requires knowledge of science.5 
These are all measures of acceptance of scientific claims, and with these measures 
we can see if people in religious traditions that have conflicting propositional 
belief claims (e.g., conservative Protestantism) are actually in systemic knowledge 
conflict by rejecting the rest of science.
I use types of regression analysis to determine if there is a relationship between 
participation in particular religions and knowledge of and exposure to science. 
I also control for demographic identities that can co-vary with religion and sci-
ence. These controls are important because, for example, if I see a relationship 
between religious participation and less exposure to science, it could actually be 
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that what I am actually seeing is the hidden effect of gender. Women are more 
religious, and perhaps they have less exposure to science, so what seems to be a 
relationship between religion and science may actually be about gender. To avoid 
these problems, I use statistical controls for variables that may vary with religion 
and may also predict pursuit of scientific knowledge, including education, age, 
family income, gender, African American ethnicity, Hispanic ethnicity, southern 
residence, and rural residence.
With the setup in place, we are now ready to run some tests. The first is of 
propositional belief conflict—are there religious groups where the members do 
not agree with some of the claims of scientists? For this I see if members of reli-
gious groups “know” fewer of the contested scientific facts about the origins of the 
universe and of humans—after statistically controlling for all of the other reasons 
they might not know the scientifically correct answer, such as their level of edu-
cation. We can then assume that they get these questions “wrong,” because they 
disagree with the scientists, not because they do not know what scientists’ claim.
To see the formal statistical results, see either the technical published papers 
or the tables in the online appendix, both of which are referenced in the end-
notes. Since regression results are not intuitively understandable, to understand 
the magnitude of these differences, Table 1 reports the predicted probabilities for 
hypothetical ideal-type respondents to the survey.6 For example, the first entry 
in the first line lists the average number of religiously contested scientific “facts” 
that a literalist, high-attending conservative Protestant knows, after controlling 
for reasons they would not know these facts. This sort of “average” hypothetical 
respondent is also set to be as close to an average respondent in the survey as is 
possible, in that she is a Caucasian woman who lives outside the south in a nonru-
ral area, with the average age, income, and education of the respondents included 
in that particular analysis. In each line, the critical comparison is between a reli-
gious group and the nonreligious category in the final column.
For example, the average nonreligious respondent knows on average nearly 
one of the two contested facts (.97), which does suggest limited knowledge of sci-
ence in the public in general. But, a literalist conservative Protestant with the same 
level of education, income and age, and the same race, gender and region of resi-
dence, only knows the scientific version of .28 facts. That is, literalist conservative 
Protestants are much less likely to know these facts. (At least one “*” in the table 
means that the difference between that number and the one in the final column is 
not simply due to chance—technically called statistical significance. If there is no 
“*” it means that the difference is so small it could be the result of chance in the 
selection of the survey population.)
We find nonliteralists, mainline Protestants, and black Protestants to be some-
what more likely, followed by Catholics. Again, since I have controlled for being in 
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disagreement. Therefore, every religious group but the nonconservative Catholics 
disagree with the scientific “facts” compared to the nonreligious. That is, mem-
bers of most Christian groups, liberal and conservative, are in propositional belief 
conflict with science over these few contested facts. This is contrary to what we 
would expect from the official teachings in the more liberal groups, and I will offer 
explanations for this discrepancy later in this chapter.
I am primarily interested in the assumption of systemic knowledge conflict, 
where believing a religious fact-claim about evolution, for example, would lead to 
not believing other scientific fact claims for which there is no conflicting religious 
version, like global warming. If there is systemic knowledge conflict, then mem-
bers of those religious groups that have propositional conflict with science—and 
conservative Protestants in particular—should avoid exposure to all of science.
The rest of Table 1 shows that there is no religious group whose members are 
more likely to avoid noncontested parts of science compared to the nonreligious. 
The second line in Table 1 shows that the only difference between participants 
in religious traditions and the nonreligious in knowledge of scientific methods 
is that mainline Protestants know slightly more science than do nonparticipants 
in religion. Again, this means that, as I control for the level of education of the 
respondent, literalist conservative Protestants with college educations—and thus 
with equal chance of exposure to science—are equally likely to know the scientific 
method as the nonreligious with college educations.
The systemic knowledge conflict thesis would also predict that conservative 
Protestants would hear religious fact claims that conflict with scientific claims, 
conclude that the scientific way of knowing is opposed to the Biblical way of know-
ing, and therefore avoid science knowledge and thus know fewer science facts. 
However, Line 3 in Table 1 shows that there is no religious group that knows less, 
and that mainline Protestants know more established scientific facts than those 
who are not religiously active.
Similarly, the fourth row is for the measure of claiming to know more scien-
tific knowledge. The scale of this measure is not intuitive, but it ranges from zero 
to twelve, with higher numbers meaning more knowledge. This analysis shows 
that the only difference with the nonreligious is that nonliteralist conservative 
Protestants claim to know more scientific knowledge than do the nonreligious. 
(Nontraditionalist Catholics claim less knowledge than do the nonreligious, which 
is an outlier finding in these analyses.)
If conservative Protestants are avoiding all science, they should have taken 
fewer college-level science classes, be less likely to have majored in science and 
engineering, and be less likely to have a scientific occupation. The fifth, sixth, and 
seventh lines show that the only difference between any of the religious groups and 
the nonparticipants in religion is that nonliteralist conservative Protestants have 
taken more science classes. The final line in Table 1 shows that there is no religious 
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group that is more or less likely to have a scientific occupation than are the non-
religious once we control for factors like education, gender, and age. Overall, this 
analysis shows that systemic knowledge conflict does not exist for the religious 
public, including for conservative Protestants.
So far I have shown that there is no religious tradition whose members are in 
systemic knowledge conflict with science. Despite believing in some nonscien-
tific claims, they are equally likely as the nonreligious to participate in the rest 
of science. I generally find it useful to compare members of social institutions 
like religious traditions because we can at least imagine the communication pro-
cesses like training systems, educational materials, communication channels, and 
statements of belief that lead to these particular views. But, another tradition in 
sociology would focus on an individual’s beliefs separate from institutions. In this 
sociological tradition, the test of the systemic knowledge conflict thesis would be 
whether the individuals who are in propositional belief conflict with science (by 
not believing the scientific version of the contested fact claims) are those who are 
in systemic knowledge conflict, and thus avoid any science. I conducted additional 
analyses using these different assumptions and reached the same conclusions as 
the previous analysis.7
A Socially Urgent Issue: Scientific Claims about Global Warming
In the first few pages of this book I gave examples of how participants in the public 
sphere who want to combat global warming were making the false assumption 
that religious conservatives would deny scientific claims about anthropogenic cli-
mate change because they do not believe science in general. This, I claimed, was 
distorting public debate. This is then a great issue to specifically examine for sys-
temic knowledge conflict.
This is also a good test of systemic knowledge conflict for conservative 
Protestants because there is not an explicit propositional belief claim in this tradi-
tion that contradicts scientific statements about global warming. The Bible does 
not depict God as saying, “And in later years I will cause global warming.” Rather, 
the few conservative Protestants in the public sphere who contradict scientific 
claims about global warming using religion appeal to somewhat more abstract 
higher-level theological beliefs midway up the pyramid about how nature works, 
such as “God is in control.”
Opposition to climate change research is being promoted by ideological conser-
vatives and Republican party activists.8 Moreover, a study has recently shown that 
ideological conservatives are less trusting in science, and conservative Protestants 
are more likely to be both Republicans and political conservatives, both of which 
are associated with skepticism about climate change.9 Therefore, it is important 
to determine whether it is religious belief itself, or the political orientation of the 
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majority of evangelicals that is associated with not believing scientists’ fact-claims 
about global warming, by controlling for these political measures.
A question in the survey I used above asked: “The first issue is global warm-
ing. Global warming means a trend toward warmer temperatures throughout the 
world, with more extreme weather in many places and changes in food production 
that could affect our way of life. Some people believe that the burning of gasoline 
and other fossil fuels causes global warming. Others say that global warming has 
purely natural causes. . . . How well do the following groups understand the causes 
of global warming? Environmental Scientists.” Respondents who believe in the 
scientific consensus in knowledge about global warming, that global warming is 
caused by humans, will think scientists understand the causes of global warming. 
I use the same religion and demographic measures as in previous analyses, and as 
before, start with comparing members of different religious traditions, followed by 
comparing those who are in propositional belief conflict with science with those 
who are not.10
The first line of Table 2 shows the predicted probability of a member of each of 
the religious groups thinking that scientists understand global warming “well” or 
“very well” without control variables. The probability that a nonreligious respon-
dent will say scientists understand it well or very well is .68, but the probability of 
a literalist conservative Protestants saying the same is only .55. (A probability of 
1.0 means it is a certainty.) This is a small but statistically significant difference. 
No other religious tradition is different in this view from the nonreligious. That is, 
analyzing the simple bivariate relationship between religious tradition and believ-
ing scientists’ fact-claims about global warming shows that literalist conservative 
Protestants are less likely to believe scientific facts compared to the nonreligious.
However, is this opposition due to the respondent’s religion or due to char-
acteristics that people in this religious tradition also tend to have, like political 
conservatism? In the second line of the table I account for the influence of politi-
cal ideology and political party identification, and the relationship between liter-
alist conservative Protestantism and believing scientific fact-claims about global 
warming disappears. With these controls in place, the probability of a literalist 
conservative Protestant thinking that scientists understand global warming well 
or very well is .73, while the probability for the non-religious is .74.11 This small dif-
ference is not statistically significant. Therefore, the conservative Protestant effect 
in the earlier model is not the result of religious belief, but the result of conserva-
tive Protestants being more enmeshed in politically conservative and Republican 
party discourse.
As before, I re-ran this test by not focusing on religious groups, but on individ-
uals who are or are not in propositional belief conflict with science. That is, are the 
individuals who do not believe science about human origins the same people who 
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that they are not—believing those religious “facts” is not associated with believing 
scientists one way or the other about global warming.12
This concrete case of scientific claims about global warming reinforces the con-
clusion that there is no systemic knowledge conflict between any religious group 
and science. If there were, conservative Protestants would not be willing to accept 
any scientific claim based upon scientific ways of knowing and would instead 
appeal to high-level religious ideas to make fact claims about nature. People who 
do not believe in evolution or the Big Bang would do the same. That not believing 
scientists on global warming is largely an effect of political ideology—which itself 
may be a proxy for embeddedness in particular information flows like Fox News—
suggests what the motivations of elite conservative Protestant opponents of global 
warming science may actually be.13
Do You Want Your Child to Be a Scientist?
When social scientists want to cut to the quick of a respondent’s social aversions, 
they ask what they would want for their children. For example, to measure bias 
against members of a religion, social scientists often ask respondents if they approve 
of their children marrying a person from that religion.14 In 2012, the GSS asked 
about wanting your child to be a scientist, and if conservative Protestants were in 
systemic knowledge conflict with science, they would presumably not want their 
children to be scientists. However, it is also the case that if they were in total moral 
conflict with science, they would not want their children to be scientists either. 
Therefore, the survey question does not allow us to distinguish between knowledge 
and moral conflict, but allows us to rule out both extreme situations—that conser-
vative Protestants are opposed to all science because of knowledge or moral reasons. 
Put differently, do conservative Protestants think you can be a “good” scientist?
The question asked “If you had a daughter, how would you feel if she wanted 
to be a scientist—would you feel happy, unhappy, or would you not care one way 
or the other?” The raw responses tell us most of what we need to know about 
conflict over science in the U.S. Of the 517 people who were asked the question, 
only four selected “unhappy,” while five did not know or did not answer. That is, 
seven-tenths of 1 percent of Americans object to their daughter being a scientist. 
They asked another question that began “If you had a son . . .” One fewer respon-
dent objected to the son being a scientist, for a grand total of three. Essentially 
nobody is utterly opposed to their child becoming a scientist, so actual opposition 
will not be found among any religious group. While scientists may be seen as Dr. 
Frankensteins in waiting, people believe there are either parts of science or indi-
viduals in science who are good.
We can look for a milder effect we could call unease at the prospect of their child 
becoming a scientist by comparing those who said they would be “happy” their 
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daughter became a scientist to those who said they would “not care.” We should 
be cautious that this may be measuring a propensity of some religious groups to 
be less concerned with the occupational choices of their children than a concern 
about the occupation of science in particular. That said, I analyzed the question 
about the hypothetical daughter using the same statistical model as above.15
The final line in Table 2 shows that the probability that a nonreligious respon-
dent will say they are happy if their daughter becomes a scientist, compared to not 
caring, is .735. The probability for a literalist conservative Protestant is .793—actu-
ally a little higher than the nonreligious, but not a statistically significant differ-
ence.16 The only statistically significant difference is that nontraditional Catholics 
are more likely to be happy if their daughter becomes a scientist than would be the 
non-religious. Therefore, conservative Protestants are not opposed to science writ 
large on the grounds of either knowledge or morality, but think there are at least 
parts of science, or individuals in science, that are consistent with conservative 
Protestant beliefs and values.
In contrast with the academic science and religion debate, for the public it does 
not appear that there are any systemic knowledge conflicts between religion and 
science, including with members of the conservative Protestant tradition. What 
we appear to be left with is what I am calling propositional conflict—conservative 
Protestants just believe religious versions of facts of the world that they have been 
taught, and these seem to be unrelated to any other aspects of science.
TOWARD AN EXPL ANATION OF WIDESPREAD 
PROPOSITIONAL BELIEF C ONFLICT
The systemic knowledge conflict perspective provided an easy answer to any con-
flict between religion and science—the conflict was over entire ways of knowing 
about the natural world. Now that it has been demonstrated that the systemic 
knowledge perspective is unlikely, we are adrift without an explanation for the 
remaining propositional belief conflict that we do see. I see this as opening up 
a new family of empirical examinations of religion and belief about the natural 
world that is not constrained by old stereotypes. In this final section I speculate 
about what conflict about beliefs about the natural world could be about if it is not 
about systemic knowledge. I look forward to the future scholarship in this area.
Explaining Catholic and Mainline Protestant 
Propositional Belief Conflict
While Catholic and mainline Protestants are much less likely to believe con-
servative Protestant religious claims about human origins than do conservative 
Protestants, they do believe these claims more than the nonreligious do, and more 
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than their leaders or the established theology in their traditions would. This is a 
bit mysterious. For the mainline Protestants, one explanation is that the mainline 
laity are much more conservative than their clergy (and the evangelical laity much 
more liberal than their clergy). Another possible explanation is that it is difficult 
to tell the difference between a mainline Protestant and an evangelical in a survey, 
and the highest attending mainline Protestants (who I focus upon) are the most 
like evangelicals. So, my results could simply be a measurement issue. I also sus-
pect, but cannot prove, that while a mainline Protestant may believe in the Big 
Bang and human origins as depicted by scientists, they also want to give a response 
not available in the survey, such as “There is more to it than that.” Their view may 
actually be that the Big Bang occurred, but was caused by God, and not seeing the 
fullness of what they want to express, they select “No.”17
The finding for conservative Catholics is similarly surprising. These are the 
Catholics who should be more attentive to Church teaching, and their answers to 
these survey questions makes them “bad” Catholics, in that they are contradicting 
Church teaching. It is possible that while the liberal Catholics just believe what sci-
entists say, in their survey responses the conservative Catholics want to make what 
they think of as the conservative religious statement. Due to the prominence of the 
conservative Protestant claims in the public sphere, and being unaware of actual 
Catholic teaching on this subject, they think that the conservative Protestant belief 
is the proper “religious” or “Christian” response. Again, it is also possible that they 
select the nonscientific response about human origins, as if to say “There is more to 
it than that.” Future research with instruments that properly distinguish between 
the possible types of conflict will hopefully help explain why mainline Protestants 
and Catholics are in this propositional belief conflict with science.
Conservative Protestants Are Using 19th Century Baconian Science
For conservative Protestants the question is why they disagree with scientists 
about these particular fact claims, given that they mostly agree with scientists. 
One possible explanation is that conservative Protestants are locked into a 
 mid-nineteenth-century version of science that was inspired by Bacon. Returning 
to my pyramid metaphor, a nineteenth-century Baconian science pyramid of 
knowledge claims would look very similar to a contemporary science pyramid 
at the bottom. The two would reach the same conclusions about the majority of 
fact claims. But, the pyramids would be different starting halfway up, because the 
principles by which the lower-level knowledge is generated would ultimately be 
different. Midway up the nineteenth-century version would be the principle that 
fact claims need to be observable, and that you cannot generate a fact claim via 
abstractions. Since the Big Bang and human evolution are abstractions that cannot 
be observed, they are not properly scientific questions, but are religious questions. 
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But, observable scientific facts, like a warming earth, would be scientific, and thus 
scientists’ claims should be believed. This would distinguish the scientific claims 
that are and are not believed.
There is some evidence that at least the elites in contemporary conservative 
Protestantism are still Baconian, and therefore a scientific claim is only believed if 
it can be demonstrated through your own senses. This contemporary Baconianism 
is most evident in debates between what we might call elite fundamentalist lit-
eralists and elite fundamentalist superliteralists. The latter are the tiny group of 
geocentrists who reject modern astronomy to say that since the Bible says that 
the sun moves around the earth, the sun moves around the earth. Geocentrists 
are reviled as extremists by the group most people think of as the poster child for 
epistemological extremism—the creationists who want to defend the young earth 
and literal Genesis accounts of creation. But, what is useful for my purposes is that 
the creationists have had to account to the geocentrists why they believe in science 
in some instances but not others, thus revealing their principles of selecting one 
scientific claim over another.
In the words of one creationist: “Many evolutionists claim that disbelief in evo-
lution is like disbelief that the earth goes round the sun. The obvious flaw is that 
the latter is repeatable and observable while the former is not.” This means that 
“the historical sciences, including evolution, are less legitimate than the experi-
mental sciences because they purport to explain unwitnessed and unrepeatable 
events.” Other nongeocentrist creationists state that the geocentrists fail “to take 
into account a distinction between observations and the conclusions based on 
observations.” As two scholars of creationism note, creationists have long stressed 
the distinction between “‘origins science,’ in which the primary authority is given 
to Scripture, in contrast to ‘operation science,’ in which the assured results of cur-
rent observations and experiments are allowed to influence the interpretation of 
Scripture.”18
Elites attempt to teach this Baconian approach to knowledge to fundamentalist 
Protestant children. The textbook Of Pandas and People: The Central Question of 
Biological Origins is most famous for teaching an intelligent design perspective on 
human origins, which has led to the book being a centerpiece in ID court cases. 
Less remarked upon is the fact that the book also has a “note to teachers” in the 
back which outlines a proper stance toward developing knowledge about nature. 
The authors of this section of the textbook want to explain the “scientific method,” 
and make a distinction between the “inductive sciences”—certainly a Baconian 
term—and the “historical sciences.”19 The “inductive” are also “nomological,” 
which means “relating to or denoting certain principles, such as laws of nature, 
that are neither logically necessary nor theoretically explicable, but are simply 
taken as true.”20 “Simply taken as true” is the nineteenth-century Baconian and 
Scottish Common Sense Realist idea of the transparent truth of observed facts. 
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The inductive sciences concern “how the natural world generally operates”—it 
does not ask how it came to be this way.
On the other hand, “the historical sciences seek to understand how things came 
to be.” In this historical science, “the goal is not to find new laws or regularities but 
to reconstruct past conditions and events.” Critically, “postulating intelligent inter-
vention is completely inappropriate in the inductive sciences, the same is not true 
in the historical sciences.” In the inductive sciences, “the whole point is to discover 
how the natural world normally operates on its own,” no matter how it was cre-
ated in the first place.21 That is, for how the world currently works, fundamentalist 
kids should use mainstream science. But, as for how things came to be, that is not 
observable and would be speculation.
All of the theories in the historical sciences pertain to “the unobservable past,” 
including the Big Bang and Darwinism, which postulate “unobservable objects 
and events.” This is straight Baconianism—the observable is science, the unob-
servable is not science.22 The message here is clear—being a good conservative 
Protestant scientist means using a justificatory science that is ultimately based 
upon direct observation.
So, this Baconian approach to knowledge continues among the contemporary 
conservative Protestant elite, who try to teach it to their members. I doubt many 
ordinary members learn it, as scientific epistemology is not a common sermon 
topic, and only a small percentage of conservative Protestant children would attend 
schools that use books like Of Pandas and People. I suspect these kids remember 
as much of high school science as do secular high school students, which is not 
much.
For the average conservative Protestant, I think it is more plausible that 
Baconianism has survived since the nineteenth century by incubating in conserva-
tive Protestant biblical hermeneutics, which are definitely learned by the ordinary 
members. Discussion of how to read the Bible is indisputably a central part of 
being a conservative Protestant. As described in Chapter 5, a Baconian approach 
to nature supported a Baconian approach to the Bible, which is that its meaning 
is on the surface, open to examination like a set of collected plants, with no high 
theory required to interpret it. Contemporary conservative Protestants are taught 
that true knowledge of the Bible is uncomplicated, transparent, and available via 
a common sense reading, so they may think that other knowledge—like knowl-
edge of nature—is similarly uncomplicated, transparent, and available via com-
mon sense.
If they continually learn this approach to truth in general, then conservative 
Protestants will believe scientific claims that can be immediately observed (such 
as the average temperature of the Earth) and not claims based on “theories” like 
climate models and “speculations” about prehuman primates who roamed mil-
lions of years ago. Even if conservative Protestants never teach their children how 
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to interpret nature through science, they may be teaching a general approach to 
truth claims through biblical hermeneutics.
Defending Literalist Theological Claims . . . from Liberal Protestantism
Another possible explanation for conservative Protestant propositional belief con-
flict with science over human origins will be obvious to those who know American 
religious history, once I describe this history using my terminology. If you ask con-
servative Protestants about human origins, you will often hear the claim that they 
are defending the truth of the literally read Bible. They would say that if Genesis 
is not literally true, then the Resurrection is not literally true and the virgin birth 
is not literally true and so on. A recent ethnography of evangelical high schools 
confirms that opposition to evolution is primarily about defending the Bible.23
Therefore, belief in the conservative Protestant version of human origins is 
only incidentally a scientific conflict—what they are actually defending is a list 
of literalist theological claims about the Bible. But, no scientist cares about the 
Resurrection, the virgin birth, or most of the literalist claims being defended 
against the liberals. Belief in the conservative Protestant account of human origins 
is then not a conflict with science per se, but is rather a battle with their arch-
enemies the liberal Protestants, using scientific claims as a weapon. It is liberal 
Protestants who also care about claims like the Resurrection and the virgin birth, 
and the proper nightmare for any good fundamentalist is their child becoming 
a liberal Protestant. It was of course this conflict between fundamentalists and 
 liberals—not fundamentalists and scientists—that shaped American religious his-
tory and these religions’ approach to knowledge.
So, in this explanation, the reason there is not systemic conflict, but there is 
propositional belief conflict about human origins, is that they are not really con-
cerned with whether these are knowledge claims about the natural world at all. 
Rather, they are concerned with defending other sets of nondemonstrable theo-
logical belief claims. Therefore, it is possible that conservative Protestants do not 
think of a six-thousand-year-old Earth or a literal Adam and Eve as scientific 
claims. They are instead but a few of the many theological statements that must be 
held to be literally true in order to defend the Bible from liberal Protestantism and 
secularism (often thought to be the same thing).
Status Politics or Identity Formation for Conservative Protestants
A fairly old social science tradition holds that “status politics” are political move-
ments concerned with the status of a particular group in society, not necessarily an 
attempt to gain anything concrete. Some groups are losing prestige in society, and 
they promote their values as a way of demonstrating that they are still important.24 
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In a classic study of American temperance movements, Joseph Gusfield demon-
strated that middle-class, small-town Protestants felt their status was declining 
compared to urban Catholic immigrants, and used temperance to demonstrate 
the importance of their values. Gusfield demonstrated that it was a symbolic poli-
tics because temperance advocates were not very interested in actually stopping 
people from drinking alcohol, just in establishing a constitutional amendment as 
a symbol.25
We could construct a status politics explanation of why conservative Protestants 
have not given up on their nonscientific beliefs about human origins, while the lib-
eral Protestants have. It is central to conservative Protestant identity to see them-
selves as embattled group, whether this is true or not.26 It is then not so much that 
they want to show that Darwin was factually wrong so much as the want to show 
the importance of the creationist idea that has become symbolic of their religious 
group. If they can get the public schools to give equal time to creationism, they 
establish that their religious group still has status in society. Adopting this sym-
bol does not require accepting any larger knowledge structure, because all that is 
needed is a symbol that has come to represent the group.27 This identity explana-
tion is consistent with the survey findings above that show that belief in creation-
ism is not connected to any other aspect of science.
When interviewing conservative Protestants about anything, it is common to 
be given what are essentially identity-based reasons for beliefs rather than reasons 
based upon higher-level beliefs. For example, when interviewing conservative 
Protestants about reproductive genetic technologies, I was often told by respon-
dents that they are opposed to abortion “because I am Christian” and not because 
“human life begins at conception” or any other higher-level principle.
In the aforementioned ethnography of evangelical high schools, Jeffrey Guhin 
reaches a similar conclusion about evolution, seeing rejection of evolution as a 
defense of biblical literalism, which is itself a form of identity boundary-drawing. 
For evangelicals, the “symbolic boundary” with the secular United States is neces-
sary to differentiate themselves. These boundaries are important for convincing 
people to be a member of any group, in particular those in which membership 
comes at a social cost.28 If this insight is generalizable beyond Guhin’s particular 
cases, it would suggest that not only would a religious fact-claim not need to be 
connected to any broader system of knowledge, but that a religious fact-claim that 
conflicts with a scientific claim is actually more useful for demarcating the border 
of the group, because science can stand in for secular society.
Moral Opposition to Science by Conservative Protestants
It is difficult to test these possible reasons as data are not available. However, I 
think that the final possibility is the most plausible, which is that conservative 
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Protestants select religious facts to disagree with scientific facts that have the 
strongest moral ramifications. That is, not only does moral conflict exist indepen-
dent of any knowledge concerns, many religious people want to say that evolution 
is morally incorrect. They then do the next best thing in the context of a survey 
question—they say it is not true.
I would argue that this is what is occurring with the entire Intelligent Design 
movement. They seem to be primarily motivated by a concern that Darwinism 
is teaching that morality is random. They then want to overthrow Darwinism by 
showing that human evolution was at the hand of a designer. What appears to be 
about knowledge is actually driven by morality—an explanation I begin to address 
in the next chapter.
C ONCLUSION
In this chapter I looked for systemic knowledge conflict. This would matter for the 
lives of citizens, as disbelief in human origins would lead one to not believe chem-
istry, physics, or any other field requiring the scientific method, and would result 
in disengagement from society. I did not find it. There does not seem to be any 
religious group, including conservative Protestantism, that takes the actual action 
of conflict of avoiding science writ large by not taking science classes, learning 
about science, having a scientific occupation, and so on. I did find that the mem-
bers of most Christian traditions are in propositional belief conflict with science 
over fact-claims about the world. These fact-claims are few, and do not matter to 
the everyday lives of the vast majority of Americans.
Having dislodged the systemic knowledge conflict thesis, I engaged in some 
informed speculation about why propositional belief conflict would exist. First, 
I considered why mainline Protestants and Catholics would not follow the elites 
in their tradition and agree with scientists about all claims that scientists make. 
Second, I speculated about why, if not driven by systemic knowledge constraints, 
a conservative Protestant would not believe scientists’ accounts of human origins. 
One possible reason is that they could still be Baconians. Another reason is that 
conservative Protestants defend nonscientific ideas not because they are in con-
flict with scientists, but because they are in conflict with evangelicals and liberal 
Protestants over Biblical exegesis. Propositional belief claims that differ from the 
scientific consensus could also be serving as an identity symbol in creating a col-
lective identity against liberal Protestants and the broader society. A final possible 
explanation is that conservative Protestants oppose scientific facts not because of 
how they were generated, but because of their moral implications. I think that 
what we otherwise know about American society and religion suggests that this 
is the true conflict with science. I turn to these explanations in the next chapter.
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Empirical Tests of Moral Conflict for 
the Religious Public
In the previous chapter I concluded that there is no evidence for systemic knowl-
edge conflict but that there is evidence for propositional knowledge conflict. 
Existing academic research on American religion, as well as existing research on 
what the public thinks about science and scientists, suggests that a more likely 
conflict is over morality, not knowledge. In this chapter I turn to new evidence 
for moral conflict between religion and science among the U.S. public. Due to the 
dominance of the idea of systemic knowledge conflict among academics, includ-
ing the sociologists who design nationally accessible surveys, data concerning 
moral conflict are extremely limited, so most of the data I will use are indirect. 
What is needed to reach more confident conclusions are new survey questions, 
along with new qualitative research, that focus on moral conflict. My hope is that 
the results are suggestive enough that future scholars take up this topic.
The analyses in the previous chapter ruled out the idea of irreconcilable and 
complete conflict over knowledge and morality. The analysis of whether the 
respondent wants their daughter to be a scientist is the most persuasive—if a 
respondent believed that all of science was irredeemably immoral, they would not 
want their daughter to be a scientist. However, this was not the case, and what 
we have is partial moral conflict. Those religious groups who have moral conflict 
with science either think that there are some types of science that do not have this 
conflict and/or that no type of science is inherently corrupt, because a person with 
good morals, such as their daughter, can remain a good person within science.
Religious people are in moral conflict over multiple aspects of modern science. 
The first is over which institution will be looked to to set the meaning and pur-
pose of society. The second is more specific—that religious people are opposed to 
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the implicit moral teachings of some scientific claims. The third is not about fact 
claims about scientific research per se, but about the technology that such research 
produces.
FAITH IN SCIENCE VS.  FAITH IN RELIGION
Science is more than simply facts. It can also be a source of societal hope—a way 
to save our society from its troubles, in the same way that societies have looked 
to other saviors, like religion. That is, people can have “faith” in science, with faith 
being defined as a “firm belief in something for which there is no proof.”1 There is a 
lot of proof offered that molecules are made of atoms but very little proof that sci-
ence will solve the world’s problems. To believe that science will solve the world’s 
problems, people have to rely upon faith in science as an institution, and there are 
competing institutions that they could have faith in.
Religious elites have upon occasion engaged in this conflict when they see sci-
entists claiming that science can set the values and aims of society. As discussed 
in Chapter 4, the origins of the field of bioethics are in theologians’ reactions to 
scientists trying to determine societal values. For example, inventor of in vitro 
fertilization Robert Edwards claimed that “moral laws must be based on what man 
knows about himself, and that this knowledge inevitably comes largely from sci-
ence.”2 This is the type of view opposed by theologian Paul Ramsey, also described 
in Chapter 4, who claimed that scientists of the 1960s were not engaged in “an 
exact science as such, but a religious view of where and how ultimate human sig-
nificance is to be found.”3
The extent to which a population has such a faith in science obviously has 
important ramifications. For example, if people have faith in science to provide a 
source of direction that humans should aspire to, then scientists would be looked 
to to set societal goals. Survey analyses suggest that religious people are in the 
greatest moral conflict with science when science is portrayed as something to 
have faith in.
The GSS Survey I used in the last chapter has a question that can be interpreted 
as measuring the degree to which the respondent has faith in science as providing 
meaning and direction for society.4 The survey contains a block of questions with 
five-point responses, ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree,” prefaced 
by the statement: “How much do you agree or disagree with each of these state-
ments?” The first statement is “we believe too often in science, and not enough in 
feelings and faith.”5 This is a measure of faith in science’s ability to provide meaning 
and direction for society.6
To examine whether religious citizens are less likely to have this type of faith 
in science, I defined religious groups as I did in the analyses in the last chapter.7 
Analogously to the previous analyses, if members of a religious group are more 
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likely to say that we should believe in feelings and faith than the nonreligious, I 
interpret that to mean that the religious group is in this particular type of moral 
conflict with science.
The first line in Table 3 shows the probability of a respondent from a group 
agreeing or strongly agreeing that “we believe too often in science, and not enough 
in feelings and faith.” The general pattern in the results is clear. Controlling for 
demographic variables, every religious group has less faith in science producing 
meaning than do the nonreligious. It is conservative Protestants who have the least 
amount of faith in science compared to the nonreligious, with an enormous differ-
ence between the literalist conservative Protestants and the nonreligious. The odds 
of a nonreligious person agreeing is 32 percent, but for a literalist conservative 
Protestant it is 62 percent. In general, the religious respondents, compared to the 
non-religious respondents, do not want science to set meaning in society, which is 
a high-level moral conflict.
As a comparison, we can examine religious faith in science’s ability to solve con-
crete problems in the world through technology. The survey also asked the respon-
dent to evaluate whether “modern science will solve our environmental problems 
with little change to our way of life.” Solving environmental problems would be 
consistent with the morality of all of the religions I can measure in this survey, so 
this question is measuring faith in technologies without religious valence, but not 
faith in science’s ability to set meaning.
In the second row of Table 3, we see that it is only African American Protestants 
who have less of this type of faith in science. I can only speculate that African 
Americans have a different experience with environmental problems than do other 
Americans. But, more critically for my claims, the other religious groups are not 
different from the nonreligious to the extent that they have faith that modern sci-
ence will solve this concrete technological problem. In sum, religious Americans, 
and conservative Protestants in particular, are very likely to think society puts too 
much faith in science and not enough in religion. They are in conflict over setting 
the meaning for society. This interpretation is supported by comparing this result 
to faith in solving a concrete problem like pollution, where most religious groups 
and the nonreligious have the same amount of faith.
OPPOSITION TO THE MOR AL STANCE OF SCIENTIST S
The second type of moral conflict is more specific, and is that religious people are 
opposed to the implicit moral teachings of some scientific claims. These moral 
teachings can be intended by scientists, such as when they use science to justify 
a moral position, or they can be unintended. As an example of the unintended, 
conservative Protestants have long claimed that people exposed to evolutionary 
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may intend. One claim is that if high school students learn that humans evolved 
due in part to random events, they will conclude that morality is random, even if 
a scientist never says anything about morality.
Similarly, religious elites have long been concerned that certain biomedical 
technologies implicitly teach the public that humans are defined by their biology, 
not by being made in the image of God. They believe that if we learn we are bio-
logical beings we will treat each other slightly worse than we would if we consider 
ourselves to be made in the image of God. I show elsewhere that members of the 
public who think that humans are defined by biology do indeed advocate treat-
ing people in a way that is more similar to the way we treat objects.8 Below I will 
conduct a number of survey analyses that suggest that conservative Protestants see 
this type of moral conflict with science.
Opposition to Scientists’ Influence in Public Debates
If there is this type of moral conflict, members of religious groups will not want 
scientists to be influential in public debates about moral issues, independent of 
their view of scientists’ ability to generate true knowledge. I can test this with 
survey data, continuing the analysis of the GSS data. To evaluate opposition to 
scientists’ influence on moral debates in the public sphere, I use three questions 
that asked how much influence should: environmental scientists “have in decid-
ing what to do about global warming”; “medical researchers” have on “govern-
ment funding for stem cell research”; and “medical researchers” have in deciding 
whether to “restrict the sale of genetically modified foods.9 “I will generalize and 
call these three groups of professionals “scientists.”
The first two of these issues are currently framed in the U.S. public sphere as 
moral debates. At first glance the global warming debate concerns whether it is 
occurring at the hands of humans. But, the reason that scientific claims about cli-
mate change are contested is that conservatives do not want to have to change our 
society’s behavior. They do not want to drive smaller cars, make smaller houses, 
avoid airplanes, stop mining coal and so on in order to mitigate global warming. 
At its extreme, climate change deniers see scientific claims as part of a “hoax” or 
even a conspiracy to install liberal values regarding consumption, as revealed by 
the “Climategate” incident, in which conservatives claimed scientists were manip-
ulating data.10 Climate change is at its heart a moral debate. What we should do 
about stem cell research is connected with the abortion issue, and its morality is 
constantly debated.
There is almost no moral debate on the final issue, genetically modified food, 
in the U.S. (although there is such a debate in Europe.) Rather, the moral issue 
is settled—if it is determined to be safe, then it is acceptable. The survey ques-
tion itself poses the issue as one of evaluating risk, not morality, which makes the 
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question about scientific influence over a public debate about facts and knowledge. 
This final question then serves as an effective comparison because it asks about 
scientific influence on a question not currently framed as implicating morality.
If conservative Protestants are opposed to scientific influence in first two 
debates, but not the third, this suggests that conservative Protestants are not 
opposed to scientists’ influence on all debates. They are only opposed to influence 
on moral debates. This is consistent with seeing scientists as a group they are often 
in moral conflict with, and that they then have an interest in keeping out of these 
moral debates. They would have no problem with scientists’ participation in the 
public sphere if it is not framed as moral, but about knowledge—limited to making 
technical assessments (e.g., whether genetically modified food is safe).
The analyses control for the same variables as in previous GSS models. They 
also control for the extent the respondent thinks scientists understand global 
warming or stem cells and the respondent’s understanding of the methods of sci-
ence, which should account for any effect of not wanting scientists to be influential 
because the respondent disagrees with the science per se. I also use two measures 
of wanting other professional groups to be influential in the debate to control for 
not wanting anyone to be influential in a public debate.11
The third and fourth lines in Table 3 show that the literalist and nonliteralist 
conservative Protestants are more opposed than are the nonreligious to the influ-
ence of scientists on public moral debates over global warming and stem cells.12 
For example, nonliteralist conservative Protestants are only about half as likely as 
the nonreligious to want scientific influence in these debates.
Importantly, the final line in Table 3 shows that for genetically modified food, 
no religious group is different than the nonreligious in wanting scientists to influ-
ence these debates. This means that there is not an opposition to scientific influ-
ence in the public sphere in general—to, for example, giving advice on knowledge 
issues. There is only a religious opposition to scientists influencing public debates 
about moral issues.
I later repeated the same analysis for wanting scientists to be influential in 
debates about global warming but while also controlling for political identifica-
tion and political ideology, which allows us to separate out any religious effect 
from a political effect.13 In that analysis (not shown), the most powerful predictors 
of not wanting scientists to be involved in the public debate are not believing that 
scientists understand climate change, not wanting the influence of politicians, and 
identifying as a Republican.14 This suggests a generally political explanation for not 
wanting scientific influence on this one issue.
However, even after controlling for these political variables, literalist conserva-
tive Protestants are still less likely to want scientists involved in this debate. This 
difference between literalist conservative Protestants and the nonreligious is not 
large. However, it is striking that there is a difference at all. While global warming 
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is moral, it is not an issue that has particularly religious valence in the same way 
that embryonic life does. The small religion difference here is indicative of the fact 
that these conservative Protestants do not want scientists involved in any moral 
issue, not just the ones where the morality of conservative Protestantism and sci-
ence are thought to differ.
Is the Scientific Community Self-Interested?
In 1942 sociologist Robert Merton described the four “norms of science:” univer-
salism, communism, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism.15 Universalism 
means that truth claims are subject to impersonal evaluation, regardless of who the 
scientist making the claim is. Communism means the findings of science belong 
to the community. Disinterestedness means that scientists do not make personal 
gain from their work. Organized skepticism means not making conclusions until 
data are at hand, and that all claims are subject to empirical and logical critique. In 
a later critique of the “norms of science,” sociologist Michael Mulkay described a 
longer list that included additional norms that had been created by scholars stand-
ing on Merton’s shoulders: “rationality, emotional neutrality, universalism, indi-
vidualism, disinterestedness, impartiality, communality, humility, and organized 
skepticism.”16 Merton and those in his intellectual lineage took these norms to be 
how scientists actually operated.
If this is what scientists are like, then it is hard to see how science and scientists 
could have a moral agenda. However, by the late 1960s, critics were pointing out 
that these norms are actually not in force among scientists, and Mulkay concluded 
that the Mertonian norms were not norms, but rather an ideology. Scientists only 
describe themselves in this way to justify “their claim for a special political status.” 
Moreover, this “biased image of science . . . supports their collective interests [and] 
amounts to the utilization of an occupational ideology.”17 This depiction of scien-
tists is more consistent with scientists having a collective moral agenda.
I lack a measure of whether the public perceives scientists to be observing each 
of these norms. However, a series of GSS survey questions did ask respondents if 
they thought scientists were acting in their own self-interest. Respondents were 
asked “when making policy recommendations about global warming, on a scale of 
1 to 5, to what extent do you think the following groups would support what is best 
for the country as a whole versus what serves their own narrow interests?” Best for 
country is “1” and narrow interests is “5.” They were asked similar questions about 
stem cell research and genetically modified foods. For each technology respon-
dents were asked about the self-interestedness of scientists plus two other groups.18
These questions effectively measure the extent to which scientists are perceived 
as working in the nation’s interest or their own collective interest. Believing that sci-
entists have a distinct agenda from the rest of society is a prerequisite for thinking 
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that scientists have a distinct morality that should be opposed in the public sphere. 
Therefore, if members of a religious group are more likely than members of the 
nonreligious group to think that scientists are not acting in the nation’s interest, I 
consider that evidence for moral conflict of that religious group with science.
The evaluations of the self-interestedness of scientists for global warming and 
stem cell research were combined into an overall “self-interestedness” measure.19 
For technical reasons, the responses to the question about genetically modified 
foods had to be analyzed separately.20 I needed to find a way to account for the 
fact that conservative Protestants are more likely than others to think that any 
group is self-interested—or, more theologically, that everyone is sinful. I therefore 
control in the statistical models for thinking other groups that the survey asked 
about were self-interested, to see if respondents think that scientists are particu-
larly self-interested.21
As in previous analyses, the regression models also control for demographics. 
The analytic question is, as before, are particular religious groups likely to think 
that scientists are self-interested when they enter the public sphere, even after 
controlling for the extent to which the respondent thinks that all groups are self-
interested? The results shown in the first row of Table 4 suggest that both literalist 
and nonliteralist conservative Protestants are much more likely than the nonpar-
ticipants in religion to say that scientists are working for their own and not the 
country’s interests.22 No other religious groups are different from the nonreligious.
On the other hand, the second row shows that there are no differences between 
religious groups and the nonreligious on thinking scientists are self-interested on 
genetically modified food. This is consistent with the earlier findings about want-
ing scientists to be influential in the public sphere. That is, on the two issues that 
are constructed as moral issues in the U.S.—global warming and embryonic stem 
cell research—conservative Protestants think that scientists are forwarding their 
own and not the public’s interests. But, this is not the case for the one issue that is 
constructed as being about knowledge—genetically modified foods.
Similarly, in 2012, the GSS asked about the level of agreement with the state-
ment “Scientific researchers are dedicated people who work for the good of 
humanity.”23 This produces an image of disinterested scientists forwarding the 
consensual morality. The analysis shows that the probability that a nonreligious 
respondent will not strongly agree that scientists work for the good of humanity 
is high, at .769. There is clearly generalized skepticism about scientists among the 
entire public. The probability for a literalist conservative Protestant is even higher, 
at .869. (see the third row of Table 4.) That is, despite only 443 people being asked 
this question, making it less likely that any difference would be statistically signifi-
cant, literalist conservative Protestants were more likely than the nonreligious to 
disagree that scientists work for the good of humanity. In sum, these survey anal-
yses suggest that conservative Protestants are more likely than the nonreligious 
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to think that scientists are working in their own self-interest. While this is not 
morality per se, it suggests that conservative Protestants do not think scientists are 
neutral investigators of nature.
MOR AL C ONFLICT OVER TECHNOLO GY
The third type of moral conflict is not a moral objection to scientific research per 
se, but rather to the technology that scientific research allows. Technology is “the 
application of scientific knowledge for practical purposes,” so medicine and engi-
neering are technologies.24 While it could be argued that science is distinct from 
technology, I doubt the general public sees a distinction between, for example, 
scientists and medical researchers or scientists and engineers.
Technology has even more direct moral implications because it is applied to 
the social world. And there is a moral critique of almost every technology we can 
imagine: automobiles, airplanes, television, the internet, nuclear energy, and on 
and on. However, most technologies do not have a particularly religious valence, 
and Western religions do not have a problem with technology per se.
But, there are some technologies that do have implications for religious beliefs 
and morals. While the computer is religiously neutral, the Christian religion at least 
is in general centrally concerned with the human body—particularly reproduction 
and sexuality.25 Therefore, technologies that concern the body, life, and death are 
those most likely to have moral implications for Christians. Technologies that con-
cern human embryos and the hastening of death, as well as human genetic engineer-
ing, reproductive genetic technologies, pregnancy, childbirth, organ transplantation, 
and human enhancement are all examples that are probably seen by religious people 
as having moral implications. We are all familiar with public debates about these 
technologies and that religious people are often front and center in these debates.
Below I conduct quantitative and qualitative analyses that show that religious 
people are not opposed to technology itself, nor are they opposed to manipulating 
the human body. For example, they do not think that manipulating the human 
body is “playing God.” Rather, they think, to use the phrase of the late Paul Ramsey, 
that we should “play God as God plays God” with nature and the human.26 The 
question is moral—what is the appropriate version of playing God?
Moreover, opposition to a technology by religious people is never about knowl-
edge. For example, if you look at the papal documents that argue for the sanctity of 
human embryos, and thus that abortion, most reproductive genetic technologies, 
and embryonic stem cell research are all morally wrong, these documents accept 
and use the latest scientific research on embryos.27 It was embryology, after all, that 
taught the institutional church about what exactly happened at fertilization. The 
Catholic Church just reaches a different moral conclusion from the scientific facts 
than most scientists do.28
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In another example, in an earlier book I engaged in an in-depth interview study 
of 180 largely religious Americans to discern their views of reproductive genetic 
technologies such as pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, human genetic engineer-
ing, and cloning. In general, these religious citizens were more opposed to these 
technologies than were the nonreligious people. In the analysis of all of those 
interview transcripts, I do not remember an instance of a respondent, including 
the fundamentalists, challenging the scientific claims behind any of these tech-
nologies. It was just accepted that the science was accurate. They did have a moral 
analysis of those facts that often conflicted with the moral analyses given by the 
proponents of these technologies.29
Growing Moral Conflict Between Conservative Protestantism and 
Technology Applied to the Body
It is quite easy to show that conservative Protestants and conservative Catholics 
are more opposed than are the nonreligious to many technologies that involve the 
human body, like embryonic stem cell research. It is a greater empirical challenge 
to show that they see their opposition to embryonic stem cell research to be part 
of a moral conflict with scientists. Below, I infer this moral conflict through an 
evaluation of changes in the level of confidence in scientists from 1984, when the 
available data begins, to 2010.30 Over this time period, scientific innovation shifted 
to the human body—at the same time that religious conservatives were also shift-
ing attention to the human body. Thus, moral conflict.
In the 1950s and 1960s, conservative Protestants were involved with anticom-
munism, and in the late 1970s, they joined conservative Catholics in the religious 
right movement. While the original motivation of the religious right was to defend 
its schools from what it saw as government interference, it later began to take 
positions on issues like abortion, homosexuality, and sexual ethics, later turning 
to euthanasia and embryonic stem cell research.31 These questions of the body, and 
particularly reproduction and female sexuality, have always been central to the 
Christian tradition.32 They had just had not previously been as central a part of 
public debate.
The public face of science was changing at the same time, making it more likely 
that conservative Protestants would see science as a competitor in moral debates 
about the body. The scientific issues in the public sphere from the 1950s through 
the 1970s were nuclear energy, pollution, weapons, and the genetic modification 
of micro-organisms. These were not generally thought of as “religious.” However, 
by the 1970s, science began to debate issues having to do with the human body 
such as abortion, birth control, human genetic engineering, organ transplantation, 
the definition of death, euthanasia, mind control and, later, embryonic stem cell 
research and cloning. These could be seen as part of the moral agenda of scientists, 
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but these were traditionally more “religious” issues. By the mid-1970s theologians 
and scientists were solidly engaged in clashes over the morality of these technolo-
gies in the emergent public bioethical debate.33
Therefore, a growing moral conflict with science could have resulted from this 
change in the social priorities of both conservative Protestants and scientists, as 
both groups began to make often conflicting moral claims about the human body 
in the public sphere. If so, it should also be the case that conservative Protestants 
have become increasingly opposed to the moral influence of scientists since 1984.34
I focus on the respondents’ response to the question: “I am going to name some 
institutions in this country. As far as the people running these institutions are con-
cerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, 
or hardly any confidence at all in them? Scientific community.” This question is 
not framed as asking the respondent for an evaluation of the legitimacy of the 
methods of science. The wording and context of the question clearly indicate that 
it is read as the view of the social influence of science as an institution in the public 
sphere.35 When asked for their level of confidence in the scientific community, 43 
percent of the respondents replied “a great deal,” fifty percent replied “only some,” 
and seven percent replied “hardly any.” I conducted analysis by comparing those 
who said “a great deal” to those who said “only some” or “hardly any.”
As with the analyses above, I controlled for the demographic qualities and 
political orientation of the respondent and used regression models to see what 
characteristics of a respondent predict responses to this “confidence in scientists” 
question.36 As you might imagine, one of the strongest predictors of confidence in 
science is confidence in any institutions about which the GSS asked. People who 
do not trust one set of elites usually do not trust any elites. That is not especially 
interesting but is important to account for in any analysis, given that conservative 
Protestants may be inclined not to trust elites in general.
More important to my interpretation is to show that people do not lack faith 
in the leaders of science simply because they think that the methods of science 
are wrong or that science does not generate accurate truth claims. That would be 
knowledge conflict. To ensure that I am not measuring knowledge conflict, we can 
see if those who have avoided science (as I measured in the analyses described in 
Chapter 6) have less confidence in scientific elites. I looked to see whether peo-
ple who knew more uncontested scientific facts, claimed more knowledge about 
science, knew more scientific methodology, had taken more college level science 
classes, or had a scientific occupation had more confidence in the leaders of sci-
entific institutions. None of these factors have any influence on what the public 
thinks about scientific leaders, so their confidence in institutional science is not 
about true or false knowledge.
A stronger test is whether those people who believed in the conservative 
Protestant claims about human origins had less confidence in scientific elites. 
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This would mean that the lack of confidence was about a knowledge conflict over 
human origins. I used the same measure introduced in Chapter 6 that measures 
belief in this contested knowledge. Here again there is no difference in confidence 
in scientists between those who agree more with the scientific versions of human 
origins versus those who agree less with the scientific version of human origins. 
Confidence in scientific institutions in the U.S. appears to have nothing to do with 
knowledge claims at all. While I make this point in service of larger claims below, 
it is itself further evidence for a lack of systemic knowledge conflict in the contem-
porary U.S.
Further analysis shows that, consistent with the general narrative of this book, 
confidence in science for the entire public—not just the religious—is at least partly 
based on morality. There were few appropriate survey questions available, but I 
was able to use the question from the previous analyses in this chapter, where the 
respondents were asked whether they wanted scientists to be influential in debates 
about embryonic stem cell research.37
Even after controlling for all of the knowledge measures and demographics, 
there is a quite large difference in confidence in the scientists between those who 
are opposed to scientists’ influence on stem cell research and those who are sup-
portive of this influence. The analysis, not otherwise shown, reveals that similarly 
situated respondents who want little to no influence of scientists in debates about 
stem cell research have a one in four chance of saying they have confidence in the 
scientists running the institution of science. Those who want a great deal of influ-
ence of scientists on stem cells have a one in two chance. Confidence seems quite 
highly structured by how much the respondents want scientists to be involved 
with moral debates in the public sphere, so I will treat this confidence measure as 
a proxy for moral conflict.
I continued the analysis to see if the lack of confidence in elite scientists was 
influenced by religion, even after controlling for variables indicating exposure to 
science. It is. The last row in Table 4 shows that a literalist conservative Protestant 
has only a fourteen in one hundred chance of having confidence in scientists, 
whereas the nonreligious have a thirty-eight in one hundred chance. There are no 
other differences by religion. Moreover, additional analyses show that if someone 
is opposed to scientific influence on embryonic stem cell research and is a literalist 
conservative Protestant, they have even less confidence in elite scientists.38
In sum, for the entire public, confidence in the scientists who run American 
science institutions appears to be driven by moral evaluation of the scientists, not 
by opposition to the knowledge claims made by science. This is particularly true 
for conservative Protestants. Has this moral evaluation of scientific elites changed 
over time? If so, we can infer what the moral conflict may be about.
If we look over time, we see that the level of confidence by most religious groups 
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less confident in scientists in 1984 then were the nonreligious, and they are equally 
less confident in 2010. The one difference is for literalist conservative Protestants, 
who have become even less confident over time.39 In 1984, the difference in odds 
between literalist conservative Protestants and the nonreligious was only .10, but 
by 2010 the gap had about doubled.
We can then ask what has changed socially or morally for science and/or con-
servative Protestantism between 1984 and 2010 to cause this increased level of con-
flict. Here I run out of available survey questions, and it is my hope that if social 
scientists become more attuned to moral conflict, they will begin to incorporate 
questions into future surveys. But, I believe the answer is, as described above, that 
during this time period both science and religion moved from concern with the 
physical world toward concern with the human body, which has long been a moral 
focus of Christianity.
Religious Views of Engineering the Human Species
I finish this chapter by trying to more precisely describe religious Americans’ view 
of technology, so that we can see possible present and future moral conflict with 
science. I focus on one of the technologies with a great deal of potential religious 
implications—genetic modification of the human species.
I lack data on the views of the scientific community concerning genetic modi-
fication or, more importantly, what the religious public thinks the view of the sci-
entific community is. I examine in-depth interview data with religious Americans 
that allow us to imagine what points of consensus and conflict would come into 
being if the scientific community is seen as taking various positions in the years 
ahead. The most obvious conflict would be if the scientific community is seen to be 
on the side of “improving” the human species, as it was in the eugenics movement. 
However, we need to see that there would be many points of consensus that may 
surprise many. I will make the following points about the moral views of religious 
Americans.
First, far from being opposed to applying technology to the human body, reli-
gious Americans see technology as a source of hope and an engine of human prog-
ress. However, religious people have ethical concerns about the end goal of this 
progress. They would be opposed to the use of this technology for creating an 
improved human species beyond what it is “supposed” to be. For the religious, 
the goal for these technologies should be to restore the nonsuffering human, not 
create a super-human.
Second, common wisdom is that religious people are opposed to modifying 
the human genome to improve the species, because God created humans as they 
should be. I will argue that this is not correct, and that the majority of religious 
people are not opposed to genetically modifying the human species per se. They 
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do not view the current human genome as somehow sacred and not to be “tam-
pered with.” That is not where any moral conflict lies.
Third, in actuality, religious people think we have an obligation to use technol-
ogy to transform the world and even the human body. The difference with much 
of the scientific ethical thought on this issue is that the religious believe we should 
not use our own vision to make the blueprint for the future, but should instead 
determine what God would want us to do. This subtle difference could result in 
future conflict if technological abilities improve.
I conducted an inductive discourse analysis of responses from an in-depth 
interview study that focused on what religious people in the U.S. think about 
reproductive genetic technology40 The interviews began with a series of hypotheti-
cal scenarios about couples who are planning on having children, and I asked the 
respondent what advice they would give the couple. The first scenario was about a 
couple who had found that they are both carriers for cystic fibrosis. “What should 
they do?” the respondent was asked. In the next scenario, the woman is already 
pregnant, and they are offered amniocentesis possibly followed by abortion. 
“Should they do this?” the respondents were asked. In the next scenario, a couple 
is offered pre-implantation genetic diagnosis to avoid cystic fibrosis.41 Another 
couple are offered pre-implantation genetic diagnosis for early onset Alzheimer’s 
disease, and another for deafness, and yet another are offered pre-implantation 
genetic diagnosis to avoid having an obese child. Finally, a hypothetical couple is 
offered pre-implantation genetic diagnosis to obtain the smartest child possible. 
Another scenario involves sex selection, and another sperm sorting to determine 
the gender of the baby. The scenarios then turn to germline human genetic engi-
neering to engineer traits such as cystic fibrosis, obesity, and intelligence in an 
embryo that eventually becomes a child—and thus that trait would be found in 
all of that child’s descendants. A final scenario asks about reproductive cloning. 
Questions then turn to what the respondent thinks the effect of these technologies 
will be on society, some questions about religion, and finally how the respondent 
thinks our society should have a debate about reproductive genetic technologies.42
The questions I primarily focus upon here were near the very end of the 
interview after an hour or more of conversation about religion and reproductive 
genetics. The typical conversation by that point has been, at least for the religious 
respondents, interwoven with religious discourse, and due to the priming early in 
the interview, many responded with religious reasons for and against the use of 
these reproductive genetic technologies.
The first of the questions I examine occurred at the very end of the interview. 
It was different than the previous questions, in that the interviewer handed the 
interviewee a card that had ten words listed in a column on it, and the interviewee 
was asked, “When you think about all the issues that we have talked about today, 
which one of these words best summarizes your feelings. Or, you can pick a word 
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that is not on the list. Or, you can talk about more than one if you want.” When 
the respondent would pick a word, they were asked, “Why that word?” It is in their 
reasons for picking that word that we can determine their moral vision for these 
technologies. The words on the card were humility, worry, fear, hopefulness, hap-
piness, hopelessness, anger, helplessness, reverence, and awe. The other responses 
I focus upon in this analysis come from us asking, “Should the ability to change 
the genes of the human species be reserved for God?” This is designed to get to 
the question of who should modify and/or provide the design for future humans.
Let me start with the data generated from the word selection exercise, which 
helps me address my first point, that religious people in the U.S. generally see 
reproductive genetic technologies through a lens of hope. The question comes 
after extended discussions of technologies, some of which nearly all respondents 
are opposed to. For example, almost nobody was in favor of human cloning, 
with most people finding it repellent. The vast majority of respondents had some 
technologies and applications that they approved of, and some that they did not. 
Overall, what was the conclusion about reproductive genetics? Were they hope-
ful, and thus tended to ignore the “threat” of technologies like cloning and creat-
ing super-intelligent babies? Or, did they focus upon the negative, and see human 
bodily modification through genetics as a foreboding picture of our future?
I deductively coded the responses by the word selected, and then inductively 
coded the reasons given for selecting that word. There were certainly people who 
fit the stereotyped depiction of religious people seeing dread, with some selecting 
“worry,” “fear,” “worry and fear,” “anger and fear,” and “hopelessness.” A few sug-
gested their own word to summarize their thoughts about reproductive genetic 
technologies—“concern.” The response of one of the Catholic respondents was 
typical. His word was “worry,” and when asked why, he said “I would hate to see 
society come to the place where we can manufacture a human being the way we 
want it to be. That would be very worrisome to me.”
Similarly, a mainline Protestant who approved of the individual use of many 
of the technologies talked through the other possibilities on the card. “Well, not 
‘happiness’ or ‘anger,’” he said. “I think probably ‘fear’ and ‘worry’ more than the 
‘hopefulness’ reference and ‘awe,’ which probably reflects my cynicism more than 
anything else. But—I mean it could potentially be a very good thing, but human 
history being what it is, you know, when we meddle in these things, we tend to end 
up doing more harm than good. So, I think ‘fear’ and ‘worry.’”
However, these negative visions of the future of genetic modifications of 
humans were not the dominant response. The majority of words selected by con-
servative Protestants, mainline Protestants, and Catholics could be categorized as 
either “all good” or “good and bad.” Mainliners were the most positive, with almost 
all selecting “all good” words or “good and bad” words. Conservative Protestants 
were a bit less positive, followed by Catholics.
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By far, the “all good” word most chosen by respondents was “hopefulness,” and 
nearly everyone said the reason they selected that word was that we would soon be 
able to relieve the suffering of disease by using reproductive genetic technologies. 
As one mainline Protestant respondent put it:
I think hopefulness would be the selection that I would make. I get to thinking about 
it and think that we can contribute significantly through the development of these 
technologies to reduce human suffering. I can’t imagine anyone not being hopeful 
about that. It’s not going to be easy. It’s going to be very complicated. We need to 
exercise humility in the process, but I don’t find it hopeless or helpless. I’m hopeful.
Earlier, she was asked about a scenario in which a doctor could “fix the genes in a 
fertilized egg to remove the chance that any baby would have cystic fibrosis,” so that 
“not only would this child be free of this gene, but so would the child’s children, 
the child’s grandchildren, and so on.” She responded that she would be supportive 
of the use of this technology to change “the lineage,” in her words, because “I think 
it’s a great technique, if that exists, and I think it would be wonderful to eliminate 
cystic fibrosis from our world, and that will take some time to do, I’m sure.”
A fundamentalist Protestant said he picked “hopefulness” because “I think 
we’re on the verge of some good things for people for our society and hopefully 
we’ll be able to handle these new technologies with wisdom. And if we’re wise in 
what we do, we only improve society. If we’re not wise, they’re very dangerous. So 
I guess I’m hopeful that we’ll be wise in the way we can handle them.”
Earlier, in a discussion about using germline genetic engineering to remove 
cystic fibrosis from the family line, he was not concerned about the technology 
itself, only that it did not involve killing embryos or fetuses—a common response 
for conservative Protestants. “Sure, if that technology is available, certainly,” they 
should use it, he said. When asked, “Do you have any concerns about this technol-
ogy at all?” he said no, as long as “it’s not done by replacing a gene with fetuses, 
that stem cell stuff.” We can see the boundaries of his moral conflict with science.
A Catholic man said the choice of words was easy, and his choice was “hope-
fulness.” The reason was “because we have within our grasp, like no other time in 
history the chance to eradicate so much human suffering. We’re on the cusp of a 
great era of discovery and . . . hopefully my children will live to see it. . . . I remem-
ber getting . . . polio shots and you know polio and small pox has been eradicated. 
Amazing things have .  .  . happened in my lifetime and my kids are going to see 
remarkable things.”
Perhaps more interesting was the very common impulse to select a positive and 
negative word to indicate the good and the bad. The positive was always a word that 
they chose to represent the hope of the relief of suffering through genetic technol-
ogy. The negative was a word to represent either fear of misuse (typically radical 
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enhancements) or of forgetting that we humans are not God. The most common 
words selected together were “hopefulness” and “worry.” One respondent stated, 
“Actually, two things kind of pop out. The hopefulness because I think that a lot of 
good could come from being able to control some really major medical problems 
and worry  .  .  . a little worry about just how far the scientific community would 
maybe want to go with the technology that they are developing or that they have.”
Similarly, a mainline Protestant stated that “I would put hopefulness in there 
and I think I have to add worry.” Hopefulness was selected because of “the good 
things that can happen with the technology that you have described,” and worry 
was selected because “the technology could be . . . misused for frivolous reasons.” 
She was typical in her support for revising the human species to eliminate disease, 
but not for changes that she thought were not disease-based. She was in favor of 
germline genetic engineering for cystic fibrosis, as long as there were no “unfore-
seen consequences.” The interviewer then began “what about for …” and she inter-
rupted with “for blue eyes . . . no!”
Religious respondents often also selected terms of reverence and awe, signify-
ing caution, that we are interfering, perhaps with good reason, in something that 
is far above our human perspective. Similarly, it was common for respondents to 
select “hopefulness and humility,” with “humility” a reminder that we are not God. 
As one conservative Protestant put it, he selected humility “because it helps—you 
know, helps me realize that I’m not God. I’m not able to make perfectly correct 
decisions.” He was hopeful, “because I think that this is a technology [that] will 
help people.”
A smaller group of people selected “hopefulness” and “awe,” with hopefulness 
for the prospect of curing disease, and “awe” meaning “at awe of our awesome 
technological abilities.” A fundamentalist Protestant said he picked these words 
because:
I believe of course there is, you know, as we progress along as a society, there are 
things to be hopeful for that diseases will be eradicated and that people will live 
comfortable lives. You know, and an ultimate hopefulness of someday getting to 
Heaven and sitting face-to-face with the Creator. It is kind of awesome to think that 
we have this technology to be able to do some of these things, but I believe of course 
that credit should be given where credit is due. It’s not necessarily us that are actu-
ally doing this. We’re the clay in the potter’s hands, even those that may not neces-
sarily be someone who believes in Christ, because God certainly has the capability 
and power to do that. So I would say probably hopefulness and awe. Some of these 
more negative feelings, you know, I just don’t see that. I for one, I’m certainly not 
worried or fearful.
Roughly equal numbers of religious people in each religious tradition selected 
“all good,” “good and bad,” and “dread” terms. There was a slight tendency for 
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mainliners to be more “glass is half full and Catholics to be more “glass is half 
empty.” For the “all good” category, these were people who, despite being opposed 
to some aspects of reproductive genetic technology, had an overall exclusively 
positive, hopeful vision for genetic intervention going forward.
Religious people in this study are not anti-science or anti-technology. By and 
large they do not see the human genome as sacred and thus inviolable. They believe 
in what they perceive as the relief of suffering, most notably through “medical” 
interventions. However, religious people in the U.S. seem to entirely lack a eugenic 
vision, where we intervene in the human genome to “improve” the species. Rather, 
the present-day healthy “walking-around” sort of human is the ideal, and the goal 
is to get everyone to that “normal” state. However, their positive vision going for-
ward is largely tempered by a caution at what humans might do wrong. When 
future scholars closely examine any moral conflict between religion and science, I 
expect that they will find these subtle points of convergence.
Subtle differences between religion and science should also be expected 
to emerge. To the extent that scientists are more sympathetic with the idea of 
“improving” humans according to our own human definitions of quality, we can 
expect moral conflict. In contrast, one could imagine religious people in the U.S. in 
favor of creating a Humanity 2.0, as long as the blueprint was made by God. Again, 
the difference in these moral visions is not in their view of scientists’ knowledge 
or abilities. Nor is the difference in their view of whether humans should change 
nature. On this they would agree. The difference is that the religious would try to 
get the moral principles behind any change from the “objective” source of God’s 
will. The scientists would look to contemporary human values where, if the cur-
rent culture values super-intelligence, than that is what Humanity 2.0 should have.
I turn to my second point, which is that the religious are not opposed to modi-
fication per se, and my third, which is that humans are to enact this modification, 
not God. Religious respondents believe in modifying the current human, but want 
to constrain changes to those that would please God. Of course, an academic ana-
lyst could say that these people should recognize that what is thought to be “pleas-
ing to God” is also a matter of social consensus, ultimately no different than simply 
polling a society. However, this is not how religious people see it.
The limitations on human improvement in the Western religious vision can be 
found in the elite theological discourse, where there is a strong dichotomy between 
God and humans. Humans are not God, but were created by God, along with all of 
“nature.” A long-running part of Christian theology concerns what actions in the 
physical world are then the responsibility of humans, and which are to remain the 
province of God. This is represented by the theological debate concerning whether 
we humans are simply a created creature of God or co-creators with God.43
With a technology like the genetic engineering of humans, if we are purely 
creatures, God is entirely responsible for our human bodily form, and we are not 
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to interfere. To take this to its logical conclusion, we should not heal diseases 
humans are born with, because God created them. However, if we are co-creators 
with God, we participate in fulfilling God’s desires for the human bodily form. In 
this vision, God wants us to heal disease and relieve the suffering of an imperfect 
world and an imperfect human.
In the interviews, well after all of the questions about what people should do in 
the face of various genetic conditions, the respondent was asked: “Do you think 
that the ability to change the genes of the human species should be reserved for 
God?” The responses here point directly to the respondent’s notion of whether we 
are co-creators with God and whether something like human genetic modifica-
tions should be something “left to God.” We can also see what is left to God and 
what is left to humans and, to anticipate the conclusion, it is God’s job to come up 
with the plan, and it is humanity’s job to implement it.
A minority of religious people do say that yes, the ability to change the genes 
of the human species should be left to God, and these are typically the people who 
are opposed to all applications of all technologies. It is hard to imagine that they do 
not believe in the human modification of God’s creation, because presumably they 
all believe in medicine, mechanized agriculture, and so on. I suspect that it is the 
intervention into the design of the human species that is particularly problematic 
for this group. I also suspect that this response is not an objection to technology 
itself, but rather that they can think of no morally acceptable application for the 
technology, so they oppose it by saying humans should not have the authority to 
do it.
It is hard to tell what these outright opponents were thinking, because they 
rarely gave their reasons, and just implied that it was obvious from their previous 
comments. The few who really articulated their reasons sound like the stereotypes 
of religious people as theological Luddites. The common wisdom would be that 
religious people would say that we “should not play God” with technologies, and 
one Pentecostal respondent seemed to agree, saying “yes,” we should leave it to 
God, “because He created us  .  .  . I don’t think someone should change you just 
because they want you to be a certain way. . . . If God wants you to be better, then 
He will make you better. . . . No, I think it’s up to God to do it, not to wait for sci-
entists to put you out in a lab and you’re sort of like a guinea pig or something. So 
I think it’s up to Him. I mean, we’re here. He made us a certain way for a reason.”
However, the strong majority of religious respondents said “no,” the ability to 
change the genes of the human species should not be left to God. There were three 
major reasons: that God works through humans; that we should transform the 
human if limited to good, God-given purposes; and that we have God-given free 
will to do both good and bad.
The first reason is well articulated by one Catholic respondent, who put it 
quite succinctly, stating that “He created the people and He helps people to create 
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technology to change these things. I don’t think it should be just God.  .  .  . No, 
I think He’s out there saying, you know, ‘I hope you find a cure for cancer’ or 
whatever.” A mainline Protestant said that “We are God’s hands on earth. So it’s 
up to us to use it, not—God’s not going to do it. [Normally], He’s going to have us 
do it. So, it’s our responsibility to use those techniques.” Similarly, an evangelical 
responded that:
it goes back to the sense that God has given us these abilities and this intelligence to 
create penicillin to wipe out, not wipe out, but to be able to fight bacterial diseases, 
to create drugs that combat cancer and other disease. It gives me medicine to take 
for my thyroid to make it work right, and I think that is all good stuff. I think there 
can be good stuff coming out of genetics and genetic technology. But there is always 
the flip side of how that technology is going to be used. I mean, we create all these 
drugs, and we also create dangerous viruses that can be used as weapons. That is the 
flip side of everything. God has given us the ability, so . . . I don’t believe you can say, 
“Okay, God alone can do this,” but on the other hand I believe you have to be willing 
to look at things as not just as a “What can I do?” but “What should I do? What is 
the right thing to do?”
The second common response is that genetic transformation should not be 
reserved for God, as long as we are doing God’s will, which is obviously related to 
the first reason. A mainline Protestant respondent said that:
If it’s something like medical science would determine that if they removed a gene 
and prevent someone from being born with the disease or could prevent disease 
from occurring in that child, yeah, I think that’s great. Again, I look at that as medi-
cal science that knowledge . . . a God-given knowledge. It’s not creating life . . . it’s 
improving the quality of life. It’s human life, but I think that’s as far as I can go. But 
altering genes to make a superhuman being or, you know, making someone . . . mak-
ing a life, cloning, cloning a life to be something that wouldn’t otherwise be naturally, 
I don’t think that’s within our purpose as human beings. I don’t think it’s our right.
An evangelical responded that “some of this genetic engineering is good and some 
of it’s bad, but overall, I think He’s given us the intelligence that I think our soul 
and our spirit—if the soul and the spirit’s not lighted up with God, then that’s 
where you get into trouble.” We have to be doing it “from the right perspective . . . 
and from God’s perspective.” Finally, a mainline Protestant said that:
It goes back again to, what are you going to do with it? Like, that’s the big question 
in all of this. It’s not so much that should you or shouldn’t you do it. It’s like once you 
learn how to do it, the genie is out of the bottle, right? You’re never going to put him 
back in. What are you going to do with it, now that you’re able to do this? Are you 
going to do things good for society and for humankind or use it for trivial things like 
picking kids’ eye color. That’s the question.
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The third reason is not so much that God’s plan should be in control, but that we 
humans are on our own to select good and evil. We have free will. There is still 
good, and the respondent seems to know what it is, but this choice is part of the 
human condition. God is not a micro-manager. As one Catholic man said, “We’re 
always going to be able to do miraculous things. We’re always going to be able to 
go to the moon . . . It’s what we do with it and how we use it is where we stay con-
nected to God. I think we’re capable of dickering with just about anything we want 
to. That’s just our nature, because we’re that smart or that intelligent and we can. 
We have that free will.”
Similarly, a conservative Protestant woman told us that “my belief is that the 
Lord has these things at our disposal or at our use, if needed, if necessary, and we 
make the choice of how we want to move with that. Do we want to use it—do we 
not want to use it? Why do we want to use it? I don’t think it’s an issue of are we 
going to upset God if we do it. Are we going to upset Him if we don’t do it? No. 
I think these are the different options we have. What are we going to choose and 
what are we doing in making our choice?”
Yes, there are some religious people who are opposed to developing some tech-
nologies at all. I suspect that this is because they can think of no moral use for the 
technology, like a pacifist who could see no moral use for a weapon. Most religious 
people instead view scientific technologies like most people view guns. It is not 
that they should not exist, it all depends upon what they are used for and who 
controls them. Most religious people think reproductive genetic technologies are 
great—as long as they are used to further God’s wishes, such as the elimination 
of disease. They are concerned that these technologies will be used for other pur-
poses, like creating blue-eyed, blond-haired “perfect” children.
This is the sort of subtle moral conflict that to some extent already exists among 
religious and scientific elites and could become more pervasive among the reli-
gious public if genetic modification technologies continue to improve. Again, 
none of this is about knowledge, as the religious people are willing to conclude that 
scientists have their facts right about genetics and reproduction. What would be in 
conflict are subtle moral differences, such as scientists and the religious having dif-
ferent notions of what a disease is, with the scientists relying upon contemporary 
conceptions of disease and the religious on their interpretation of religious views. 
These subtle disagreements are fruitful territory for future scholars to examine.
C ONCLUSION
In this chapter, I demarcated three types of moral conflict between religion and sci-
ence, and used what social science data exists to try to evaluate such conflict. The 
first is conflict over whether science or religion will set the meaning and purpose 
of humanity. That is, at its most abstract, should we have faith in religion or faith 
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in science? Evidence shows that religious Americans in general are in this type of 
conflict with science, and that conservative Protestants are even more strongly so.
A second type of moral conflict is over the moral teachings of scientists. 
Scientists typically do not think that they are promoting a particular moral-
ity, but in Chapter 5 we saw a wide range of evidence suggesting that the public 
will view scientists through a moral lens. That is what we also see in this chapter, 
with the evidence suggesting that conservative Protestants do not want scientists 
to be influential in moral debates in the public sphere, which suggests conflict. 
Moreover, conservative Protestants do not think of scientists as selflessly work-
ing on society’s behalf, suggesting that they could also see scientists having moral 
interests.
A third type of moral conflict is over the technology that science empowers. 
Analysis shows that the most conservative of Protestants are increasingly in moral 
conflict with science over time, which I interpret to be a reflection of both religion 
and science becoming more concerned about technologies of the human body. 
Finally, I engage in fine-grained analysis of interviews with religious Americans 
of their views of reproductive genetic technologies. These show that religious 
Americans are not opposed to technology per se, but may be in subtle moral con-
flict with scientists now and in the future over these technologies. In the same way 
that Brooke’s historical “complexity” thesis of the relationship between religion 
and science disrupted simple claims of universal knowledge conflict, the qualita-
tive data reviewed in this chapter show that the moral relationship between reli-





It has long been claimed that one source of conflict between science and society is 
the religious citizens who are inevitably in conflict with science. They are so, the 
narrative continues, because they are opposed to scientific claims, since religion 
has a different way of knowing facts about the world. The common conception is 
that religion ultimately determines truths about the natural world through super-
natural revelation and science ultimately determines truth through observation 
and reason. This is what I have termed the systemic knowledge conflict between 
religion and science. Since all on-the-ground beliefs about nature are derived from 
high-level abstract ideas of how belief is generated, religion and science should not 
agree about any beliefs about the world. Therefore, if a citizen believes the conser-
vative Protestant and nonscientific claim that the Earth is six thousand years old, 
then they cannot believe scientists’ claims about the origins of global warming. In 
the first pages of this book I showed how this exact systemic knowledge conflict 
claim is common in the public sphere.
The reason this systemic knowledge conflict view is common, as I argued in 
Chapters 2 and 3, is that most academics, and especially those who focus on the 
“religion and science debate,” assume it is so, and broadcast these views to the 
public. Scientists, theologians, historians, and particularly social scientists have all 
long made this assumption, with the origins of this view for social science reaching 
back to the birth of social science in the Enlightenment. One general reason aca-
demics assume that any relationship between religion and science will be based on 
systemic knowledge is that academics are rewarded for using hierarchical logically 
deductive systems of justification. The problem for contemporary public debate 
is then that these academic debaters do not acknowledge that their conclusions 
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about the relationship between religion and science may not apply to the general 
public, who use a different form of reason.
THE D OMINANCE OF THE SYSTEMIC 
KNOWLED GE PERSPECTIVE
A final example will show that the public is indeed being taught that the systemic 
knowledge conflict is in force for both elites and the public. This extrapolation 
from elites to the public is typically a sin of omission, not commission, primarily 
occurring by using the words “religion” or “Christianity” without a modifier. As 
the first sentence on the dust jacket of the influential edited volume When Science 
and Christianity Meet states, “Have science and Christianity been locked in mortal 
combat for the past 2000 years?”1. Is “Christianity” in this case the members or the 
elites? By not specifying whether a text is talking about the elite or the public, and 
by not theorizing the link in general, the public is being taught that knowledge 
conflict is what the public also holds. We end up with Huffington Post articles 
using these assumptions and thus misinforming readers about the religious public.
Of course, the public does not read books like the aforementioned edited vol-
ume. I have no doubt that such writing trickles down through college education 
and other elite information venues. Empirically demonstrating that trickle-down 
would be extremely difficult, but I do not think that this claim is controversial. I 
will use as an exemplar a Google search that any high school student may make if 
interested in “religion and science.”2 Such a search reveals what would be learned 
by an uninformed person, and they would learn that the public is in systemic 
knowledge conflict over science and religion.
In a Google search for “religion and science,” the first link seen is an advertise-
ment for a documentary called Closer to Truth? that interviews academics about 
“humanity’s deepest questions.” Apparently these documentaries are shown on 
PBS, but this advertisement encourages you to watch an interview series titled Are 
Science & Religion at War? Our first indicator of the content is that these inter-
views are all with academics. This links to another series of interviews titled Do 
Science & Religion Conflict? Here we see content from atheists and science/religion 
synthesizers such as Daniel Dennett and Francis Collins. These are all participants 
in the elite struggles about systemic knowledge conflict, and there is no inter-
viewee qualified to talk about what the public believes. One is left with the impres-
sion that members of religions believe this because these elites do.
The next link is seemingly a paid link from the National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering, and Medicine. Titled “The compatibility of science and religion,” it 
begins, “Science is not the only way of knowing and understanding. But science is 
a way of knowing that differs from other ways in its dependence on empirical evi-
dence and testable explanations.”3 While it is not explicit from this page whether 
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religion is about knowledge, it is clear that science is only about knowledge. This 
page implies that any conflict in the public is similarly structured when it claims 
that “Today, many religious denominations accept” evolution. Given that denomi-
nations are filled with ordinary citizens, we see that the one issue discussed for 
these citizens is the knowledge claim about evolution. On this page, science and 
religion are in knowledge conflict, primarily over evolution, which seems to stand 
in for all “compatibilities,” and this same conflict is implied to be held by the public.
The third link is to the place where most people would probably start, which is 
Wikipedia. The entry is called “Relationship between religion and science,” essen-
tially what the book you are presently reading is about. The first sentence says this 
relationship has long been studied, with the second saying that some people char-
acterize the relationship as conflict, harmony, or of little interaction. The third sen-
tence reveals the assumption of the entire extremely long page: “Science and religion 
generally pursue knowledge of the universe using different methodologies.” This is 
clearly systemic knowledge conflict, since methodologies for generating knowledge 
are near the top of both pyramids. Now that both science and religion have been 
defined as institutions dedicated to producing fact claims about the natural world, 
the page continues with innumerable details about these fact claims. The next sen-
tences talk about how “Science acknowledges reason, empiricism, and evidence, 
while religions include revelation, faith, and sacredness.” We are introduced to 
Galileo, Dawkins, Weinberg, and Sagan. We read about non-overlapping magiste-
ria. The public makes an appearance in a way that makes it clear that the religious 
public is also only concerned about fact claims: “Public acceptance of scientific 
facts may be influenced by religion; many in the United States reject the idea of 
evolution by natural selection, especially regarding human beings.”
Many of the scientist-theologian synthesizers are discussed, such as Polkinghorne, 
Barbour, and Arthur Peacocke. Various scientists and atheists are introduced to talk 
about knowledge claims, with Neil deGrasse Tyson saying that the two institutions 
rely upon “irreconcilable approaches to knowing,” and Victor Stenger saying that 
the conflict is based upon “approaches to knowing.” It runs through more scientists 
and talks about the dialogue movement populated by the theologian-scientists. The 
elite views from different religious traditions are discussed.
The public appears again in a discussion of American creationist movements, 
which are at least outwardly about fact-claims. Creation science, for example, 
“began in the 1960s as a fundamentalist Christian effort in the United States to 
prove biblical inerrancy and falsify the scientific evidence for evolution.” Since the 
only suggestion of the religious public’s view is fundamentalist views of evolution, 
the impression is given that the religious public is engaged in a fact conflict with 
science. Getting much closer to the public is a section on “Studies on Scientists’ 
Beliefs” that summarizes the research on the religiosity of scientists.
The final 550 out of over 10,000 words are about the “public perceptions of sci-
ence.” It starts by saying that “While large majorities of Americans respect science 
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and scientists, they are not always willing to accept scientific findings that squarely 
contradict their religious beliefs.” Moreover, “specific factual disagreements are 
‘not common today’, though 40% to 50% of Americans do not accept the evolu-
tion of humans and other living things, with the ‘strongest opposition’ coming 
from evangelical Christians at 65% saying life did not evolve.” It continues by say-
ing that “in the U.S., biological evolution is the only concrete example of conflict 
where a significant portion of the American public denies scientific consensus for 
religious reasons.” This is exemplary reporting of the propositional belief results 
summarized in Chapter 6, but certainly does not flag for the reader that this is a 
fundamentally different perspective than what has been discussed for the previous 
9,500 words.
Most notably, this says nothing about moral conflict. Moral conflict is only 
gestured to with one sentence summarizing a study that I described in Chapter 7. 
The general conclusion from the Wikipedia page is that religion and science are 
about systemic knowledge. Elites are concerned with systemic knowledge con-
flict, but if you get to the last 5 percent of the entry, you will see that the public 
is only concerned with a few knowledge claims (propositional belief). The idea 
that the relationship between religion and science could be moral essentially 
does not exist.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ACADEMIC RELIGION AND 
SCIENCE DEBATE
In the preceding pages I have shown, using data from a wide range of sources, that 
despite the assumptions of academics and participants in the public sphere, the 
religious members of the general public are not in systemic knowledge conflict 
with science. I show instead that some religious groups are in propositional con-
flict, which means that there are some distinct religiously-based claims that some 
religious people believe that science says are false. However, these knowledge 
claims are merely propositions—they are not linked to other facts about nature—
and religious people in propositional belief conflict would believe the majority of 
scientific claims. In this version of conflict, if a conservative Protestant thinks the 
earth is six thousand years old, it does not mean they will reject scientific claims 
about global warming.
I have also built the case that for the public the strongest and most motivating 
type of conflict between religion and science is moral. This of course flies in the 
face of scientists’ image of themselves as engaged in morally neutral investiga-
tion of the world. But, existing research on the views of the public and on the 
nature of contemporary American religion and my own empirical examinations in 
Chapter 7 suggest that the most likely conflict is indeed over morality. For exam-
ple, the much more likely driver of conflict for the contemporary religious public 
is the morality of embryonic stem cell research, not the age of the Earth.
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What I have presented above suggests that for the good of a healthy debate in 
the public sphere, scholars should make it clear when they are talking about elites 
or the public—or even explicitly say that what they write may have little to do with 
how the contemporary public views religion and science. As I demonstrated with 
my case study of an internet search, an uninformed person will conclude that, for 
the public, religion and science are locked in a systemic knowledge relationship 
that sometimes results in conflict.
It will be useful for the academic fields involved with the religion and science 
debate to be aware of the contemporary public’s views. We might think that this 
would be irrelevant for historians, because they only examine the past. However, 
history has a bias toward explaining the historical origins of what is relevant today. 
For example, I suspect that there would be much less historical analysis of Darwin 
and his interlocutors if Darwinism were no longer a live debate. If moral conflict is 
central today, it would be extremely interesting for historians to look more closely 
at the historic origins of this and other conflicts.
For sociologists, an extremely large issue, beyond the scope of this book, is 
to ask what the deep premises of the discipline should be if these premises are 
not based on systemic knowledge conflict. Closer to the ground, sociologists of 
religion and science should not presume that those they study are in systemic con-
flict, but they should continue to focus on instances of propositional belief conflict. 
That is, opposition to scientific claims about human origins remains an important 
sociological phenomena—it just does not stand in for a conflict over the nature 
of knowledge. A key question will be what predicts a person believing a religious 
claim about nature instead of a scientific claim, and I sketch out a number of 
hypotheses in the second half of Chapter 6. Moreover, as I will argue below, soci-
ologists have a long tradition of addressing debates over morality, and these tools 
will be useful in examining contemporary religion and science.
Theology and philosophy are, in ideal form, not concerned with what the pub-
lic thinks, because the public may just be wrong, and the point is to lead people to 
the correct answer. However, in general it would be useful for theologians and phi-
losophers to be aware of the public’s views before they try to change these views. 
At a minimum, they need to be aware of the misperceptions the public holds and 
how far they have to go to get to the correct answer. For example, it is useful for 
Catholic theologians to know that their most observant members are actually quite 
heterodox regarding evolution, believing in the conservative Protestant version. 
For theological traditions like Protestantism where the individual believer is also 
a source of truth, the collected views of the members of a tradition could provide 
theological input to the theologians. Theology and philosophy should continue 
to try to integrate systemic knowledge structures, because that is what their fields 
are about. It is important to emphasize to their readers that their systemic view of 
knowledge is probably not held by average religious practitioners, and to be very 
clear when claims are about nature and when they are about morality.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR SCIENTIST S
Additional social science research on religion and science would be the most use-
ful for scientists. Scientists are aware that society—whether the scientists like it or 
not—can determine what the scientists do by either creating explicit public poli-
cies or more subtly by influencing government funding. Many scientists think that 
there is a Republican war on science, which means that one political party and its 
supporters are limiting the resources that flow to science and ignoring the infor-
mation it provides.4 Science is then inevitably political, and it would be extremely 
useful for scientists to have accurate information about the source of opposition 
they actually face. For example, if scientists continue to think that the Republican 
war on science is driven by conservative religious people—which is possibly 
true—they should know that it is unlikely driven by these religious people’s view 
of knowledge per se, but by morality. Scientists should acknowledge and deal with 
this moral difference to resolve this lack of support from the political system. That 
some Protestant fundamentalists do not believe scientists’ accounts of the age of 
the Earth really is not the problem, but pretending that it is is comforting for sci-
ence, because it keeps the debate on the scientists’ turf of facts. But, this comfort 
comes at the price of ultimately hurting science.
What is worse for science in the U.S. is that what I am calling the systemic 
knowledge conflict narrative is likely hurting scientists in the eyes of the public. 
The public is being told that they must, in the weak systemic knowledge conflict 
version, believe all scientific claims, even if irrelevant to their lives. For example, to 
believe in science, they have to believe in an ancient Earth. In the strong version, 
science requires metaphysical naturalism and atheism—God cannot exist. I am 
certainly not the first to suggest that promoting the idea of knowledge conflict is 
bad for science. Typical is eminent primatologist Frans de Waal, who writes:
Most Americans feel that the Bible is either an inspired text not intended to be taken 
literally or a book of legends and moral precepts. This is great to know for those try-
ing to get an evolutionary message across. The nonliteralist majority is (or should be) 
their target audience, since they are more likely to listen. Except, of course, if the dis-
cussion opener is a slap in the face. Unfortunately, all this talk about how science and 
religion are irreconcilable is not free of consequences. It tells religious people that, 
however open-minded and undogmatic they may be, worthy of science they are not. 
They will first need to jettison all beliefs held dear. I find the neo-atheist insistence 
on purity curiously religious. All that is lacking is some sort of baptism ceremony at 
which believers publicly repent before they join the “rational elite” of nonbelievers. 
Ironically, the last one to qualify would have been an Augustinian friar growing peas 
in a monastery garden.5
It is also likely that some of the moral agenda of some scientists hurt science. 
For example, consider attempts to have science set meaning for society. In Peter 
Harrison’s words, “In the twenty-first century, attempts to imbue science with 
166    Chapter Eight
quasi-religious significance play little role in routine scientific activities, but are 
common in some influential popular presentations of science, particularly among 
those who seek to promote the image of an essential antagonism between science 
and religion.”6 While more research is needed, the survey analysis in Chapter 7 
suggests that religious people have a particularly strong reaction against scien-
tists’ trying to determining meaning and direction for society. I suspect that the 
vast majority of practicing scientists do not want this role for their profession, so 
why have they allowed it to be seen as a part of the scientific agenda?
The analysis in previous chapters leads me to conclude that scientists should 
admit their own moral stance and engage with the religious public in moral debate. 
Consider climate change again. Conservative Protestants, and all the other reli-
gious groups I examine, do not seem to have religious motivations to not believe 
scientists, but rather political motivations.
Climate scientists obviously have a moral position on climate change. Yes, 
it is a highly consensual moral position—that we want to limit the suffering of 
humans—but it is a moral position nonetheless. I would bet that most climate sci-
entists are also concerned that the poor of the world will disproportionately suffer 
due to the actions of the wealthy who have created the problem in the first place. 
The current pope recently made a statement that accepted all of the science on 
global warming and then turned to morality—for example, that the people most 
negatively impacted by global warming will be the poorest.7 Mainline Protestants 
have long had similar views, and the National Association of Evangelicals takes a 
very similar stand.8 The climate science community and the largest religious tradi-
tions in the U.S. appear to be in moral agreement.
By explicitly turning to morality, scientists might be able to crack the real prob-
lem with climate change mitigation—the Republican party. Like it or not, most 
Americans probably view issues of intergenerational responsibility and the future 
of the species through a religious lens. Scientists could take components of the 
morality expressed by religious leaders, such as concern for the poor, and use this 
to facilitate the divorce of conservative Protestants from the Republican Party—at 
least on this issue. Groups like the Evangelical Environmental Network are work-
ing on exactly this project.9 But scientists will not be able to help facilitate this 
divorce if they imply that conservative Protestant religion somehow precludes 
believing scientific claims about global warming, or if scientists cannot be explicit 
about their own moral values.
Grabbing a different moral bull by the horns would also be useful to science. I 
can see why scientists and others are bothered by the propositional belief conflict 
that does exist. My research above suggests that the concern that not believing in 
Darwin means that people cannot become doctors is overblown. But, it is plausible 
that creationist activists are limiting the education of some children in the U.S. by 
stopping schools from effectively teaching scientific topics.
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If scientists simply acknowledged that many people have moral concerns about 
science, they could mitigate some conflict without having to take a moral posi-
tion themselves. For example, pretending that the debate about human origins is 
only about knowledge claims makes that debate go on and on, because the two 
“sides” are talking past each other. The courts have decided that science has greater 
authority, but that is not going to resolve any debate.
If scientists acknowledged that people have moral concerns about Darwin, they 
could at least join with the religious people to counter-program against these supposed 
moral impacts. For example, scientists could advocate detangling facts from morals. 
We can imagine science teachers talking about moral concerns with Darwinism, and 
teach that, for example, the survival of the fittest organism is not a moral model for 
human society. They could note that the role of random mutations in evolution does 
not mean that human morality is random. The moral lessons of Darwinism that con-
cern religious critics could be counteracted in schools without compromising the idea 
that Darwinism is true or violating the separation of church and state. Some scientists 
already do this moral deprogramming. For example, in his response to the movie 
advocating Intelligent Design titled Expelled, Richard Dawkins wrote:
Natural selection is a good object lesson in how NOT to organize a society. As I have 
often said before, as a scientist I am a passionate Darwinian. But as a citizen and a 
human being, I want to construct a society which is about as un-Darwinian as we 
can make it. I approve of looking after the poor (very un-Darwinian). I approve of 
universal medical care (very un-Darwinian). It is one of the classic philosophical fal-
lacies to derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is.’10
Scientists might think that such an exercise is a silly waste of time, because that is 
not how they view religion and science. Even if scientists think the concern that 
scientific research teaches morality is fanciful, it would benefit them to acknowl-
edge that others, rightly or wrongly, have these concerns. If Richard Dawkins can 
take the time to give these moral qualifiers, anybody can, given that Dawkins has 
been called the “high priest of the religion of scientism.”11
A FUTURE DEBATE
Religious groups and scientists are going to be in conflict with each other in the 
public sphere as long as some religious groups oppose the moral goals of scientists. 
In these debates, scientists may come to disagree with their religious opponents, 
and vice versa. That is fine and a part of democracy, but people should disagree 
with each other for the right reasons. I hope that after reading this book we can 
conclude that the religious opponents of the scientists are not “anti-science” but 
rather opposed to the moral values promoted by scientists. Our public debates 
would be better if the participants were clear about this fact.
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The final problem is where this moral deliberation between science and soci-
ety, including the religious groups in society, would occur. We might think that 
the field of bioethics would be such a location, but as I have argued elsewhere, 
beginning in the mid-1980s mainstream bioethics evolved into a field that sur-
reptitiously promoted the morality of scientists while claiming that this morality 
was that of the public.12 What is worse is that with the advent of the George W. 
Bush administration, the final polarization of the field occurred, as it split into 
liberal and conservative factions or, in the terms of one of the liberals, between 
those who “celebrate the transformative power of science and those who fear it.”13 
Religion became associated with conservative bioethics, and mainstream science 
participates in liberal bioethics, which still promotes the moral values of scientists. 
This is unfortunately not the venue of a conversation between religion and science 
about morality.
We are left with the public sphere—with the internet, opinion editorials, con-
ferences, and TV shows. Before this can effectively occur we need to better under-
stand the structural impediments to having a debate between religion and science 
in the public sphere. A recent study of religion and science debates in the public 
sphere by sociologist Michael Evans suggests a number of problems. At least in 
current media debates, when representatives of “science” and “religion” appear to 
discuss contentious issues, they do not engage in debate but just assert or advocate. 
Actual dialogue is a rare commodity.
The most severe problem for an actual debate between religion and science 
over morality is that the public thinks that “religion” means “religious right,” and 
the religious right is seen as violating the expectations of an appropriate debate in 
the public sphere. So, the liberal religious people who typically engage in debates 
with science are discredited along with the religious right. What is worse is that, 
for science, the dominant model of scientific credibility removes the credibility 
of science from any one scientist. Thus, science is more legitimate if it is faceless, 
without a representative, and the public then generally disapproves of scientists in 
public debates. How a debate without representatives could occur is unclear. Even 
worse for science is that people think that scientists are trying to cut off delibera-
tion by deploying expert knowledge.14 Thus, we need more social science research 
on the nature of debates in the public sphere before a productive debate about 
morality between science and religion can occur.
CALL FOR MORE RESEARCH
As I have written in previous pages, the claims in this book are somewhat tenta-
tive because most of the existing data on the relationship between religion and sci-
ence was designed while assuming the systemic knowledge conflict. I have tried to 
repurpose these data for my analyses. My point is to show enough disparate strands 
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of data to spur others to conduct more research in this area. For example, I pro-
posed a number of explanations for the existence of propositional belief conflict 
in Chapter 6, all of which would require more social science research. Much of the 
existing data is about knowledge claims and can then be, to some extent, repurposed 
to examine propositional conflict. The most pressing need in this area is further 
studies of the moral relationship between religion and science for the public, in par-
ticular the area of moral conflict. Examination of the moral values taught by religion 
is a recognizable field in social science, so I will focus my suggestions on a more het-
erodox call for a similar investigation of science. I see three primary areas of inquiry.
The Moral Values of Science
Religion and science are both institutions that exist to replicate certain ideas and 
practices. Both have either explicit or implicit moral values that are taught to those 
embedded in these institutions—and these moral values may be behind more 
 surface-level conflicts concerning beliefs about nature.
The first deeper institutional value of science that should be investigated to see 
if it actually exists among scientists—and if the public perceives it as well—is the 
aggressive attitude of science versus the more cautious approach of nonscientists. 
Science, at least in its cutting-edge forms, has a persistent “We know what is good 
for you, we know what is right, just get out of our way” attitude. As Wuthnow 
writes, in many people’s view: “Scientists are drunk on hubris, in it for the money 
or their own glory, and sadly incapable of any humility.” Wuthnow quotes C. P. 
Snow as writing that the scientific culture “is expansive, not restrictive, confident 
at the roots, the more confident after its bout of Oppenheimerian self-criticism, 
certain that history is on its side, impatient, intolerant.” Concerns remain that 
the “can-do attitude of science presumably overwhelms questions about deeper 
values.” 15
This “can-do attitude”—this “impatient, intolerant” view on “progress”—is likely 
a major cultural and moral divide with the rest of the population, and another rea-
son why the public thinks that scientists are promoting a morality different than the 
public’s morality. Scientists probably think that the public is far too cautious, and 
that if we had listened to public concerns about safety there would be no test tube 
babies or organ transplants, both of which occurred with only the dimmest under-
standing of what would happen. The public has a more cautious view, and this may 
be a trigger for public groups to engage in moral conflict with science.
A second institutional value to investigate is scientism, defined as “a matter of 
putting too high a value on natural science in comparison with other branches of 
learning or culture.”16 An extreme version of this idea is that the natural sciences are 
the only source of real knowledge. Poetry, literature, philosophy, and obviously reli-
gion would all be, at minimum, second-class ways of thinking, even for questions 
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that have nothing to do with the physical world, such as what our ethics should be. 
If scientists are explicitly or implicitly projecting this view and the public perceives 
it, I think this would again be another source of moral conflict with science.
A third and related potential source of moral conflict to investigate is the extent 
to which scientists look to science to set the goals for humanity. As noted pre-
viously, at various points in recent history prominent scientists and their allies 
have not wanted to be limited to investigate the world but have rather wanted to 
change it to be consistent with their own eschatological vision of human prog-
ress. For example, the eugenics movements of the twentieth century wanted to use 
science to improve the human species through selective breeding. In developing 
these movements, scientists often create idea systems that are structurally similar 
to religions. It would be good to see whether scientists approve of these attempts 
and if the public perceives scientists as trying to create a religion of science.
Fourth, and finally, research should try to enumerate the values forwarded by sci-
entists on some public issue, like embryonic stem cell research, and compare these 
to the values forwarded by the public. For example, I think that medical research 
scientists explicitly learn only two values from their scientific  training—the relief 
of suffering and the value of human understanding of the world. Individual sci-
entists may have additional values, but they did not learn these from institutional 
science. Religious people share these values, but probably have a number of addi-
tional ones. If this is true, then moral conflict will occur, because religious citizens 
are using moral values that scientists do not recognize. More research is necessary 
to determine whether this is really true. In all four of these open questions, what 
requires examination is not only whether scientists hold these views but whether 
the public sees the scientists as holding these views and whether this changes their 
orientation toward scientists in the public sphere.
The Morally Expressive Nature of Science and Technology
A second major area that needs more social science research is in the area of 
the morally expressive nature of scientific discoveries. As bioethicist Erik Parens 
summarizes, “Technology is value-laden and it shapes us in ways that usually 
elude our attention.” For example, no pregnant woman has to take the test for 
Down syndrome, but the existence of such a test has a moral message, that people 
may want to avoid having a baby with Down syndrome. Social pressures then 
emerge for its use and then, in Parens’ words, “the fact that a technology exists 
can swiftly, if imperceptibly, turn into an ethical obligation to use it for a specific 
purpose.”17
In a recent study, I examined belief in an extreme version of a biological defini-
tion of a human, where humans are biological machines defined by their DNA. I 
showed that among the public this view is associated with being less concerned 
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about human rights violations such as buying organs from poor people, not stop-
ping genocides, taking blood from prisoners against their will, and people commit-
ting suicide to save money for their families.18 This suggests that certain biological 
claims are expressive of a certain moral orientation toward people.
Again, the question is whether the knowledge and technology promoted by 
scientists really do teach the public a certain morality, as social scientists and 
humanists have long claimed.19 If so, this could be the source of a moral conflict 
between religion and science. Research is needed on a range of scientific claims 
and technologies to see whether they really do teach people a moral value, whether 
the public perceives this to be the case, and whether what is taught is at odds with 
what the public’s values are.
Moral Conflict Over Specific Scientific Experiments and Technologies
The third type of moral conflict where much more research is needed is in pub-
lic conflicts over specific scientific experiments and technologies, like embryonic 
stem cell research. It is extremely easy to show with public opinion data that the 
public is more opposed to embryonic research than are scientists. That is not the 
interesting question. The question is whether the religious public perceives “sci-
ence” to be behind calls for embryonic stem cell research and whether any dis-
agreement they have with science in this one area spills out into opposition to 
scientists’ involvement with other issues. Moreover, how does the public perceive 
scientific advocates of these technologies? Are they perceived as medical research-
ers focused on the relief of suffering—or as one of the negative Frankenstein-type 
figures so popular in our culture? A similar and interesting question would be 
what the public hears when it hears about a new technology, such as “gene edit-
ing” of human embryos. Does it attribute the morally contentious technology to 
scientists? If so, what do they perceive the values of these scientists to be, and do 
they perceive them as being in opposition to their own?
It has long been said that religion and science are the two great ways of under-
standing the world, and this view has justified the enormous energy that has been 
spent on the relationship between these two great institutions. I would still say 
that religion and science are the two great ways of understanding the world, but 
by understanding I mean the relationships between humans in the world and the 
relationship between humans and nature. These relations are the stuff of morality, 
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In a time when conservative politicians challenge the irrefutability of scientific findings 
such as climate change, it is more important than ever to understand the conflict at 
the heart of the “religion vs. science” debates unfolding in the public sphere. In this 
groundbreaking work, John H. Evans reveals that, with a few limited exceptions, even 
the most conservative religious Americans accept science’s ability to make factual 
claims about the world. However, many religious people take issue with the morality 
implicitly promoted by some forms of science. Using clear and engaging scholarship, 
Evans upends the prevailing notion that there is a fundamental conflict over the way 
that scientists and religious people make claims about nature and argues that only by 
properly understanding moral conflict between contemporary religion and science will 
we be able to contribute to a more productive interaction between these two great 
institutions.
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of knowledge to that of moral value. He is by far the most sophisticated of the sociolo-
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